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ABSTRACT 
This research seeks to understand the political, economic, geographical and cultural 
discussions in the British media representation of Turkey’s bid to join the European 
Union (EU). The idiosyncratic aspect of the topic is that both Turkey and the British 
media have a special relationship with the EU.  
Turkey is the only inveterate EU membership candidate. No country has waited at the 
front door of the EU as long as Turkey yet. There are different reasons behind this and 
they make the issue interesting to contemplate. In addition to Turkey’s different status 
compared to the EU membership candidacy processes of other countries, the thesis 
also takes into account the different and awkward relationship between the EU and 
the UK, and inevitably the British media. Therefore, the analytical framework of the 
thesis draws on the notion of ‘a positive Other’ while explaining the media 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid. The research also highlights the ‘essentialist’ and 
‘functionalist’ approaches in its attempt to explain the differences within the EU in 
understanding the fundamentals of the EU and the view about Turkish membership. 
The research sought to explore how Turkey’s EU bid was represented in the British 
media by focusing on one main research question, namely, ‘How was Turkey’s EU bid 
represented in the British media?’ In order to answer this question in a systematic way, 
the study employs a triangulation of different methods. In the empirical chapters, the 
study first looks at the coverage of different important periods in Turkey-EU relations 
between 1999 and 2006. The news items published in these periods by six news 
organisations from the British media are analysed by using quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis. Secondly, the thesis presents an analysis of how the coverage was 
produced. The analysis is based on the semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted 
with the journalists who work, or had worked, for the British media and who had 
published news items about Turkey-EU relations. The data gathered from the 
interviews are presented by employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical 
model. In the concluding chapter of the thesis, the findings from the research are 
linked to the notion of ‘a positive Other’. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“[He] spent the 1986-1987 academic year at the  
University of Manchester, U.K. as a research fellow.  
On one occasion he asked a faculty member there who  
taught Politics in the Middle East, what kind of  
material on Turkey he uses in his course. The response  
he received was, “Well, in my course we don’t cover  
Turkey; after all Turkey is not really a Middle  
Eastern country.” A few days later he directed the  
same question to another colleague who offered a  
course on European politics. He again received  
a “really” answer” (Heper, 2004: 1). 
 
Turkey has been trying to become part of the EU for more than 50 years. Important 
events have occurred in the last decade and Turkey finally started membership 
negotiations1 in 2005. Yet seeking a membership while being an historical Other to 
Europe (Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Delanty, 1995; Neumann, 1999) makes Turkish 
accession to the EU a different case compared to the accession process of former 
candidate countries from Middle and Eastern Europe. Thus, in addition to economic 
and political discussions, Turkish membership of the EU is a significant historical and 
cultural challenge for European politicians and public. According to McLaren’s (2007: 
273) study, EU citizens hesitate about the cultural differences of Turkey more than its 
economic and political incompatibilities. This means that even though Turkey can 
reach a sufficient economic and political level to join the EU, its membership bid may 
be blocked because of an essentialist approach towards the Turkish issue. Therefore, in 
addition to its efforts to reach the written EU standards, Turkey also has to convince 
opinion leaders such as journalists, commentators, parliamentarians, and people from 
                                                          
1
 The membership negotiations are about adopting the EU acquis communautaire. Throughout the 
negotiation process, Turkish national law will import almost 80.000 pages of EU rules (Grabbe, 2005: 
71).  
2 
 
the business circles of the EU, and through them the public at large, of the merits of its 
case (Grabbe, 2005). 
 
Although the European Commission manages the membership negotiations with 
Turkey, it is argued that the final accession can be completed only with the approval of 
EU citizens. It was already decided in France and Austria that Turkey’s full membership 
could be accepted if citizens of both countries say ‘yes’ to Turkish membership in a 
possible referendum. Even though the same discussion has not taken place in several 
other EU Member States such as the UK, Spain and Italy, “*…+ the seemingly pro-
Turkish elites [in these countries] might somehow be forced to acknowledge public 
opinion when the day comes for the final decision” (Aksoy, 2009: 471).  
 
This study argues that the media are one of the most important contributors to the 
formation of knowledge regarding foreign countries and accordingly international 
politics (see Zhang, 2011). “*…+ *O+ur views of the world, and resulting actions, [are] 
moulded by our predominant source of information: the mass media” (Shoemaker and 
Reese, 1996: 59). For most EU citizens, therefore, the only way to access information 
concerning EU affairs, including Turkey-EU relations, is the media.  
 
In this respect, it can be argued that the media coverage of Turkey’s EU bid is 
influential on the public, the elite, and the politicians (see Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 11). 
Therefore, this study argues that if Turkey and its people want to get support for their 
EU bid from EU citizens, they must first understand the nature and extent of the 
coverage of Turkey-EU relations in the EU media and the nature of its production. It 
must then develop a strategy to deal with the knowledge gained. This study is an 
 3 
 
attempt at providing research findings about the first task at hand, even though it does 
not focus on developing the strategies. 
 
With the above presumption concerning the importance of the media, the study seeks 
to examine the British coverage about Turkey-EU relations and how the coverage is 
produced. Therefore, the main research question of the thesis is: ‘How was Turkey’s 
EU bid represented in the British media?’ By asking ‘how’, the question refers to both 
the content and the production of news items. The verb ‘to represent’ illustrates the 
way Turkey and its relations with the EU were portrayed in a selection of British news 
media. In order to substantiate the answer to the main research question, the study 
also seeks to answer 11 supplementary questions which will be described in the 
chapters where the empirical data are presented (Chapter 6, 7, 8, 9). 
 
1.1. Research framework 
National news media are still more important than pan-European media (e.g. 
Euronews, Financial Times Europe, International Herald Tribune, European Voice) in 
forming public opinion within the EU (de Vreese, 2001: 287). Thus, research on each 
European country’s news organisations, instead of pan-European media, could present 
more reliable data concerning how EU affairs are discussed in EU Member States. As 
the UK is one of the “Big Three” powers of the EU, together with Germany and France 
(Anastasakis, 2004: 10), its domestic media can be seen as some of the most important 
across the EU. Even though the relationship of the UK and its media with the EU is 
evaluated as awkward (see Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Marcussen and Roscher, 
2000: 345; Dougal, 2003; Öktem, 2005), the UK can still be accepted as a significant 
Member State of the Union. In Tony Blair’s leadership, the UK played an especially 
4 
 
active role during the discussions of Turkey-EU relations. Accordingly, the British media 
can be accepted as influential on the EU political agenda as the news items published 
in the UK are often quoted in many other countries due to the importance of British 
politics and the leading position of English as the lingua franca of the EU (Corcoran and 
Fahy, 2009: 103). For instance, with the help of English, it is easier to write news 
reports about what the British media outlets said regarding the EU agenda. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the news items on Turkey's EU accession published in the UK may 
influence the editors of other EU Member States’ newspapers, and accordingly the 
wider European public sphere. 
 
The thesis answers the main and supplementary research questions by looking at the 
news items2 published in the British media which covered six important events 
between December 1999 and November 2006. These seven years can be evaluated as 
the period which spanned the start and the end of intensive relations between Turkey 
and the EU and accordingly the rise and fall of media interest in Turkey’s EU bid. The 
research sample consists of five prominent newspapers and a news website3. These 
are: Financial Times (the FT), The Guardian, the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, The Daily 
Telegraph and BBC News Online. The sample for the news production analysis consists 
of the journalists who had written the news items that are analysed in the study. The 
research was conducted by a triangulation of three methods which are: quantitative 
and qualitative content analysis on news items, and in-depth interviews with the 
journalists. 
 
                                                          
2
 The research sample consists of reports, commentaries, leaders, reviews and analyses. Therefore, the 
texts in the sample will usually be described as ‘news items’.  
3
 As BBC News Online is also included in the sample, the total sample is called ‘the British media’ instead 
of ‘the British newspapers’ throughout the thesis. 
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The analyses draw on the analytical framework of the thesis which identifies the 
special relationship between the UK and the EU, and accordingly between the British 
media and the EU. Therefore, the differences between the views of the UK and other 
EU Member States on the Turkish issue are taken into account while explaining the 
analytical framework. It is claimed that even though the British media still underline 
Turkey’s differences compared to the media in other EU Member States, these 
differences are not represented as disadvantages but as an opportunity for the EU and 
the UK. Therefore, it is stressed that the discussions about Turkey’s EU bid in the 
British coverage are not underpinned by the characteristics of an Orientalist discourse. 
For this reason, the thesis argues that Turkey’s media representation concerning being 
part of the European Self or being the European Other cannot be explained without 
utilising the notion of ‘a positive Other’ (see Neumann and Welsh, 1991).  
 
While using the notion of ‘a positive Other’, the research also takes into account the 
essentialist and functionalist approaches which are embedded in the news coverage. It 
is immensely important to underline that positioning Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ or 
‘the Other’ depends significantly on how one envisions the EU. Therefore, 
differentiating these two understandings of the EU is useful in analysing Turkey’s EU 
bid in the British media as it helps to better comprehend the special relationship of the 
UK and its media with the EU (see Lazarou, 2010 for a specific discussion on essentialist 
and constructivist approaches concerning European identity and how much Turkey 
internalized it). It should be explained how these different approaches -the essentialist 
and the functionalist- are understood in this thesis and in the context of media 
representation of Turkey-EU relations. According to Kösebalaban, 
6 
 
“Today, there are two opposing perspectives in Europe on Turkey: Turkey as an 
integral part of Europe, and Turkey as the essential historical other of Europe. 
Underlying these two perspectives is the debate on the definition of European 
integration. Is European integration based on a single civilization, defined as 
European civilization and marked by distinct European cultural heritage and 
values? Or is Europe based on common ideals and a common destiny, a union 
that members of different civilizations can join on equal terms?” (2007: 101) 
 
Based on the first question of Kösebalaban above, the essentialist approach argues 
that some characteristics of Europe are the core of Europe and Europeanness, and that 
they are fundamental and unchanging. It follows that those characteristics of Turkey 
that cannot be changed -its essentialist characteristics- such as geography, culture, 
religion and history, comprise most of the essentialist arguments regarding Turkey’s EU 
membership. Therefore, 
“*…+ while the logic of raison d’état, through diplomatic and economic contact, 
extended the boundaries of the European international system to encompass 
‘the Turk’, the prevalence of the logic of culture made his [sic] status 
ambiguous from a societal point of view” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 348). 
 
Even though the essentialist approach in EU affairs, including the discussions on 
culture, is not observable in the British Conservative Party’s politics, it is apparent in 
the right wing politics of continental Europe. Former French President Giscard 
d’Estaing’s comment (BBC News Online, 2002) that Turkish accession would be the end 
of Europe, and François Bayrou’s remark on the importance of “the legacy of the 
Rome–Athens–Jerusalem triptych’ *…+” (Aissaoui, 2007: 9) for Europe are significant 
examples of the essentialist approach. That is, it establishes characteristics that of 
themselves make Turkey’s accession impossible since these cannot be changed. 
 
On the other hand, and in the context of the second question in the excerpt from 
Kösebalaban (2007), the functionalist view considers the EU at the level of economy 
and democracy. In this view, the EU is not a Christian club and its characteristics are 
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universal. Therefore, the expectations of the functionalist approach from Turkey are 
not about culture, religion or geography but they have more to do with human rights, 
democracy, economy, geo-strategic considerations, and coming to terms with the 
problems of history (Tekin, 2010; Ramm, 2009). This means that the functionalist 
approach sees the problems between Turkey and the EU as alterable if both sides 
persist in finding solutions. 
 
All the points illustrated above will be further explained and discussed in detail 
throughout the thesis within the structure which is summarised below. 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of 10 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis by highlighting the 
importance and objectives of the study, together with a brief explanation of the 
research question, sampling, method and analytical framework. In Chapter 2, the 
study looks at the historical background of Turkey-EU relations. Even though the Turks’ 
relations with Europe have a long history, the chapter mainly focuses on the period 
from 1959 until today. Chapter 3 seeks to articulate the literature written on Turkey-
EU relations. As the literature consists of numerous publications dealing with different 
aspects of these relations, the chapter only focuses on the events, terms and concepts 
which are related to this study’s research questions and accordingly, the research 
sample. In the same chapter’s second section, specific literature on the media 
representation of Turkey-EU relations is investigated. The section attempts to utilise all 
studies on the issue which were published since 2001. Chapter 4 argues that there is 
not one type of Other and the Other does not have to be an enemy of the Self. The 
relationship between the Self and the Other can be based on differences which have 
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several degrees of, rather than a complete, disparity. Therefore, the historical 
Orientalist approach is not valid in explaining the British media’s representation of 
Turkey’s EU bid. Thus, instead of drawing fully on the Orientalist discourse and 
presenting it as a fundamental reason for Turkey’s representation in the British media, 
the chapter employs the notion of ‘a positive Other’. Furthermore, the same chapter 
puts forth different aspects of why the British Government and the British media are in 
favour of Turkey and why the notion of ‘a positive Other’ could be suitable in order to 
conceptualise the representation that is under scrutiny. After presenting the analytical 
framework of the thesis, Chapter 5 demonstrates the methodological structure. It 
claims that the study needs triangulation in order to make the findings more reliable. 
Then, the chapter discusses the features of an ideal media research methodology. 
Later, the same chapter elaborates on the sampling process and how each method is 
applied to the data in the thesis. 
 
After Chapter 5, the thesis focuses on the analysis of its own empirical material. In 
Chapter 6, the outcomes of the quantitative content analysis of news items are 
illustrated by using tables and comments regarding the figures. The numerical findings 
on various points feed into the following chapter. Chapter 7 presents the results of the 
qualitative content analysis on the coverage. In contrast to the previous chapter, the 
analysis is based on the latent meaning which takes into account the context in the 
news items. The main discussions in the chapter concentrate on the representation of 
Turkey as a European Other and as part of the European Self. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 
exhibit the findings from the fieldwork on the production of news items concerning 
Turkey’s EU bid. As investigating the news production process is a complex issue, the 
two chapters about the interview data present the findings by a ‘level of analysis’ and 
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give the main importance to the individual level. Chapter 8 begins with an explanation 
about Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model and then attempts to present 
the findings by using the individual level of the model. Chapter 9 draws on the model 
underlined in the previous chapter; however, this time two other levels of the model 
and their influence on the individual level are examined. Finally, Chapter 10 includes a 
general summary of the thesis and a discussion on the findings by connecting data with 
the analytical framework of the thesis. The discussions chiefly seek to answer its main 
research question. Furthermore, the chapter presents its contributions to the existing 
literature, explains its limitations and gives some suggestions for future studies. The 
chapter ends with a brief discussion of the recent state of Turkey-EU relations and 
some recommendations concerning how Turkey can contribute towards better 
coverage of Turkey-EU relations. 
 
In summary, the study derives its main significance from its interest in the media 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid. The research aims to put forth the general 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media. The focus is mainly on the 
overall representation instead of a media outlet specific analysis or detailed 
comparisons between the news organisations of the research sample. Apart from an 
examination of the media content, the study is also important as it seeks to illuminate 
a long-term and immense challenge for Turkish politics. Becoming an official EU 
membership candidate and finally starting membership negotiations are some of the 
major events in Turkish politics in the last decade (Keyman, 2006: 211). At the 
moment, even though Turkey-EU relations are not as significant as they were in the 
first half of the 2000s, it can be argued that the research investigates a series of 
historic events about Turkey’s EU adventure which is undeniably crucial in the long 
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history of Turkish westernisation and Turkey’s contemporary politics. Furthermore, the 
research is not only interested in the news coverage concerning Turkey’s EU bid as 
several studies were in the past (inter alia Negrine et al., 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bischof et 
al., 2010). The study also examines how this coverage was produced by looking at 
journalists’ views on Turkey’s EU bid per se and on news production regarding Turkey-
EU relations. No previous study about Turkey-EU relations has focused on journalists in 
the same way. Moreover, by means of a focus on Turkey’s EU bid, the study debates 
the different understandings of the EU (e.g. functionalist). This gives an opportunity for 
the thesis to elucidate the relations between the UK and the EU, and accordingly the 
British media and the EU while analysing the Turkish issue. As will be explained in 
detail in the Analytical Framework Chapter, without taking into account the special 
relationship between the UK and the EU, it would be less reliable to conceptualise the 
media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British context.  
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As most news items in the research sample mention some of the historical events in 
Turkey-EU relations (e.g. the Copenhagen Summit), presenting the historical 
developments behind Turkey’s bid to join the EU is crucial. Therefore, this chapter 
provides a summary of how Turkey-EU (previously EEC4) relations developed from 
1959 to the first decade of the 21st century. The period prior to this will be presented 
in this section, a short historical survey of Turkish westernisation in the Ottoman 
Empire and the early Republican period. This historical background is sometimes useful 
to comprehend the contemporary relations between Turkey and Europe. Following 
this, the chapter looks at the political problems which postponed Turkish accession to 
the EU and other political events which moved Turkey much closer to the Western 
world between 1959 and 1999. Finally, the third section deals with what has occurred 
in Turkey-EU relations since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey became an 
official EU membership candidate. This final section has a special importance for the 
thesis as it includes the events which constitute the research sample of this study. 
 
2.2. Turkey’s journey towards the West 
Turks have been moving in the direction of the west since 500s BC. They started their 
journey as nomad tribes around the Altay Mountains between the Gobi Desert and 
                                                          
4
 The European Union had been called the European Economic Community (EEC) before the Maastricht 
Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993 (The European Union Website, 2009). 
12 
 
west Siberia (Karlsson, 2007: 32). This physical movement from the East to the West 
changed their culture, religion, language and even appearance (Kongar, 2007). When 
they arrived in Asia Minor, they dwelled first in the eastern realms of the Byzantine 
Empire. In 1071, an important victory against the Emperor Romanus Diogenes at the 
Manzikert Battle opened the gates of the Anatolian western flank to the Turks (Morris, 
2006: 14). Then, in 1354, for the first time the Ottomans passed into Europe across the 
Dardanelles where ancient Greece and Rome lay (Morris, 2006: 15). Edirne 
(Adrianople) was taken in 1361 and later on it became the capital of the Empire until 
the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 (Ahmad, 1993: 17). Following this event, the 
Ottomans continued to proceed westwards. The furthest west they reached was the 
borders of Vienna in Europe, and Algeria in North Africa. After reaching this zenith, the 
Ottomans started to lose power and “*t+he themes of decline and corruption became 
much more pronounced in the 18th century *…+” (Çırakman, 2001: 51). While the 
Ottomans were losing economic and military strength, Western Europe, on their door 
step, was continuing its rise in philosophy, arts, science, economy and military power 
(see Ahmad, 1993: 21).  
“The defeat of ‘the Turk’ at the hands of superior European military and 
economic might had necessitated a grudging self-examination on the part of 
Muslim leaders and intellectuals. The humiliation of military defeat was 
aggravated by accompanying perceptions of arrested cultural development. 
Europe was no longer considered an inferior entity to be converted, but a 
military, economic and political giant to be emulated” (Neumann and Welsh, 
1991: 344). 
 
Following the Western advancement, modernisation of the Army became a necessity. 
However, the reforms “*…+ required fundamental changes in society itself and the 
conservatives, supported by the Janissary army and the ulema, refused to go along 
with reform which would undermine their own position” (Ahmad, 1993: 22). 
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Therefore, the Janissaries had to be dissolved as a prerequisite for modernisation of 
the Army and other necessary changes in society. 
“Mahmud II (1808–1839), who succeeded Selim, the reforming sultan who had 
been overthrown and executed by the Janissaries, seized the opportunity to 
crush them, replacing them with his new-style army. The conservatives were in 
disarray once their armed protectors had been eliminated. The reformers were 
now able to restructure the state *…+” (Ahmad, 1993: 25). 
 
Finally, the Turks’ physical movement to the West became a state led 
modernisation/westernisation process and this made an enormous impact on Turkish 
culture, identity and relations with other people in the world. In the new 
circumstances, the reforms covertly referred to the “*…+ Ottoman failure and 
inferiority, a mirror image of European success and superiority” (Eldem, 2010: 27). 
Therefore, the West became 
“*…+ the inspiration, often the motivator, behind the efforts undertaken by the 
Ottoman rulers to modernize their state. Western-inspired reforms were 
introduced as part of the Empire's effort to survive and in time accounted for a 
far-reaching transformation of state and society” (Kushner, 1997: 231). 
 
By this means, “Turkey has been one of those exceptional countries that started to 
transform its identity from an Eastern to a Western *…+” (Heper, 2004: 2). The Turkish 
desire for westernisation was not a colonial story but the Turks’ “own volition” (Heper, 
2004: 2). Even though it was a top down process, the projects for change were 
ultimately decided by Turkish leaders and intellectuals who thought that 
westernisation would be the best solution for Turkey to reach the level of modern 
societies. Even though there is no doubt that the inspiration for modernisation came 
from foreign ideologies (Lewis, 2002: 481), Eurocentric considerations are insufficient 
to understand the change in the Turkish state and society. It can be argued that, by 
and large, the interior problems and internal dynamics in the Ottoman Empire and 
later in Modern Turkey led the demand for change.  
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Following the initiatives in the late Ottoman Empire period5, Turkish westernisation 
became more explicit and more pronounced after the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923.  
“During the past hundred years of Turkish history, a process of defensive 
modernization was implemented, based on the view that in order to be strong 
against the West one needs to adopt its civilization, getting rid of one’s own 
tradition and moral codes. For self-empowerment, a comprehensive 
Westernization process was necessary” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 88). 
 
For a complete transformation, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
founder of modern Turkey, most institutions of the Ottoman Empire were abolished 
(Massicard, 2005: 54). Immense changes happened in a limited time and these caused 
a ‘Kemalist historical leucotomy’ (cutting one part of the brain) in the society (Fuller, 
2008: 12). The Turkish Republican identity emerged by forgetting the Ottomans’ 
Islamic past, weakening relations with the Middle East and choosing modernisation via 
westernisation. Therefore, it can be argued that the new Turkish identity was born by 
othering the Middle East and what is left from the Ottoman heritage. This led to the 
formation of Turkish Orientalism towards non-Turkish Muslims.6 According to Eldem 
(2010), the difference between Ottoman Orientalism (from the mid-19th century on) 
                                                          
5 Akyol (2009: 183) argues that the reason behind Turkish modernisation and Turkey’s better democracy 
compared to other countries in the Islamic world is not because the early Republican period created 
modern Turkey ex nihilo. He argues “*…+ it was in fact the Ottoman legacy that gave rise to both Atatürk 
and modern Turkey. The Kemalist period was undoubtedly a leap forward in several respects, but it was 
preceded and made possible by a rich heritage of Ottoman modernisation” (Akyol, 2009: 183). 
6
 A similar othering process from centre to periphery, especially towards the Arabs, happened in the late 
Ottoman Empire period. Eldem states 
“The point was to dissociate the term ‘Ottoman’ from the notion of ‘Oriental’; after all, the 
Ottomans were perfectly conscious that their Christian compatriots were much less targeted by 
Western Orientalism. The precondition, then, was to find an Oriental Ottoman on whom 
European scorn would be deflected. To some, like Osman Hamdi Bey, who lived in the ivory 
tower of his studio and his museum and frequently ‘played’ Oriental, that would be pretty 
much all the rest of the population; most, however, would have to be more specific and direct 
their attention towards the savage Bedouin, the uncouth Turkish peasant or the unruly Kurd. 
Not surprisingly, the system worked pretty well. By creating the categories of the civilised 
Ottoman and the savage Oriental, most members of the elite made peace with an ideology that 
had been originally designed against them” (Eldem, 2010: 28; also see Makdisi, 2002). 
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and Turkish Orientalism (in 1930s) is that Turkish Orientalism was in an extreme 
fashion. He argues that it was even similar to Western anti-Turkish Orientalism. 
Therefore, Eldem claims that “[i]n fact, the Kemalist establishment agreed with every 
point of Western Orientalism, as long as it concerned the Arabs, the Kurds, the 
Ottomans; in short, anybody but the Turks” (2010: 29). 
 
“In embarking on a process of Westernization, the new Turkish regime saw the social 
and political influence of Islam as its most significant challenge to establish for itself a 
political hegemony and associated it with backwardness (irtica)” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 
89).  Therefore, secularisation was also an important step for Turkish Republican style 
modernisation and its attempts to be segregated from the Muslim world. On 10th April 
1928, the Turkish Parliament deleted the clause "The religion of the Turkish state is 
Islam" and secular Turkey was officially born (Lewis, 2002: 276). The purpose of this 
amendment was not demolishing religion but to decrease the importance of it in 
people's daily life (Lewis, 2002: 412). The policy was based on limiting religion to 
worship and segregating it from politics. However, in reality, the state became 
powerful over religion by restraining the religious institutions under the control of “the 
Republican bureaucratic structure” (Criss, 2008: 75).  
 
During the same period, Turkish westernisation was performed by direct changes in 
public life. The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished in 1922 and the dynasty was 
banished. The Caliphate and the Islamic courts were abrogated in 1924 (Criss, 2008: 
75). Following that, the western hat instead of the fez was welcomed7, the Gregorian 
                                                          
7
 Wearing a western style hat is compulsory in Turkey since the Hat Law came into force in 1925 (Turkish 
Ministry of Justice, 2012) http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/389.html 
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calendar was adopted, the Swiss Civil Law, Italian Penal Code and French 
Administrative Law were taken as references while preparing the new legal system 
(Karlsson, 2007: 50). Besides, the Latin officially replaced the Arabic alphabet in 
November 1928 (Lewis, 2002: 433). Accordingly, the next generations lost connection 
with the Ottoman literature and became unaware of their entire historical heritage. 
This was not only due to the alphabet change but a revolution in language also came 
into force. Especially in 1933-1934, many Arabic and Persian words were excluded 
from Turkish and replaced by 'pure Turkish' words or words of European origin (Lewis, 
2002: 434). During the same period, women’s suffrage was granted, having a surname 
became compulsory, and Sunday was accepted as the holiday instead of Friday.  
 
Even though Atatürk’s project of Turkish modernisation originates from Western 
values, Turkish foreign policy cannot be evaluated as pro-western in the first two 
decades of the Republican period (Kushner, 1997: 231). As a result, this caused an 
inward-looking country with a neutral foreign policy orientation. However, there was a 
consistent aspiration that  
“*…+ the Turks could, should and would become members of the civilized 
western world. In the post-Kemalist years there have been significant strides 
forward in this direction and both foreign policy and cultural orientation have 
converged and fed each other. *…+ Turkey adopted a multi-party system, and 
demonstrated a strong resolve to abide by western democratic rules” (Kushner, 
1997: 231).  
 
Following the end of WWII, Turkey ended its neutrality in relations with the Western 
bloc, Germany, and the Soviets (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 10). Ankara moved much 
closer to the Western world and was invited to the United Nations founding 
conference in the US (Mango, 2004: 37). In August 1949, just a few months after the 
foundation of the Council of Europe, Turkey became a member of the organisation 
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along with Greece (Lewis, 2002: 313). Following this, by fighting together with the US 
and the UN allies in the Korean War, Turkey came closer to joining NATO (Bilgin, 2003: 
348). In this period, the Soviet threat on the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and Turkey’s 
north-eastern cities Kars and Ardahan motivated Turkey to approach the Western 
world more (Fuller, 2008: 76). Finally, in 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO, 
again at the same time as Greece. This gave Turkey the role of a front line state against 
the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. 
 
2.3. Turkey’s EU perspective: 1959-1999 
Turkey guaranteed its place in the Western bloc after taking France's side in its war 
against Algeria in mid-1950s (Dismorr, 2008: 37). Having been a member of most US 
and Western Europe led organisations, there was one more step left to gain full 
attachment to the Western world (Aksoy, 2009: 470). This was membership of the 
newly established EEC. In the circumstances of 1950s, Turkey’s bid to join the EEC was 
not only related to the economy or westernisation. It was also connected to Greek 
foreign policy. Birand (1978: 52 cited in Arikan, 2008: 57) argues that Turkey was afraid 
of Greek's close relationship with Europe because this could be used in the reciprocal 
disputes of Turks and Greeks. The main aim of Turkish foreign policy at that time was 
to be represented wherever Greece was. The Turkish Government had been planning 
to become a member of the EEC before Greece joined because Greek membership 
would present a big veto risk for Turkey in the future. Therefore, the first application 
on the 1st August 1959 was made hurriedly. The leading party members or the public 
were not sufficiently informed about this speedy application which was an entirely 
elite initiative (Ugur, 2006: 86-88).  
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The Ankara Agreement 
Even though the 1960 coup slowed down the process, the environment of the Cold 
War period helped Turkey to approach an association agreement with the EEC 
(Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 29). At the time when the Ankara Agreement (association 
agreement) was signed on the 12th September 1963, the EEC Commissioner, Walter 
Hallstein, said that Turkey was part of Europe. This was exactly what the Turkish 
Government had expected to hear (Dismorr, 2008: 38) because for the Turks, an 
association agreement with the EEC also meant being recognised as a European state 
(Arikan, 2008: 51). The agreement foresaw a step by step integration which referred to 
preparatory and transitional stages, a customs union and full membership (Littoz-
Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 2).  
 
Apart from the competition with Greece, Turkey’s expectations from the EEC were 
almost the same issues which are also expressed today: The EEC could bring Turkey 
many political and economic benefits; it could encourage the continuity of Turkish 
modernisation; and it could reduce the effect of nationalists, Islamists and populists in 
Turkish politics (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 24). Consequently, Turkish politicians 
were satisfied by the Ankara Agreement as it clearly pointed to Turkey's full 
membership in the future (Arikan, 2008: 60). The association became robust by signing 
an additional protocol in 1970 which became effective in 1973. By means of the 
Additional Protocol, the road map to a customs union was prepared (Littoz-Monnet 
and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 2). 
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Another Coup in 1980 
During the 1970s, the Cyprus issue was one of the biggest headaches for Turkey. The 
Turkish military operation of the island in 1974 created significant problems between 
Turkey and the international community, including Europe (see Chapter 3, page 34). 
Moreover, in the same period, Turkey had serious internal clashes between the 
supporters of the political right and political left. The tension caused bloodshed on the 
streets, especially among university students. On 12th September 1980, Turkish Armed 
Forces seized control of the Government and dissolved the parliament. Predictably, 
these events blocked Turkey's integration to Europe (Dismorr, 2008: 39). At the 
beginning of the coup process, the EU's reaction was not very strong until political 
parties were shut down, former prime ministers were arrested and human rights 
abuse increased (Kaleağası, 2006: 286). Following these events, the EEC withdrew its 
diplomatic relations with Ankara. European countries started to complain about the 
number of Turkish asylum-seekers who were coming to Western Europe. In October 
1980, Turkish passport holders lost their visa-free travel right to most Western 
European countries (Özkan, 2007: 412). Turkish membership became impossible for 
the foreseeable future, at least until the military presence had been removed from the 
Government (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 2). 
 
On 23rd October 1985, the European Parliament asserted some conditions concerning 
human rights in order to normalise the relations (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 30). 
Thanks to the Turkish style of coup d'état, the military government did not last long 
and the relations with the EEC were normalised by civil governments. In this respect, 
Lewis indicates that the army coups in Turkey are different to other young 
democracies. Interventions by the Turkish Army in politics have always resulted in 
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them leaving the place to civilians - at least officially - after having provided peace 
within the country (Lewis, 2002: xi). 
 
Full Membership Application in 1987 
More than 20 years after the Association Agreement was signed, Turkey started to 
prepare an application for its full membership (Arikan, 2008: 70). In this period, the EU 
was in a deepening integration process and for that reason Turkey was afraid its 
membership bid might be too late. In addition, Turkey had just appointed a civilian 
government. This could be evaluated in a similar way to the situation in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal where army coup periods had been experienced and which subsequently 
delayed the EEC membership of these countries (Arikan, 2008: 71). Finally, Turkey was 
able to apply for a full membership in 1987. The answer of the EEC came after two 
years - Turkey's application was rejected due to its political and economic 
circumstances (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 31). After receiving the rejection, 
Adnan Kahveci, the then Turkish finance minister, said that Turkey’s aim was to get 
attention from foreign investors and show them that Turkey wanted to be part of 
Europe (Mango, 2004: 89). 
 
Big Changes in Membership Conditions: The Copenhagen Criteria 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, most of the ex-communist countries in Middle and 
Eastern Europe were waiting to integrate with the EU. However, the membership 
qualifications of the EU, which were mainly based on Birkelbach report and the 
establishing treaty of the EEC, needed to be amended. Thus, the European Council 
decided on the Copenhagen Criteria in June 1993 (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 33). 
It was determined that firstly, a country should fulfil the political criteria, and that was 
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the main pre-condition in order to start accession negotiations. Secondly, compliance 
with the economic criteria was to be a requirement for full membership of the EU 
(Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 3). The announcement of the Copenhagen 
Criteria increased the ex-communist Eastern European countries’ motivation for EU 
membership.  
 
A customs union with the EU 
The rejection in 1987 did not completely shut the doors to Turkey (Bryce, 2009b: 174). 
While the Eastern European countries were becoming closer to Brussels, Turkey 
concentrated on a customs union with the EU which was less complicated than full 
membership and could be achieved in a short period. The then Turkish Prime Minister 
Tansu Çiller thought that a customs union could ease the challenge of full membership 
(Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 35). Conversely, on the EU side, there was an 
expectation that a customs union might satisfy Turks and for that reason the Turkish 
pressure on the EU for full membership might decrease (Bryce, 2009b: 174). Therefore, 
right at the beginning, the EU emphasised that a successful application for a customs 
union was not directly related to full membership (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 
35).  
 
The negotiations for a customs union were also problematic. The Turkish Parliament 
needed to change 14 articles of the ‘army made’ 1983 Turkish Constitution in order to 
make it correspond with European values regarding human rights and democracy. 
Meanwhile, Greece resisted the Turkish bid for a customs union. However, when the 
EU accepted the start of membership negotiations with Cyprus, Greeks stopped their 
resistance. In the end, a customs union with Turkey began on the 1st January 1996 
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(Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 36). Excluding the microstates in Europe (e.g. 
Andorra), this made Turkey the only country in the world which is outside the EU but 
part of a customs union. 
 
The Luxembourg Summit in 1997 
The Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 was a real disappointment for 
Turkey. The European Council revealed that the membership negotiations were going 
to start with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. 
Another group of countries from Central and Eastern Europe were also offered the 
same right when they fulfilled the political and economic criteria (Hülsse, 1999: 15). 
Turkey reacted harshly to its exclusion from the list. The then Turkish Prime Minister 
Mesut Yılmaz said "[t]here will not be a political dialogue between Turkey and the 
European Union" (James, 1997). Turkey even intimidated Europe by talking about 
annexing the Turkish sector of Cyprus if the Greek side of the island was allowed to 
become a member of the EU before an agreement between the two sides had been 
reached (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 38). 
 
2.4. The period after official candidacy: 1999-2006 
This section seeks to explain some important events in Turkey-EU relations between 
1999 and 2006. Most events in this period constitute the time sample of the content 
analysis (see the Methodology Chapter). 
 
The Helsinki Summit in 1999 and afterwards 
Although Turkey's strategic importance decreased following the end of the Cold War, 
political and security factors changed all around the world after the 9/11 terrorist 
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attacks in the US (Arikan, 2008: 228). The new circumstances increased Turkey’s 
significance again in the new insecure world (Keyman, 2006: 204). Accordingly, the 
situation also affected the EU and it relinquished its containment policy towards 
Turkey (Arikan, 2008: 228).  
 
In fact, the wind of change started for Turkey's EU bid in the late 1990s. The victory of 
Tony Blair in the UK general election in May 1997 brought a vocal supporter of Turkey 
to the EU. Then, in the following year, Gerhard Schröder became the Chancellor of 
Germany and his positive view regarding Turkey was in contrast to his predecessor, ex-
Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Dismorr, 2008: 49). The earthquakes of 1999 in Turkey and 
Greece brought the public and politicians together and both sides forgot the past and 
helped each other. Meanwhile, Costas Simitis, a moderate politician, became the new 
leader of Greece and supported Turkey's EU bid (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 38). 
Moreover, Greece and the EU were in need of Turkish help concerning the Cyprus 
issue and Central and Eastern European countries' NATO accession (Faucompret and 
Konings, 2008: 38). In addition to these changes in Europe, the US has also started to 
give unconditional support to Turkey's EU bid. Just a few weeks before the Helsinki 
Summit in 1999, the former US president Bill Clinton said that an undivided, 
democratic and peaceful Europe could never become real without embracing Turkey 
(Dismorr, 2008: 50). With the help of all these developments, Turkey was finally 
accepted as an official candidate at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, 40 years 
after its application for an association agreement. This upgrade also made Turkey 
more popular in the EU media and Turkey's EU bid started to appear more in news 
reports. 
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The Copenhagen Summit in 2002 
The 'Accession Partnership Document' for Turkey, prepared by the European 
Commission, was accepted by all Member States at the European Council meeting in 
Nice in December 2000. The point which annoyed Turkey was related to the number of 
votes and seat distribution for the future EU because Turkey was not included in this 
equation (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 41-42).  
 
The Turkish Parliament made important amendments to the Constitution on 3rd August 
2002 in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. For instance, teaching different mother 
tongues (e.g. Kurdish) at private language schools and broadcasting in these languages 
became legal. In addition, the death penalty was abolished (Faucompret and Konings, 
2008: 42; Kirişci, 2008) and Turkey signed almost all European and international 
human rights agreements (Arikan, 2008: 232). However, happy days in Turkey-EU 
relations in the post-Helsinki period did not last long. Even though there was no 
significant political crisis, it could be observed that the discussions concerning Turkish 
membership in different European circles were more than Turkey’s responsibility to 
fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. “*…+ *T+he question of Turkey’s Europeanness, and its 
belonging to European civilization, has re-entered with full force into the European 
public spheres” (Tekin, 2008: 728). Even though the impact of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the US increased the strategic importance of Turkey, the cultural aspects of 
Turkish membership also became a matter of discussion after this event (Aksoy, 2009: 
471). For instance, just one month before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, 
former French President Giscard d’Estaing’s famous comment on Turkey’s EU bid 
echoed in Europe. In his statement to Le Monde, he said that Turkey was not a 
European country and its membership would be the end of Europe (BBC News Online, 
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2002). During these discussions, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) 
started a large-scale media campaign in European countries in order to get support for 
Turkey's EU bid before the Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002. Full-page 
advertisements were published in British newspapers and depicted the photo of Tony 
Blair and the title: 'The only way to have a friend is to be one'. In Austrian newspapers, 
TÜSİAD challenged Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel 'Don't pull up the plant to see if it's 
growing' (Dismorr, 2008: 86). Meanwhile, the AK Party (Justice and Development 
Party) had a landslide victory in the 2002 Turkish general elections. The election results 
ended the period of 1990s weak coalition governments in Turkey. The party 
introduced itself as a ‘conservative democrat’ and a fervent supporter of Turkey’s EU 
bid (Kösebalaban, 2007: 93; Yılmaz, 2009: 62). Different from previous Turkish 
Government’s European integration motivations, the AK Party government’s 
understanding of EU membership chiefly focused on being a bridge between two 
civilisations instead of the full integration of Turkey into the Western world. 
 
At the Copenhagen summit, the European Council announced that eight new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe plus Malta and Cyprus would become EU members 
on 1st May 2004. Bulgaria and Romania were considered to be members from the 
beginning of 2007. Regarding Turkey, the Council announced 'date for date' and 
decided to reveal its decision in December 2004. The Council underlined that 
membership negotiations with Turkey could only start if Turkey fulfilled the 
Copenhagen political criteria. The homework which was given to Turkey was about 
amendments in the law concerning human rights and efforts to find a solution for the 
Cyprus issue as well as the problems concerning the Aegean Sea between Greece and 
Turkey (Roy, 2005: 23-24). 
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The Negotiation Process 
After welcoming former hostile, ex-communist countries to the bloc on 1st May 2004, it 
became harder to deny Turkey which was an old member of NATO (Faucompret and 
Konings, 2008: 48). The European Commission's report of October 2004 announced 
that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 
2006: 10; Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 19). Thereafter, in the Brussels Summit between 16th – 
17th December 2004, the European Council accepted this report and decided to start 
the membership negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October 2005. 
 
The Austrian objection to the commencement of negotiations with Turkey was hardly 
suppressed by the EU leaders after a late night discussion. Finally, the negotiations 
were launched in Luxembourg on 3rd October 2005. According to the Negotiation 
Framework, the aim of the talks was full membership for Turkey. However, the 
framework underlined that the process could not guarantee membership as it was 
'open-ended'. Accordingly, Turkey could not succeed in getting an exact date for 
membership. Although there has been no country which could not finish the 
negotiation process successfully so far, the accession process gives veto rights to each 
Member State. It also commands that in order to open or close any chapter in 
negotiations, all EU members must agree unanimously on the case. After completing 
all chapters of membership negotiations, the draft accession treaty is sent to each 
country's parliaments. For some countries like France and Austria, ratification can be 
done by referendum instead of a parliament decision (Hakura, 2006: 106).  
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The Port Crisis with Cyprus 
At the 3rd October 2005 EU Council Meeting, Cyprus was one of the countries which 
were strictly against the start of membership negotiations with Turkey but at the last 
minute they decided not to use their veto right. Nonetheless, the negotiation process 
deteriorated in the first year of membership negotiations because of a problem 
between Turkey and Cyprus in 2006. Turkey had to open Turkish ports to Cypriot 
vessels and airplanes until the end of 2006 because of an agreement concerning the 
annex of the customs union. The situation showed that the Cyprus issue had 
transformed into an EU level problem and the negotiation process had become “*…+ a 
soft-law type of framework for EU intervention in the political developments of 
Turkey" (Arikan, 2008: 227). Nonetheless, Turkey declared that it would continue not 
to acknowledge Cyprus. Although the EU pressure caused many changes in Turkish 
politics, the soft power of the EU has not been powerful enough to alter some crucial 
problems like the case of the Cyprus issue. As a result, eight of 35 chapters of 
membership negotiations were frozen at the end of 2006 (Eylemer and Taş, 2007; 
Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs Website, 2012). This situation was described as 'a train 
crash' by Ollie Rehn, the then EU Commissioner of Enlargement. In its reaction to the 
situation, Turkey reminded the EU of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan said “700.000 Greek Cypriots' interests stand against those of 
seventy million Turks” (Dismorr, 2008: 154). As a last minute solution, Turkey proposed 
to open one port and one airport provided that the EU accepted the commencement 
of direct trade with Northern Cyprus. However, Brussels rejected the proposal. 
Moreover, “*t+he symbolic exclusion of Turkey from the celebrations of the EU’s fiftieth 
birthday celebrations in March 2007 darkened an already gloomy picture” 
(Kösebalaban, 2007: 109). Therefore, a new period in Turkey-EU relations began. 
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The Silent Period 
Since some chapters were frozen in 2006, Turkey-EU relations became considerably 
silent. Accordingly, the media appearance of the relations also lessened. The start of 
the period was induced by the Cyprus issue. However, two elections in Europe also 
caused a negative influence on the motivation of Turkey’s bid to join the EU. The 
relatively pro-Turkish positions of Germany and France in the post-Helsinki period 
disappeared after the commencement of membership negotiations. Angela Merkel, 
the leader of Christian Democrat Union, became the Chancellor of Germany in 
November 2005. She claimed that “the EU of today is different from the EEC of which 
Turkey was offered the prospect of membership in 1963; the EEC was nothing more 
than an economic association while today the EU is a political union based on common 
values” (Die Welt, 16.10.2004 cited in Kylstad, 2010: 18). Therefore, she clearly 
expressed her view that Turkey should be ‘a privileged partner’ of the EU but not a full 
member. Things were getting worse for Turkey after the French Presidential election in 
2007. Nicolas Sarkozy, an ardent opponent of Turkey’s EU bid, won the elections and 
suspended some other chapters in Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU. In 
addition to the change in two prominent positions in Germany and France, the EU and 
Turkey became more interested in their domestic issues. While Europe was discussing 
the European Constitution, the enlargement in the Western Balkans, the global 
financial crisis, the Eurozone, huge economic problems of Greece, and the Arab Spring, 
the Turkish issue became remarkably unpopular on the EU’s political and media 
agenda. Similarly to the situation in Europe, Turkish politicians also became apathetic 
about Turkey’s EU bid. “*…+*T+he celebratory tone of the advocates of membership in 
Turkey is very much muted, and the level of public support is rapidly decreasing” 
(Kösebalaban, 2007: 110). Meanwhile, Turkey was improving its relations with the 
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Middle Eastern countries and dealing with its domestic problems such as the 
problematic election of the President in 2007, the cooled relations with Israel, the 
military operations towards the PKK, the clashes between the Army forces and the 
Government, the Ergenekon case, and the Arab Spring. All these reasons made Turkey-
EU relations less popular in the EU media. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the historical development of Turkey’s bid to join the EU. 
Following a long westernisation process in political and cultural terms, Turkey wanted 
to be a full partner of Western Europe just after the EEC was established. By signing 
the Ankara Agreement, Turkey and the EEC agreed on full membership for Turkey 
provided that some phases would be completed. However, because of various types of 
problems the Turkish bid became the longest waiting process at the front door of the 
EU. In the 1970s and 1980s, Brussels indicated Turkey's economic and political 
problems as a rejecting reason for Turkey whereas in the 1990s the agenda was 
specifically based on its problems with Greece and Cyprus as well as human rights 
issues. Meanwhile, the EU had made enormous changes in its structure and developed 
into a more integrated organisation.  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, Turkey started to have fervent supporters within the 
EU. Finally, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey became an official candidate. This 
motivated Ankara to continue with economic and political reforms. During this period, 
the most significant event was probably the European Council meeting on 3rd October 
2005. The media attention on the Turkish issue had never been so prominent before. 
Following long discussions between European rivals, particularly ‘Austrians versus the 
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British’, a decision was made to start membership negotiations with Turkey. It was a 
decision which had made all candidates a full member in the past. Therefore, the 
opponents were as angry as the supporters were happy. However, after just one year, 
the negotiation period was seriously damaged because of a crisis between Turkey and 
Cyprus, a new EU member. 
 
Consequently, one can argue that Turkey has never come as close to EU membership 
as in the first decade of the 2000s due to having the official candidate status and being 
in the membership negotiation process. Today, mostly because of the influence of 
Germany and France, the EU authorities have avoided revealing a date for the 
completion of negotiations. Recently, different political agendas in the EU and in 
Turkey, especially the crisis in the Eurozone, and Turkey’s political interest in other 
parts of the world, have decreased the importance of the issue. However, the new 
changes cannot easily diminish the importance of this nearly 60 year old story. 
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with background material which underpins the research findings 
and analyses in the following chapters. The breadth of the discussions on Turkey-EU 
relations and how it was represented by the British media in particular can be better 
understood after consideration of this background information and a literature review. 
In some sections, the discussions may appear to be closer to different areas such as 
politics, geography, sociology, history rather than media studies. However, the 
research requires this kind of interdisciplinarity which can also be seen in different 
previous studies in the field (e.g. Anderson and Weymouth, 1999). 
 
The chapter begins with a section which comprises the main discussions on Turkey-EU 
relations in the extant literature. As the literature is remarkably broad, the section 
mostly focuses on the common terms and concepts, how pro-Turkish and anti-Turkish 
discourse legitimise their views, and other key debates which are common in the news 
items on Turkey-EU relations. Following this, the second section looks at what was 
covered in the media concerning Turkey’s EU bid. The section seeks to explain how the 
academic works on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations analysed the 
issue. Both sections seek to clarify what this dissertation focuses on in the following 
chapters. 
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3.2. Key points of discussion regarding Turkey’s EU bid 
The discussions, which were found in the literature on Turkey-EU relations, are 
categorised under four sub-sections which are politics, economy, geography and 
culture. Some issues were inevitably suitable for more than one category (e.g. 
absorption capacity, clash of civilisations) (see Kösebalaban, 2007). They were 
categorised according to their most important association in the Turkish membership 
context. All the issues in four categories will allow the reader to more clearly 
comprehend the findings and analysis of the thesis. 
 
3.2.1. Political discussions 
The accession phase of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU was a 
technical process which was mainly managed by the specialists of the Commission. 
However, the Turkish accession has usually been a politicised issue among the 
politicians of Member States (Barysch, 2005: 6). European politicians even exploited 
Turkey’s EU bid during the national or local elections of their countries. This is probably 
because of the fear that Turkish membership is going to influence people’s daily lives 
in Europe. Moreover, the Turkish issue is considered with its possible impact on how 
the EU is going to evolve. Therefore, Turkey's bid is not only about the discussions on 
Turkey, it is also an important factor for the future definition and organisation of the 
EU. 
 
Even though all debates on Turkey-EU relations are somehow political, this section 
seeks to clarify the points which are ‘directly’ related to political discussions in Turkey-
EU relations. As each political issue’s detailed historical background may lead this 
section to long discussions, the priority is given to each political issue’s direct 
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connection with the debates on Turkey’s EU bid. The points explained below usually 
appear in the news items on Turkey-EU relations. They are: Democracy and human 
rights; The Cyprus Issue; The Armenian issue; The clash of civilisations thesis; European 
Public Opinion towards Turkish membership; Privileged partnership; and Absorption 
capacity. 
 
Democracy and human rights 
Human rights, the rule of law, guaranteeing democracy, and respect for and protection 
of minorities are the essence of the Copenhagen political criteria to join the EU (Sakwa 
and Stevens, 2006: 68; Aksoy, 2009: 482). Turkey’s insufficiency in those points is a 
crucial reason why Turkish membership of the EU is being postponed. It has been more 
than 50 years since Turkey signed the Association Agreement with the EU. It can be 
argued that Turkey is also responsible for this long term waiting process. The internal 
problems (e.g. army coups, coalition governments, the Kurdish issue, the tension 
between the Islamists and the secularists, etc.) in Turkey should be taken into account 
while its long journey to the EU is criticised. Moreover, it can be claimed that 
nationalists, Islamists, extreme left groups, parts of the bureaucracy (e.g. State 
Planning Organisation), military, and traditional Republicans had slowed down the 
reform movements for Turkey's EU bid in different periods (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 30). 
As a result, compared to the EU average, Turkish civil society organisations are still 
weak and they have an insufficient role in affecting the government's decisions. 
 
However, in recent years, the EU's soft power effect had an enormous impact on the 
change in Turkish democracy (Dismorr, 2008: 57). Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, 
the Turkish Parliament made significant amendments to the Turkish legal system in 
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order to integrate it with the EU’s acquis communautaire and increase the quality of 
human rights and democracy in the country. Accordingly, starting membership 
negotiations was an important proof of providing the Copenhagen criteria which can 
be seen as a measure of human rights and democracy according to EU standards. 
Decrease in the Turkish Armed Force’s intervention in politics, more freedom in 
religious affairs, and new initiatives in order to solve the Kurdish issue are some of the 
examples concerning the rehabilitation in Turkish democracy. 
 
The Cyprus Issue 
In addition to the issues on human rights and democracy, there are several political 
crises which have blocked Turkey’s bid to join the EU. The Cyprus issue is one of the 
vicious circles. Greece’s EU membership in 1981 and the Greek Cypriots’ accession to 
the EU in 2004 made the Cyprus issue an EU wide problem. Accordingly, the EU lost its 
impartiality due to having one side of the issue within the community. Now Turkey is in 
the situation of being called ‘the invader’ of a part of EU land (North Cyprus) and at the 
same time a country which is an official membership candidate for the organisation 
which is the owner of this ‘invaded’ land. 
 
The story of the problem dates back to the end of 19th century when the Ottomans 
leased Cyprus to the British. When the Ottomans entered WWI, the island was 
annexed by the British Empire. Turkey accepted this annexation in the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923. After some decades, the ethnic conflict between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots on the island provoked some discussions concerning the partition of the island 
between Turkey and Greece. However, this plan was abandoned and an independent 
state was established on 16th August 1960 (Kazancigil, 2005: 173-175). Even though the 
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new entity looked like a compromise between the two groups of the island, “neither of 
whom was willing to build a nation together” (Kazancigil, 2005: 175). 
 
On 15th July 1974, a right-wing coup d’état in Cyprus raised serious concerns in Turkey. 
Ankara was worried about the safety of Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the 
island to Greece. Turkey invoked “article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, which 
gave them the right to intervene if the independence, territorial integrity and security 
of Cyprus were threatened” (Kazancigil,  2005: 176).  
 
Consequently, the Turkish Armed Forces landed on the northern sector of the island 
on 20th July 1974. Even though Turkey defined the act as a ‘peace operation’, the then 
EC condemned the Turkish intervention to the island (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 
28). The military operation only took two days and the northern part in the island was 
de facto detached from the south. As a result, the Turkish Armed Forces stayed on the 
island and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983. No 
country has recognized the entity except Turkey yet (Kazancigil, 2005: 178). 
 
Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, acted as a mediator and prepared the 
Annan Plan which aims to unify the island. However, the plan was rejected in a 
referendum in 2004. Even though 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’, the results 
of the referendum shows that 76 per cent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the 
unification plan (Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 14). If the EU had asked for ‘good neighbourly 
relations’ as a criterion for membership from Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan would 
have become real and the island would have been united (Arikan, 2008: 234). Since the 
Annan Plan was refused, the peace negotiations have been going remarkably slowly. 
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However, there is hope as long as Turkey stays on the EU track. Greece has been 
supporting Turkey's EU membership since 1999 and the solutions for the problem in 
the region seem attainable only within a European perspective. Birand (2006: 117) 
argues that if Turkey-EU relations have serious problems, Turkey will be the most 
negatively affected one. The Cyprus issue or the continental shelf problem between 
Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea will be less important matters as long as Turkey 
seeks to be part of the EU. Since the Turkish military operation in Northern Cyprus in 
1974, both parties have never been as close to solving the issue as in the first decade 
of the 21st century. 
 
The Armenian issue  
Since the 15th century, the minorities in the Ottoman Empire, including the Armenians, 
had enjoyed a significant freedom and autonomy. Following the start of political and 
economic decline in the Empire, the rise of Turkish nationalism made the minorities 
the target of violence . “*…+ [T]he Turks tried to suppress one national movement after 
another. In the end they too adopted nationalism, waged their own struggle *…+” 
(Ahmad, 1993: 24). Particularly after Greek and Bulgarian independence, the Ottoman 
Turks started to be afraid of the same initiative from Armenians (Chiclet, 2005: 164). 
Accordingly, while the Ottoman Empire was fighting against Russians in the Eastern 
Front in WWI, independence-seeking Armenians (Ottoman citizens) in the East of 
Turkey started fighting on the Russian side. A great deal of violence towards the 
Armenians, first in Constantinople and then in Eastern Anatolia, began. On 24th April 
1915, Turkish authorities made a decision to deport Armenians to Syria in order to stop 
their cooperation with Russians. A significant number of Armenians (the exact number 
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is always a discussion) died on the way due to the weather conditions and famine 
(Kongar, 2007: 88-89). 
 
Today, the events in 1915 are highly politicised. Turkey argues that “many Armenians 
lost their lives in the events of 1915, this by no means amounted to a systematically 
planned ‘genocide’, and that many Turks and other residents of Anatolia also perished 
at the same time” (Aybet, 2006: 535). Therefore, the Turkish side always defends itself 
by naming the events with the terms 'massacre' and 'deportation' while the Armenians 
call the events 'Armenian Genocide' (Kongar, 2007: 88). More than 20 parliaments (e.g. 
French, Greek) around the world acknowledged 'genocide' by the efforts of Armenian 
diaspora (Ahtisaari et al., 2009: 30-31). Even though Turkey strictly rejects the 
allegations, the issue has been attached to Turkey’s EU membership bid. Politicians 
from different EU Member States, especially the French, make statements which 
politicise the Armenian issue, and warn that Turkey cannot join the EU before it comes 
to terms with its past. Thus, “Turkey is likely to find the issue increasingly linked to its 
bid to join the EU”. The issue has not been included in the Negotiating Framework 
(2005) of Turkish membership. However, a report of the European Parliament in 2002 
recommends Turkey to work on a compromise in its relationship with Armenia 
(Chiclet, 2005: 171). 
 
The clash of civilisations thesis: Can Turkey be a model for the Muslim world?  
Even though the clash of civilisations thesis is significantly related to cultural 
discussions, this section focuses on its reflection in politics. Turkey was an important 
ally for the Western European powers in the Cold War period. However, after the end 
of the Cold War, Turkey had lost its frontier security character between the Soviet and 
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the Atlantic blocks (Aybak, 2006: 70) and Turkey has become a new buffer zone 
between the Muslim and Christian world in the post-9/11 world. This was actually 
turning to the past, to the origin of discussions regarding the tensions between the 
Eastern and the Western world; but this time Turkey is being shown as a model for 
Muslim countries and a solution for the clash of civilisations (Keyman, 2006: 203). With 
a secular state system, a Muslim society, and good relations with the Western world, 
Turkey has a “unique geopolitical identity [which] makes the country an ideal broker 
between these civilizational realms” (Kuzmanovic, 2008: 42). 
 
The clash of civilisations thesis is employed with different meanings by two different 
camps in the EU. While the thesis is used by some European politicians who are against 
Turkish membership, the invalidity of the thesis is employed in the pro-Turkish 
membership politicians’ arguments. Especially, British politicians underline why the 
clash of civilisations does not exist by referring to characteristics of Turkey. According 
to their view, Turkey is the solution to avoiding a clash of civilisations if it ever exists 
(see Aissaoui, 2007: 12). 
“*…+ The argument that was consistently deployed by the *British+ government 
was that EU membership would help consolidate democracy and secularism in 
Turkey, which was overwhelmingly a Muslim nation, and this would, apart from 
sending all the right messages to other Muslim nations which were similarly 
trying to democratize, help repair the relations between the West and the 
Muslim world that were significantly damaged by the September 11 attacks 
and the subsequent War on Terror” (Aksoy, 2009: 476). 
 
There are also views which consider Turkey incapable of being a model country for the 
Muslim world or playing a mediator role between the Eastern and the Western world. 
Karlsson (2007: 80) argues that when Turkey’s westernisation process is completed, 
this can be a good example to other Muslim countries as a proof of a democratic and 
Muslim country. However, he believes that Turkey cannot be a direct, one to one 
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model for other Muslim countries due to several historical, cultural and political 
reasons -e.g. Turkey's secular experience, political self-confidence which comes from 
its imperial roots, long standing relationship with the Western world, and NATO 
membership (Everts, 2005: 65). According to this view, there are remarkable 
differences between Turkey's and Middle Eastern countries' pasts. Unlike the Iranian 
and Arabic world, Turkey's Kemalists and Islamists were deeply affected by European 
thinking and European politics. Besides, Turkey has never been a colony and the 
Islamic thought in Turkey has never been a significant base to stand against imperialist 
powers (Karlsson, 2007: 103). Moreover, Turkish voters or political parties can show 
their reactions through democratic ways which are not always possible in the majority 
of other Muslim countries (Akyol, 2009: 192). For example, when the Islamist Refah 
Party was abolished because of its non-secular activities, Necmettin Erbakan, the 
leader of the party, applied to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
instead of encouraging his voters to rise up (Karlsson, 2007: 104). Regarding the same 
issue, Ahtisaari et al. (2004: 16) argues that because of Turkey’s secular character and 
long term close relations with Europe, the Turkish model cannot be directly applied to 
other Muslim countries (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 17). Yet they argue that Turkey can be 
an effective member of the bloc in relationships with Muslim countries (Ahtisaari et al., 
2004: 43). 
 
European Public Opinion towards Turkish membership 
Public opposition to Turkish membership is a serious obstacle for Turkish accession. 
Since the beginning of the EU, it has been thought that the Union was built by elites 
without any interest in public opinion especially in the period leading up to the 
common currency decision and accepting new members from Middle and Eastern 
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Europe. The recent referendums regarding the EU constitution showed that 
governments cannot ignore, anymore, what the citizens think (Hakura, 2006: 110). 
Public opinion may become more effective when the day comes for Turkey's EU 
membership because the French and Austrian governments have already announced 
that they could consider a referendum for the ratification of Turkey's 
membership. Thus, it should be noted that when EU leaders make a decision, they do 
not only take into account maps, energy corridors, trade and defence policies; they 
also care about the reaction of the public to their decisions (Kaleağası, 2006: 355) as it 
is hard to apply a policy successfully in a long term process without public support 
(Chatzistavrou, 2008). 
 
According to a Eurobarometer survey in March-May 2006, 38 per cent supports 
Turkey's EU bid while 49 per cent8 of EU citizens (of EU25) are against Turkey even if it 
reaches the Copenhagen criteria. Austria is the leading opponent country by 81 per 
cent and Sweden is the strongest supporter by 60 per cent. The countries which prefer 
less intensive integration within the EU (such as Spain and the UK) are in favour of 
Turkish membership while the French and Germans are against the Turkish bid due to 
several specific factors and their intensive approach to European integration 
(Eurobarometer, 2006: 70-71). As a result of their strong opposition, a new proposal 
which is ‘privileged partnership’ instead of a full membership started to be spelled out 
in European circles. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 It should be borne in mind that EU citizens tend not to give strong support to new candidates. 
According to a Eurobarometer poll, conducted in 1997 and published in 1998, support for each of 11 
new candidates was between 33-47 per cent (Eurobarometer, 1998: 55; see also Anastasakis, 2004)  
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Privileged partnership 
Some countries which are against the Turkish bid argue that proposing a ‘privileged 
partnership' to Turkey instead of full membership is much better for both sides. 
Although the content of the proposal is still vague, the aim is not to lose an ally and 
weaken economic ties if Turkey cannot be a member of the bloc. However, the 
discussions on privileged partnership always come to the agenda when the 
relationship between two sides is problematic. For this reason, the proposal usually 
disappears without any productive and deep discussion. In fact, Turkey has many 
bilateral agreements with the EU and a customs union. Therefore, regarding the 
'privileged partnership' proposal, Turkey believes that it already has a privileged 
relationship with the EU (Barysch, 2005: 8). 
 
Germany, Austria and France are the leading countries which think that this offer is the 
most suitable third way for the relationship with Turkey. While they propose 
'privileged partnership' with Ankara instead of full membership, they argue that the EU 
has changed a lot since the Association Agreement with Turkey (Kylstad, 2010: 18). 
Even though the Turks were promised to a welcome to the Union in the past, the anti-
Turkish camp defend itself by referring to the EU’s deeper integration perspective 
today. Therefore, their answer to "pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)" is 
"rebus sic stantibus (things thus standing)" (Kaleağası, 2006: 261). If the ‘privileged 
partnership’ initiative is going to be like the Barcelona Process9 or the European 
Neighbourhood Policy10 of the EU, it can be argued that the initiative could become a 
                                                          
9
 The Barcelona Process aims to strengthen the relationships between the EU members and non-EU 
Mediterranean countries since 1995 (Europa Glossary, 2009). 
10
 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 in order to avoid big gaps between 
the EU and its neighbours. The project aims to achieve better security, prosperity and stability around 
the EU. The policy includes several countries surrounding the EU borders including Ukraine, Belarus, 
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symbolic act and it may end up offering no profit for the EU or Turkey (Chatzistavrou, 
2008). 
 
A more radical alternative proposal, which has not been sufficiently discussed yet in 
European political circles, was emphasised by former French Prime Minister Michel 
Rocard. He thinks that instead of privileged partnership, a gradual membership of 
Turkey in three phases until 2023 could be better for both sides. According to this, 
Turkey's EU membership can start on less disputed areas such as education, culture, 
research, and environment. Then, if everything goes well, the full membership can be 
awarded in 2023 when the Turkish Republic will be 100 years old (Rocard, 2008: 89). 
 
Absorption capacity 
Another common term in the political discussions on Turkey-EU relations is ‘absorption 
capacity’. The term is not as new as the term ‘privileged partnership’ since the EU’s 
capacity to absorb new members was also mentioned in the final declaration of the 
Copenhagen summit report in 1993. However, it did not influence the Eastern 
European expansion in a negative way (Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 7). In contrast, the term 
became a popular excuse to say ‘no’ to the Turkish side during the 3rd October 2005 
meeting of EU leaders and in the early period of membership negotiations. It was not 
only mentioned by European politicians and accordingly the media but was also used 
in the Negotiating Framework:  
"While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption 
capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Caucasian countries, countries in the west part of the Middle East, and all North African countries which 
have coastlines on the Mediterranean Sea (The European Commission Website, 2009). Like some other 
categorizations or decisions by the EU, the ENP reveals that Turkey is perceived as within the EU. Thus, 
the ENP does not include Turkey and does not see it as a neighbour but includes Turkey's non-EU 
neighbours excluding Iran and Iraq. 
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obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in 
the European structures through the strongest possible bond" (Negotiating 
Framework, 2005: 1). 
 
The expression ‘the strongest bond’ in the framework evoked Turkey a ‘privileged 
partnership’ even though the term was not directly used. Neither absorption capacity 
nor privileged partnership was mentioned in the negotiating framework of Croatia 
which started membership negotiations at the same time as Turkey in 2005 (Aydın-
Düzgit, 2006: 6). Karlsson (2007) argues that some EU leaders never believed a change 
might happen in Turkey to that extent. He thinks that when Turkey fulfilled the 
Copenhagen criteria to start membership negotiations, opponents have started to 
invent new criteria such as geographical, geo-strategical, cultural, historical and finally 
the 'absorption capacity'. Therefore, he asks if any other EU member has been 
absorbed so far. 
 
After presenting the political discussions, the economic dimension of Turkey-EU 
relations should also be considered. 
 
3.2.2. Economic discussions 
In the 1970s, when the EU was called the Common Market, a leftist political motto in 
Turkey was popular: "They are the common, we are the market" (Ortaylı, 2008: 103). 
However, this approach was weakened by the rise of pro-free market politicians (e.g. 
Turgut Özal) in the 80s and a customs union between Turkey and the EU came into 
force in 1996 which showed that the Turkish economy could compete with the rival 
producers in European markets. 
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Without a doubt, Turkey is economically more connected to Europe than Asia or the 
Middle East. In 2010, four of the top five export partners of Turkey were EU member 
countries (CIA The World Factbook, 2012). It is clear that the Turkish economy, similar 
to those of new members from Middle and Eastern Europe, is not as strong as EU-15. 
However, if only the GDPs before starting the membership negotiations with the EU is 
considered for each country, Turkey (in 2003) has better indications than Romania (in 
1999) and Bulgaria (in 1999) (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 40). Besides, when the Turkish 
economy is compared to ex-communist members of the EU, it can easily be claimed 
that Turkey is much more experienced in market economy. For instance, while the new 
EU members, the previously communist countries, did not have any representation at 
BUSINESSEUROPE (established in 1958), Turkey was one of the members of the 
organisation (Kaleağası, 2006: 281).  
 
After this brief review of economic discussions, it would be better to explain the 
economic debates by means of details from pro and anti-Turkish membership stances. 
 
The economic arguments of Turkey’s supporters 
The pro-Turkish camp argues that Turkey can strengthen the EU's competitiveness in 
the global market. It is claimed that not including Turkey in European integration may 
cause the EU to be ranked after China, the US and India in 2040 in the list of economic 
giants. If Turkey is included, the prediction indicates that the EU can reach the level of 
the US (Yeşilada et al., 2006).  
 
In contrast with the opponents of Turkish membership, the pro-Turkish camp thinks 
that there will not be a serious Turkish burden on EU funds. If Turkey joins the EU in 
 45 
 
2015, the cost of Turkey’s share in the membership funds will not be more than 0,16 
per cent of the EU’s total gross product (Gros, 2005). Furthermore, as it was applied to 
the new members from the Middle and Eastern Europe, some restrictions in 
agricultural subsidies, free movement of workers and regional aid will also be applied 
to Turkey in the first years of membership in order to manage the transition period 
(Hakura, 2006: 108). 
 
The pro-Turkish camp believes that Turkey “*…+ managed to liberalize its economy to a 
considerable extent, and has been increasingly integrated into the world economy” 
(Aksoy, 2009: 482-483). The total of Turkish exports increased from less than three 
billion dollars in 1980 to 20 billion dollars in 1990. Following the economic boom in 
recent years, the total export exceeded 100 billion dollars in 2007 (Pamuk, 2008). This 
growing economy is a huge market for EU Member States and it can carry the EU to 
the new markets. According to Kaleağası (2006: 210), as Spain brings Latin America to 
the EU, Turkey can bring the Black Sea, Caspian and Middle Asia regions to the EU 
economy. Moreover, Turkey’s young population can be beneficial for the EU’s social 
security and retirement systems (Kaleağası, 2006: 112). 
 
Concerning Turkey’s large size and population, and relatively lower GDP performance 
compared to the EU average, supporters of Turkey's EU bid defend their view by 
underlining the rehabilitation effect of long term membership negotiations. They argue 
that the former EU candidate countries rehabilitated their economies during the 
negotiations. According to this view, when Turkey is criticised as a poor country, it 
should be remembered that the negotiation period will be long and Turkey will reach a 
better economic level at the end of the negotiations. Most of the new members from 
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Middle and Eastern Europe became a centre of investment during the negotiations and 
afterwards. The way to the full accession will also encourage Turkey to make 
significant institutional changes and these developments can lead Turkey to have new 
entrepreneurship and employment investments (Hakura, 2006: 111). 
 
The economic arguments of Turkey’s opponents 
Many EU citizens evaluate European integration in terms of its economic effect on 
their lives and their greatest fear is usually revealed as losing jobs because of 
immigration (McLaren, 2007: 255). A possible immigration flow of Turkish workers to 
the EU is one of the main issues that the opponents of Turkish membership in the EU 
seriously hesitate about (Anastasakis, 2004). The lower income levels are the strongest 
argument against Turkish integration since they fear that their positions can be 
substituted by cheaper labour power. This can happen through immigration or moving 
the industry to Turkey where wages are cheaper (McLaren, 2007: 255). Moreover, in 
many sectors, producing something in Turkey costs less than in most of the EU 
Member States. This situation can negatively affect some EU members which produce 
similar products to Turkey (Arikan, 2008: 237). European farmers are also very uneasy 
about Turkish integration into the EU. The Turkish agriculture sector is significantly 
large and it can decrease the prices of products and the shares of subsidies to the 
farmers of other Member States (McLaren, 2007: 256). 
 
Probably, the strongest trump in the opponents’ hand is the problem of regional 
differences in Turkey which is incomparable to any EU member. Mango (2004: 250) 
argues that Turkey has already incorporated a European way of life or standards. 
However, the problem he underlines is that the opportunities and improvements have 
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not been expanded to the whole society. This inequality is overlooked in the shadow of 
political, cultural or geographical discussions concerning Turkey's EU bid. Indeed, 
Eastern-Western division in Turkey in terms of economy, educational level, and culture 
is remarkably strong. A reflection of this inequality also shows itself in different parts 
of big cities as a result of huge internal migration.  
 
According to Morris (2006: 4-5) the seaside in the Bosphorus and the shores of Lake 
Van can depict the differences between the first world and feudal poverty. While 
pointing out the Eastern-Western differentiation on the Turkish map, Mango (2004: 
208) describes the eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey as 'Turkey's Middle 
East'. Similarly, Dismorr (2008: 115) claims that the Kurdish-dominated, southeast of 
Turkey is more like its oriental, Middle Eastern surroundings and significantly different 
from the European Mediterranean environment of Turkey's west coast. The reason for 
this huge gap is related to the imbalanced share of money as the main economic 
activities are in the western flank of the country, especially in the Marmara and 
Aegean regions. Because of these differences, the regional income inequality is much 
more than in the other EU-25 countries (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 125). For 
example, when the average GDP unit for Turkey is 100, it is 153 for Marmara region 
(which includes Istanbul) and only 28 for Eastern Anatolia region (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 
37). 
 
All in all, providing “*…+ a functioning and competitive market economy” (Aksoy, 2009: 
482) is one of the requirements of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. Accordingly, three 
quarters of the negotiation chapters are related to economics. Turkey still has lots of 
things to do in the field of economics for its EU bid (Hakura, 2006: 111) and the recent 
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global financial crisis and its impact in the Eurozone may slow down the integration 
process of Turkey. 
 
3.2.3. Geographical discussions 
This section argues that the geographical categorisations of the world are highly 
political. In particular, the places which are in the zone of geographical ambiguities can 
be categorised either in or out by means of politics. It can be claimed that no other 
continent's borders in the world are as politically manipulated as the eastern (including 
the southeast) border of Europe. Thus, the geographical ambiguity of Turkey has a 
crucial place in the discussions concerning Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
Said (2003: 4-5) argues that the Orient and the Occident do not exist as facts of nature. 
He indicates Vico's opinion that history is made by humans and connects this argument 
to the relationship between the East and the West which are shown as cultural and 
geographical actualities i.e. they are actually human-made. In this respect, the division 
between Europe and Asia can be seen as the most human-made continent border 
which annihilates a continent called Eurasia. Europe’s southern, western and northern 
borders look indisputable as they are surrounded by the sea. However, the eastern 
end of the continent is porous. Even though there is no standard definition on where 
Europe’s eastern borders end, the most well known line is probably drawn throughout 
the Ural Mountains, the River Don, the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, 
the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea (Delanty, 1995: 49; Duroselle, 2005). This 
ambiguity on the eastern side of the continent makes it impossible to discuss the 
geographical borders of Europe without the impact of politics. 
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In addition to the historical influences of the Byzantium, the Ottoman and the Russian 
Empires in Eastern Europe, the EU (the then EEC) was associated with the concept of 
‘Europe’ in the Cold War period. This monopoly on the concept restricted the idea of 
Europe to the western flank of the continent and excluded the eastern part (Delanty, 
1995: 129). Even today, the concept of Europe is much more related to Paris and 
Vienna than Bucharest and Sofia. It can still be witnessed that a person from Istanbul 
or Belgrade can say "I am going to Europe" when they are going to Western Europe 
although they are not outside the continent that they refer to. Delanty defines this 
situation as “the westernization of Europe” (1995: 30) which arose from the time of 
the Holy Roman Empire when the centre of the continent was shifted from the 
Mediterranean region to the Baltic. The possible full integration of Turkey to the EU 
will move the centre point of the continent more to the southeast. This will bring the 
concept of Europe nearer to its origin, to the land of antiquity11.  
 
The following examples show how slippery it is to decide on the borders of continents. 
It is seen in the examples that the continental divisions are not innocent when the 
definition of geographical places is in the hands of politicians. The ambiguities in the 
eastern border of Europe will be explained via three places respectively: The island of 
Cyprus, Asia Minor, and the small European piece of Turkey. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 If the beginning of the concept of Europe is investigated, there is an irony regarding the discussions of 
Turkey's geographical position because ancient Europe was exactly where Turkey is situated now. 
Delanty (1995: 16) argues that although the idea of Europe was not significant in antiquity, the concept 
of Europe referred to the Greek world of Asia Minor not western Europe (also see Leontidou, 2004). 
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The island of Cyprus 
Europe's eastern border is still like pieces of puzzle for politics and new bits were 
attached to the complete / incomplete European map in the expansion of the EU in 
May 2004. Among these pieces, Cypriot membership of the EU was the controversial 
one for Turkey. However, few people emphasized that the membership of Cyprus was 
a new legitimating trump for Turkey to use in the discussions regarding geographical 
aspects. Although Cyprus was an important part of ancient Europe like Asia Minor, 
now it is the furthest EU member from the European mainland. The island is 170 
kilometres from Beirut while the closest EU capital Athens is 500 kilometres away. 
From Nicosia it takes half an hour to go to Damascus, one hour to Tel Aviv and four 
hours to Brussels by flight (Karlsson, 2007: 9).  
 
Similarly to Cyprus, Turkey is sometimes included in European maps and sometimes 
not but the membership of Cyprus has enlarged the frame of the European map and 
now the big part of Turkey is automatically included in order to position Cyprus in the 
frame. However, this was manipulated in the new design of the Euro coins where 
Cyprus was virtually carried and placed in the location of the Aegean Sea and Asia 
Minor. Turkey was completely excluded except for Eastern Thrace and Istanbul. The 
former Euro coin design referred to the Member States of the EU instead of 
representing the whole continent but according to Financial Times, the European 
Commission proposed a new design which depicts a larger Europe as far as the Caspian 
Sea, including Turkey. This design was rejected by the European Council and new coins 
were circulated in 2008. Italian Liberal MEPs, Marco Cappato and Marco Pannella's, 
objections did not change the decision. They claimed “the design shows dictatorships, 
such as Belarus, but not a democratic country like Turkey with whom the accession 
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talks are ongoing” (Boundsin, 2007). While most nation states and empires have 
always been keen to add more lands to their sovereignty and to depict these on maps, 
it is remarkable that the European Council has consciously framed the Europe of the 
EU in such a way as to exclude Turkey's geographic existence on euro coins and 
narrowed the map proposal of the European Commission. 
 
Asia Minor 
A 'politics led geographical division' could happen in Asia Minor by a military 
occupation. During the Greco-Turkish war after WWI, on May 1919, a Greek army 
came to Izmir with the support of British, French and American warships. First Izmir 
and then the surroundings were occupied (Lewis, 2002: 241). Eventually, the western 
part of Asia Minor, almost as far as Ankara, was under Greek occupation. If this region 
had not been taken back by Turks, one could claim that the western flank of Asia 
Minor could be accepted as part of Europe today. This postulate can be seen in the 
contemporary status of the Greek Aegean Islands on the west coast of Asia Minor. 
 
The Small European Piece of Turkey 
The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Empire was the start of 
ongoing discussions about the location of Turkey vis-à-vis Europe. The Islamic 
civilisation's new capital was now in one of the most important cities of Europe. 
Therefore, the discussion, which is still alive, was born: “Turkey in Europe12” (Delanty, 
1995: 36). After proceeding until Vienna in the 16th century, Turkish sovereignty in 
Europe came back to the most south eastern part of Europe again after WWI. The 
                                                          
12
 It should be highlighted that the term ‘Turkey in Europe’ was also used to refer to the Balkan 
territories of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the 19
th
 century (Livanios, 2006). 
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name of this place is the Turkish part of Thrace which is the land between Edirne 
(Adrianople) and Istanbul. Thrace includes only three per cent of Turkey but it is bigger 
than Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia and insignificantly smaller than Holland 
and Belgium. This land is remarkably small in relation to the whole Turkish map, 
however the population in the region is the most densely populated area of Turkey 
with more than seven million (Karlsson, 2007: 77). If the essentialist geographical 
definition of Europe is valid, it is not meaningful to claim that this three per cent of 
Turkey is the legitimising of Turkey's attachment to Europe.  
 
Consequently, although the Treaty of Rome, establishing the EU (the then EEC), does 
not refer to having one hundred per cent European land in order to be eligible for 
becoming an EU member (Karlsson, 2007), Turkey can use the historical impact of Asia 
Minor in ancient Europe to argue for inclusion. As the effect of politics changed the 
geographical definition of Europe several times in the past, it may not be a big surprise 
if one day the east of Asia Minor is accepted as the end of the extended European 
map. 
 
3.2.4. Discussions on culture, identity and religion 
The essentialist uncertainty of Turkey’s belonging to Europe is not only an issue of 
geographical discussions (Tekin, 2008: 727). Debates on culture, identity and religion 
also have crucial roles to play in understanding why Turkey’s position between the East 
and the West is blurred. The economic reservations and political issues were the most 
important discussions in the Eastern European Enlargement of the EU in 2004. 
However, when they evaluate their hesitations on Turkey’s bid to join the EU, 
European citizens give more importance to culture, way of life, symbols and values 
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more than economic reservations (McLaren, 2007: 273). This gives Turkey's EU bid the 
unique position in the overall EU enlargement process.  
 
More support in opinion polls in EU Member States for the membership of Ukraine, 
which is economically and politically further from fulfilling the EU membership criteria 
than Turkey, can be a sign of the impact of cultural issues on Turkey’s EU bid 
(Eurobarometer, 2010: 62; also see Strasser, 2008: 179). Another sign is that there 
were no serious concerns about Romanian and Bulgarian membership in 2007. 
Therefore, even though the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership do not refer to 
religion, culture and identity, Turkey’s differences in those issues from Europe are at 
least as significant as Turkey’s geography, size and economy (Kirişci, 2008: 29). 
 
An identity between the Eastern and the Western world 
Is Turkey significantly different than Europe? Do Turkish people believe that they 
belong to the Middle East? Answering these questions is never easy. Similar to the 
story in the epigram of the Introduction Chapter of this thesis, Graham Fuller, at the 
beginning of his book The New Turkish Republic, talks about one of his memories of 
Turkey which shows the confusing categorisation of Turkey between the East and the 
West. According to Fuller’s story, he met a regular Turkish man in a regular town in the 
Middle Anatolia region in the late 1990s. The man asked him how he learnt to speak 
Turkish. Fuller answered “I am a Middle East expert”. The man said without any irony 
“then what are you doing here?” (Fuller, 2008: 27). It is interesting to hear something 
like this from a regular person in an ordinary town, because in big cities, especially in 
Istanbul, people rarely define themselves as Middle Easterners. For instance, when 
Turkey started its membership negotiations in 2005, lots of British reporters went to 
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Istanbul and asked people if they wanted to be part of Europe. The answers confused 
the reporters because Istanbulites already felt themselves to be living in Europe 
(Christensen, 2006: 66). It may be hard to believe those Istanbulites if Europe is 
perceived only as Western Europe. However, while Europe is expanding to the East, 
the centre of the continent is also being located further east of Brussels. Karlsson 
(2007: 82) explains this by using examples from the East and South of Europe. He 
argues that most Turks are sociologically Europeans. The difference is they are less 
urbanised than the average European. He believes that Turks who do not see 
themselves as European in today's Turkey are simply like the people who do not see 
themselves as European in Cyprus and Malta and especially in Romania and Bulgaria.  
 
Cultural issues from an essentialist view 
Although the influence of religion in Europeans' daily life is not as strong as before the 
Reform Movement, the Industrial Revolution and the rise of Communism, still today it 
cannot be claimed that European culture is free of the influences of Judeo-Christianity 
(Kahraman, 2002: 10). The impact of religion has even produced a nickname for the EU 
which is 'the Christian Club'. Regarding this, Pope Benedict XVI, when he was Cardinal 
Joseph Ratzinger, once emphasised that the idea of a ‘Christian Club’ for Europe is 
acceptable (Morris, 2006: 196). 
 
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Europe concerning culture and identity is not welcomed by 
the essentialist camp. Therefore, what Christensen (2006) and Karlsson (2007) argued 
above is probably not enough to persuade the Europeans who have an essentialist 
understanding of Europe. The core of the essentialist and anti-Turkish approach to 
European identity has been based on excluding the Other instead of finding common 
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values, aims and an apprehension of belongingness. This makes the points of 
difference more important than the common heritage. As a result, historically, this 
approach defines European identity by negating Andalusian Arabs, the Ottoman 
Empire, overseas colonies, and the Soviet Union (Delanty, 1995). Their understanding 
sees contemporary Turkey as the Other of Europe too. The exclusionary discourse of 
this approach is much stronger in the European countries which have “difficulties with 
their Muslim immigrants, including Turks” (Kirişci, 2008: 31).  
 
In 17th century England, in his work called ‘An Essay towards the Present and Future 
Peace of Europe by the Establishment of a European Diet, Parliament, or Estate’, 
William Penn proposed to establish a European Parliament which includes the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia (Ortaylı, 2008: 10). This proposal can be seen as an 
important step for the future of European integration. However, the precondition in 
order to be accepted by this bloc was to be converted to Christianity (Neumann and 
Welsh, 1991: 340; Neumann, 1999: 51; Karlsson, 2007: 20). Today, there is nothing 
related to religion in the Copenhagen criteria but there are unwritten, implicit opinions 
about Turkey’s Muslim identity. Some opponents refer to the impact of religion in 
Turkish society and how it magnifies the cultural differences between Turkey and 
Europe. Some of them even think that accepting Turkey to the EU is the core danger 
for Europe's Christian identity. They worry that when Turkey is welcomed to the EU, 
the ratio of Muslim people in the Union will increase significantly (Karlsson, 2007). 
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Cultural issues from a functionalist and cosmopolitan view 
A functionalist or cosmopolitan understanding of the EU does not see cultural and 
religious differences of Turkey as a problem for European identity. According to this 
view, the idea of Europe has been changing since it has existed. Therefore, Europe is 
more a product of history than its subject (Delanty, 1995). In Delanty’s words, in this 
view Europe can be defined as "a historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms 
and dynamics" (1995: 3). The same point of view’s loose definition for European 
civilisation even provides an in-group place for Turks as “*m+odern Turkey is a 
combination of the Ottoman heritage and westernization” (Delanty, 2010: 16). This 
approach opens the door to Turkey which has had a relationship with Europe for 900 
years (Ortaylı, 2008: 111). Particularly, European liberal and leftist politicians’ view 
puts forth that Turkey can find a place in the idea of Europe because  
“*i+n the world of the twenty-first century there is no longer a closed space 
called ‘the Christian West’. With growing transnational interconnections and 
obligations, Europe is becoming an open network with fluid boundaries in 
which the outside is already inside” (Beck and Delanty, 2006: 16). 
 
Therefore, positive improvements in the progress of Turkey's EU membership between 
1999 and 2005 can be also explained by the rise of functionalist politics in Europe (see 
Delanty 1995: 145). 
 
All in all, it is a fact that Turkey has been used as ‘negation’ in the identity building 
process of Europe and it will be hard to delete this from European identity's memory 
(Chatzistavrou, 2008). However, it is clear that the cultural differences and religion are 
not the only factors of significance in order to be accepted by Europe. For instance, 
Turkey's long EU journey would finish if Europe's reaction was as clear as the answer to 
Morocco. When Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, it took two years to make 
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a decision to reject Turkey. The reasons for the rejection were political and economic. 
However, Morocco’s EU bid was instantly rejected on the grounds that it was not a 
European country, which has never officially been a reason for the Turkish case 
(Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 13; Rumelili, 2004: 42; Karlsson, 2007: 66; Faucompret and 
Konings, 2008; MacLennan, 2009: 22). Therefore, one can argue that the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU is not a basic Muslim-Christian identities’ clash. It is a 
product of a complex structure which includes all political, economic, geographical, 
and cultural aspects discussed above. Consequently, this complex structure is one of 
the points which justifies the applicability of the notion of ‘a positive Other’ concerning 
the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media (see the Analytical 
Framework Chapter). 
 
3.3. Media representation of Turkey-EU relations 
Having presented the key points of discussion concerning Turkey-EU relations in the 
broad literature, this section focuses on a more specific literature which consists of the 
studies on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations. The large extent of this 
specific literature includes journal articles while there are also few theses, books, book 
chapters, and conference papers (inter alia Gencel-Bek, 2001; Durna, 2004; Leinonen, 
2004; Chaban et al., 2005; Öktem, 2005; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; 
Christensen, 2006; Koenig et al., 2006; Loukas, 2006; Marin et al., 2006; Aissaoui 2007; 
Devran, 2007; Ergül, 2007; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 
2009; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce, 2009b; Kejanlıoğlu and Taş, 2009; Orhon and 
Dimitrakopoulou, 2009; Schneeberger, 2009, 2011; Walter and Albert, 2009; Wimmel, 
2009; Bischof et al., 2010; Tekin, 2010; Paksoy, 2010; Paksoy, 2011; 
Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011; Hinrichsen, 2012). The studies found in the 
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literature were all published after 2001 and their scope is mainly newspapers from 
Turkey and EU Member States.  
 
3.3.1. A snapshot on the specific literature 
There is a growing literature on media representation of Turkey-EU relations. The 
academic interest in the topic reached its peak in 2008 and 2009. The majority of the 
research projects focus on the 3rd October 2005 process when Turkey started 
membership negotiations with the EU. English language media is the most common 
research sample. There are several works which focus on the British and American 
press and one more study comprises the Australian and New Zealand news media. In 
addition to the English language media, news content from many countries’ (such as 
France, Germany, Turkey, Austria, Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden) national media 
have been investigated on the issue so far. Even though several studies are only 
focused on one country (inter alia Negrine, 2008; Bryce 2009a; Tekin, 2010), there is 
also a substantial literature on EU-wide and national media comparative research 
projects covering more than one country’s media (e.g. Chaban et al., 2005; Koenig et 
al., 2006; Negrine et al., 2008; Wimmel, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010; Hinrichsen, 2012). 
Several studies ground their theoretical framework on Orientalism or at least draw on 
Edward Said while explaining their findings (inter alia Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 
2006; Devran, 2007; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce 2009b; Kejanlıoğlu and Taş, 2009; Bischof et 
al., 2010). Nonetheless, it can be argued that the majority of the literature 
concentrates on empirical data instead of drawing on a heavy theoretical framework. 
Concerning the methods employed in the studies, it was discovered that the interest in 
qualitative methods -especially content and discourse analysis- is more common than 
a quantitative approach. 
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3.3.2. The findings in previous studies 
This section will elucidate how previous studies dealt with the media representation of 
Turkey’s EU bid and what they presented in their findings. Following the precedent set 
in the previous sections in this chapter, more importance will be given to the points 
which are related to this thesis’ research framework. 
 
3.3.2.1. The main issues and topics in the findings 
The literature often illustrates the media representation of the geographical, cultural, 
historical, and political discussions on the issue. As most studies’ research samples 
include the period around 2004 and 2005, the political debates before and after the 
start of membership negotiations have a crucial influence on the findings. It was found 
that various actors, subjects, positive or negative political issues and terms, such as the 
Cyprus issue, democratic deficits or improvements, economy, the EU’s ‘absorption 
capacity’ and proposing ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full membership for Turkey, 
are widely included in the analysed news items. 
 
Issues were covered with different framings in different countries. For instance, 
economic debates were often overlooked in the French and Greek media while 
Turkey’s economic power was represented as an advantage of Turkish membership in 
the British coverage (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 164; also see Koenig et 
al., 2006; Negrine et al., 2008). Similarly, political issues are not consistent. The same 
political debates are represented differently in different countries -as well as in 
different periods- as they change throughout Turkey’s EU membership journey. 
Therefore, it can be seen in the literature that media coverage represents at the same 
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time both Turkey’s old and new image in democracy, human rights and economy. On 
some occasions, this even leads to a confusion concerning what Turkey has really 
transformed into (Christensen, 2006: 68; Chaban et al., 2005: 28). In the example of 
the British media, this causes a more complex situation as the general Turcophile 
stance of the papers are usually interrupted by the drawbacks of Turkish membership 
and the differences of Turkey from EU Member States. Negrine argues “*…+ a careful 
reader of the British press would be confronted by a representation of Turkey and the 
European Union that emphasized differences despite the overwhelming support the 
press gave to the bid” (2008: 626). 
 
‘Problems between Turkey and the EU’ is a common finding in most studies. For 
instance, the problematic or difficult themes are the most coded ones in a study on the 
British, French, Greek and Turkish news coverage (Negrine et al., 2008). The analyses 
about the French and German press in particular, show that the media tend to cover 
Turkish membership discussions by focusing on the possible problems which might be 
brought to the EU by Turkish accession. Moreover, the total number of references to 
differences between Europe and Turkey in the news content by far outnumber the 
similarities. Accordingly, it was found in the French press that Turkey’s EU bid often 
becomes an issue of domestic politics in France (Negrine et al., 2008). As expected, 
Turkish membership is linked to a possible immigration flow which is always a trump 
card in right wing politicians’ hands, particularly before the elections. Regarding this 
issue, a remarkably counterfactual argument was detected in Le Figaro on 16th 
December 2004. The French daily pointed out that the extreme right wing party Front 
National (FN) which claimed “200 million Turkish-speaking people” were waiting for 
Turkish accession to immigrate to Europe (Tekin, 2008: 747). The example refers to 
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Turkic people in Middle Asian countries as if they are Turkish passport holders and as if 
they speak completely the same language with Turkish citizens. This kind of extreme 
examples concerning the Turkish issue are relatively rare in the British press where the 
debate on the issue is less tense. 
 
The studies which specifically focus on the British press show that the general tone of 
the news items published in the UK are by and large in favour of Turkey’s EU bid 
(Öktem, 2005; Christensen, 2006; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Koenig et al., 
2006; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce, 2009b; 
Schneeberger, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Paksoy, 2011; Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 
2011). However, this does not mean that the opposition discourse and the drawbacks 
of Turkish membership are not portrayed. For instance, Devran’s study (2007) shows 
that the Orientalist discourse dominates the British coverage on Turkey. Moreover, the 
opinion polls from France and Germany where the results are significantly anti-Turkish 
can be frequently seen in the British coverage (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 
2011: 163). Besides, the British press does not hesitate to present economic, political 
and cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States. “Turkey has 
generally been deemed to be too populous, too poor, too undemocratic, too illiberal 
and too culturally different to become a full member of the EU” (Aksoy, 2009: 470). 
Even some left-leaning or liberal-minded news organisations such as The Guardian 
have a tendency to emphasise the cultural dissimilarities (Schneeberger, 2009). The 
continuous representation of these differences may cause a mediated Othering of 
Turkey in the European context (Schneeberger, 2009: 99). Nevertheless, in the British 
media representation of Turkey, the negative and critical elements are always together 
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with the positive overall tone compared to the representation in the Franco-German 
media: 
“What is indeed striking in the British *media+ debate is that all negative 
arguments on Turkey’s democratic deficits and status as a cultural misfit are 
recognised by most authors but the conclusions differ profoundly from those of 
the Turco-sceptic agenda of continental European debates” (Öktem, 2005: 13). 
More differences between the coverage of continental Europe and the British will be 
discussed together with the essentialist and functionalist understanding of the EU in 
the following section.  
 
3.3.2.2. The findings on the essentialist and functionalist view  
Several studies in the literature suggest that there was a cleavage between the Franco-
German media and British media in their approach to Turkish membership (inter alia 
Öktem, 2005: 10; Koenig et al., 2006; Devran, 2007; Negrine et al., 2008: 53; Wimmel, 
2009). The reason for the differences between the two can be categorised by Franco-
German media’s essentialist and the British media’s functionalist understanding of the 
EU. Compared to the British media, the extent of illustrating Turkey as the Other is 
greater in the continental European press where the recontextualisation of the 
dichotomies “Orient and Occident, tradition and modernity, civilisation and barbarism” 
is frequently observable in the news items concerning Turkey-EU relations (Bischof et 
al., 2010: 377). The reason for this manifest Othering in the European press can be 
explained by stances such as ‘ingroup favoritism’ which refers to an essentialist 
understanding of Europe (Tekin, 2008). In contrast, it was found that the discussions of 
Turkey's EU accession in the British newspapers were framed in a more liberal 
multiculturalist way compared to the news items published in France and Germany 
(Koenig et al., 2006: 158). Regarding the same segmentation, Negrine et al. (2008: 56-
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58) claimed that the UK and France had different experiences in their relations with 
Turkey and the EU. Because of the dissimilarity in their experiences, the French 
media’s approach sees the incompatibilities between Turkey and the EU as permanent 
issues which do matter. On the contrary, the British coverage argues that Turkey’s 
problem on the way to reach EU membership can be dealt with, since being part of 
European identity depends on fulfilling the principles which were specified beforehand 
rather than the essentialist aspects of Europeanness (Schneeberger, 2009: 99). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the British media often evaluates the Turkish issue by 
means of tangible topics such as economics and human rights while the French is more 
interested in identity issues such as questioning “‘Who are ‘we’? What is the ‘EU’?’” 
(Negrine et al., 2008; also see Aissaoui, 2007: 8; Tekin, 2008). The questioning is 
usually related to an essentialist understanding of European identity. The excerpt 
below from a French politician, François Bayrou, quoted in Le Figaro, is an explicit 
example to show the degree of the essentialist view.  
“Bayrou argued that Europe is a cultural project as well as a political one and 
presented European culture as rooted in Christianity and the legacy of ancient 
Greece and Rome. He stated that ‘one cannot treat with disdain one’s heritage 
that draws on the legacy of the Rome–Athens–Jerusalem triptych’*…+” 
(Aissaoui, 2007: 9). 
 
The difference between the essentialist and functionalist camps inevitably cause 
different observations on the same issues. The examples from The Guardian and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Wimmel’s study (2009) explain this point. 
 “*…+ Chris Alden interpreted the territorial size and the rapid population 
growth not as a substantial structural problem, but as the greatest potential 
advantage of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU, a fact of which nobody on the 
continent wanted to take serious note. ‘The most obvious strengths to Turkey’s 
case are its size, strategic position and powerful military’ (GUA, 12 Dec 2002: 
18). The potential conflict between widening and deepening the EU expressed 
almost ad nauseam by the FAZ [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung] journalists was 
not even perceived in passing as a problem by the Guardian journalists, so 
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incomprehensible was the ambition of a deepened political integration to 
them” (Wimmel, 2009: 236). 
All these differences between the Franco-German axis and the Anglo-Saxon 
perspective converge at one point which is Europe’s finality, namely the “old 
controversies between a politically integrated European federal state (Bundesstaat) 
and an intergovernmental association of sovereign nation-states (Staatenbund)” 
(Wimmel, 2009: 224). It can be argued that the media representation of Turkey’s EU 
bid is shaped by this very controversy. Therefore, Turkey is a popular object to exploit 
in the media debate of Europe’s finality as Turkish membership of the EU unveils what 
the EU wants to be in the future. 
 
3.3.3. What can this study add to the shortcomings in the literature? 
Probably the main shortcoming in the literature is the deficit of production and 
reception studies. No study13 on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid has used 
interviews in order to explore the news production step. Only one study 
(Schneeberger, 2011) conducted focus groups as a method. Moreover, almost all 
academic work was based on an analysis of newspapers. While very few studies looked 
at the news coverage on TV (e.g. Chaban et al., 2005; Hinrichsen, 2012), no research 
project has focused on radio, magazines, news websites or social media. Only three 
studies presented a visual analysis of news photographs of Turkey-EU relations 
(Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Loukas, 2006; Paksoy, 2010). It is significantly rare 
to see a study which makes a sufficient literature review concerning the existing 
studies on media representation of Turkey’s EU bid. For this reason, it was discovered 
that several studies did not quote from each other. 
                                                          
13 Only Tekin’s study (2010) of the French political discourse on Turkey’s EU bid includes interviews with 
journalists who work for the French media. However, the interviews in her study were not conducted in 
order to analyse the news production step. 
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The differences of this thesis compared to the existing literature are: the complete 
presentation of the specific literature on the media coverage of Turkey-EU relations 
since 2001; wider material and time samples on news content; and interviewing 
journalists as an additional method in order to look at the production of the news 
items. Moreover, this study employs an analytical framework based on the notion of ‘a 
positive Other’ which seeks to better explain the findings and propose a 
conceptualisation concerning the media representation of Turkey-EU relations in the 
British media context.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
The broad literature on Turkey-EU relations and the specific literature on the media 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid were demonstrated by focusing on the points which 
are related to the main concerns of this thesis. 
 
In the first section, the literature on Turkey-EU relations was examined by a 
categorisation of political, economic, geographical and cultural discussions. The overall 
view on Turkey throughout these categories was that Turkey was enjoying its position 
between the Eastern and the Western world while it was also suffering an identity 
crisis because of not belonging to any side. Therefore, it is impossible to decide on a 
consistent image of Turkey for Europeans. The section also argued that understanding 
Turkey-EU relations is significantly related to how the EU is imagined. It was claimed 
that a person’s ‘functionalist’ or an ‘essentialist’ perspective to the EU more or less 
reveals their thoughts on the Turkish issue.   
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The second section of the chapter focused on the particular literature which is about 
the media representation of Turkey-EU relations in various countries. The examination 
of the data was mostly performed by discourse or content analysis and they looked 
mainly at some periods in 2004 and/or 2005.  
 
Having presented the previous studies on the issue, the section also illustrated the 
deficits in the literature. It was found that the majority of research projects on the 
issue were interested in newspaper analysis and overlooked the reception and 
production analysis. The end of the chapter explained what this study can add to the 
extant literature by taking into account the aforementioned shortcomings. 
Consequently, all the new aspects and their contribution to the lacunae in the 
literature will be underlined in detail in the next chapter on analytical framework, and 
then in the following one on the methodology. Finally, how these different aspects 
were applied in the thesis can be observed throughout the data presentation in 
relevant chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“The opposite of light shows what is light, 
Hence colors too are known by their opposite. 
God created pain and grief for this purpose, 
To wit, to manifest happiness by its opposites. 
Hidden things are manifested by their opposites; 
But, as God has no opposite. He remains hidden.” 
Rumi 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Almost everything requires an opposite to come into existence and to make sense. 
Similarly, identities also need an opposite to define and make themselves stronger 
(Fürsich, 2002). Drawing on Bakhtin, Tekin argues  
“*…+ meaning is, in essence, dialogic and all meaning is relational. Therefore it is 
impossible to consider one Self as a Self, and to become self-conscious, if one 
does not reveal one’s Self to the Other, through the Other and with the help of 
the Other” (2010: 12).  
 
Thus, it can be argued that the Self and the Other are interdependent. This applies to 
how European identity was/is being constituted since “*…+ the construction of a 
European common identity depends on the existence of Europe’s cultural others” 
(Kösebalaban, 2007: 97). Regarding this, Hall says 
“*…+ the West's sense of itself - its identity - was formed not only by the 
internal processes that gradually moulded Western European countries into a 
distinct type of society, but also through Europe's sense of difference from 
other worlds - how it came to represent itself in relation to these ‘others.’” 
(1995: 188). 
 
In the same way, Delanty (1995) argues that European identity required a common 
enemy since “*c+onsciousness of a shared history was an impossible criterion: the 
divisions and discontinuities in European history were too great to produce a unified 
European identity” (1995: 84). 
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“Asia and the idea of the Orient was *…+ one of the mirrors in which a European self-
image emerged in a long historical process” (Stråth, 2000: 411). Within this 
demarcation, as an historical Other of Europe, Turkey has been contributing to what is 
meant by ‘European’ for centuries (Delanty, 1995). However, it has recently started to 
take charge of a new duty by playing the role of the European Other in a different way 
while waiting at the front door of the EU as an official EU membership candidate. This 
time Turkey is not an object to serve as the central Other of the European identity as it 
had been in the past. Instead, Turkey is now the object of the discussions on ‘what is 
European identity and where does it end?’ between the European rivals, namely the 
UK and the Franco-German axis, which compete on what the EU will evolve into. 
Therefore, when the concepts ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ are evaluated in the context of 
Turkey-EU relations, the approaches to Turkey’s EU membership are directly related to 
the definition of the EU. That is why Turkish membership does not only refer to 
Turkey’s status, but also to the EU’s future identity and the rationale of European 
integration (Beck and Delanty, 2006: 11; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; 
Kylstad, 2010; Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011). Accordingly, Turkey “*…+ 
throws up questions about what the EU is, what it means to be European, what it 
means to be in Europe, and who should be in and who should be out” 
(Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 168). Hence, the representation of Turkey’s 
EU bid in the British media is actually the objectification of Turkey in the contention 
between the two aforementioned rival sides of the EU. 
 
In the light of the brief discussion above, this chapter seeks to build an analytical 
framework for the findings and discussions of this thesis. First of all, the chapter will 
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describe the notion of ‘a positive Other’. Then, the chapter discusses the notion 
together with its links with Self/Other nexus and Orientalism. The main argument here 
is that there are different types of Others and they are not static. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the relationship between the Self and the Other does not have to be based 
on antagonism.  
 
Through the end of the chapter, it will be illustrated why the notion of ‘a positive Other’ 
is the core of the analytical framework of this thesis. In accepting the existence of a 
continuum of different types of Others and different degrees of positive and negative 
relationships between the Self and the Other, it is asserted that the representation of 
Turkey’s EU bid in the British media can be ideally contextualised by the notion of ‘a 
positive Other’. 
 
4.2. An explanation of ‘a positive Other’ 
Since Claude Lévi-Strauss introduced the term “l’égo et l’autre”, the concepts “the 
Self” and “the Other” have received significant attention from researchers who study 
identity, especially in disciplines such as cultural studies, media studies, international 
relations, sociology and history (Criss, 2008: 67). For instance, Sartre and others 
highlighted the importance of the Other in explaining the formation of the Self. 
Foucault put forth the necessity of looking at who the Others are in understanding the 
sane and the mad (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 332). Furthermore, Said’s (2003: 3) 
initiative to show how the European Self empowered itself by degrading its Oriental 
Other are additional examples of what these two terms are about (Neumann and 
Welsh, 1991: 332). Connected to the latter, there are numerous studies underlining 
the differences and clashes between the European Self and its Other (inter alia 
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Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Hall, 1995; Robins, 1996; Neumann, 1996; Hall; 1997; Said, 
1997; Stråth, 2002; Said, 2003; Kösebalaban, 2007; Strasser, 2008; Tekin, 2008; Bryce; 
2009a; 2009b; Tekin, 2010). However, ‘a positive Other’, a term coined by Neumann 
and Welsh (1991), has not reached the place it deserves in theoretical discussions 
concerning the Self/Other nexus. This chapter attempts to place the British media 
representation of Turkey-EU relations within an analytical framework of ‘a positive 
Other’, in other words ‘positive othering’. 
 
While writing on how the Other can also be a positive entity, Neumann and Welsh 
(1991) give examples from 18th century philosophers of the Enlightenment such as 
Rousseau’s point on the ‘noble savage’ and Cusanus’ argument concerning the 
importance of a dialogue in attaining positive results in relations with the Turks. 
According to Neumann and Welsh “*…+ one should not rule out the possibility of 
turning a traditionally apposite Other into a positive Other, with which one could have 
mutually fruitful interaction” (1991: 331). There are a few studies in the literature 
which borrowed Neumann and Welsh’s (1991) notion. They employed it in order to 
explain the relationship between nationalism and identity (Petersoo, 2007; Borou, 
2009; Esperza, 2010). In addition, some studies in the literature support the idea of 
‘positive othering’ even though they do not refer to the notion directly. For instance, 
certain studies on liberal constructivism in International Relations theory underline 
that the Other should not always necessarily be a dangerous entity (Wendt, 1994; 
Rumelili, 2004; Tekin, 2010). In this respect, “the contingency and the transformability” 
are the main points highlighted by liberal constructivists while understanding the 
relationship between the Self and the Other (Rumelili, 2004: 34). Therefore, what they 
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discuss by referring to ‘positive identification’ can be related to the notion of ‘a 
positive Other’. 
 
4.2.1. The Other is not static and not one type 
There are various types of Others and most of them are open to change (Billig, 1995: 
81). This means that Others may have specific characteristics, different relationships 
with the Self and different proximities to the Self. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
different types of Others and their non-static character in relation with the Self 
underpins the formation of ‘a positive Other’.  
 
Even though, following Said’s argument, “the possibility of cosmopolitan interaction 
between the West and East becomes seemingly impossible given that the former’s 
identity has been defined negatively against the latter through the construction of 
orientalism” (Hobson, 2006: 107), the changes in the world and expectations in politics 
may alter the status of the Other (Petersoo, 2007). Therefore, it is meaningful to recall 
another of Said’s points which highlights the dynamic character of othering by saying 
“each age and society recreates its Others” (Said, 1979: 322 cited in Tekin, 2010: 176). 
Tekin (2010: 176) connects this dynamic nature to the existence of an identification 
from negative to positive which may lead the Other to be an extension of the Self in 
the long run. This transformation has been proven by history several times. For 
instance, the problematic relationships between Germany and France, Britain and 
Europe, and Eastern and Western Europe were resolved in the 20th century (Tekin, 
2010: 176). Moreover, Turkey itself is an outstanding example in this type of 
transformation. 
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“With the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the 1908 revolution of 
the Young Turks and the defeat in World War I, a representation of Turkey 
began to take shape as a normalizing and modernizing nation and, with its 
entry into NATO, even as a trusted ally. More important, in being represented 
as a case of normalization, the transformation from a sick to a reborn and 
young body politic also made ‘the Turk’ less central as a constitutive other” 
(Neumann, 1999: 60). 
 
The resolutions in Europe mentioned above and Turkey’s transformation concerning 
its relationship with the European Self show that political, economic, and geographical 
actualities make the Other changeable.  
 
As part of its raison d'être, the Other should be, to some degree, different from the 
Self. However, the relationship between the two does not have to be antagonistic 
(Rumelili, 2004; Petersoo, 2007: 120). Moreover, Tekin (2010), following Todorov 
(1999), argues that the Other does not have to be seen as unequal. She asserts that 
the Self’s aim to define itself is not only 
“dependent on the attribution of absolute negativity, as it has been suggested 
by some earlier constructivist works. In this view, it is the absolute or radical 
difference of the Other that accomplishes its constitutive role in the formation 
of collective identities” (Tekin, 2010: 14). 
 
At this point, it can be argued that the representation of the Other can be seen as a 
‘continuum’ (Tekin, 2010: 14; also see Wendt, 1994; Rumelili, 2004).  
“Along this continuum, relations of identity and difference, and cooperation 
and conflict are assumed to co-vary. In negative identification, self sees the 
other as different, threatening, and inferior, and their relations are 
characterised by conflict and the ever-present possibility of war. In positive 
identification, the other is seen as similar, and as a non-threatening extension 
of self, and going to war with the other becomes a non-possibility” (Rumelili, 
2004: 34). 
Similarly, identifying the different types of Others is related to how the Self is defined. 
For instance, if the European Self is associated with essentialist characteristics, the 
transformation of the Other in order to be an extension of the Self would be 
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significantly difficult. Moreover, the Other then requires its differences to be assessed 
by the Self as temporary and amendable. Concerning this issue, Rumelili says   
“If difference is constructed to be deriving from inherent characteristics (the 
other as non-self), then the possibilities for change in the ‘other’ are by 
definition nonexistent, and the other is placed in a position of permanent 
difference. If, on the other hand, difference is constructed to be deriving from 
acquired characteristics (the other as less self), then, by definition, there is the 
possibility that the other will become like self one day, so the other is only in a 
position of temporary difference” (2004: 37). 
 
In addition to the discussions above, one should also examine Bakic-Hayden’s (1995) 
theory of “nesting orientalisms” in order to explore the existence of different types of 
Others in relation to the European Self. According to her theory, “Asia is more ‘East’ or 
‘other’ than eastern Europe; within eastern Europe itself this gradation is reproduced 
with the Balkans perceived as most ‘eastern’; within the Balkans there are similarly 
constructed hierarchies” (Bakic-Hayden, 1995: 918). Bakic-Hayden’s point can be 
reified by looking at those countries which are the European Other and those located 
on the periphery of Europe. For instance, the Turks’ position as a European Other is 
historically identified (inter alia Neumann, 1999; Stråth, 2002; Karlsson, 2007; Strasser, 
2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009; Lazarou, 2010). Apart from their impact on Europe’s 
religion and culture as an Other, the Ottoman Turk was also the important Other for 
the establishment of the modern state system in Europe (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 
330; Neumann, 1999: 43). Even today, the French discursive space sees Turkey as the 
most distant Other of Europe when compared to American, Russian and even North 
African Others. Within French political discourse, Morocco, whose membership bid 
was rejected by the EU (the then EC) in 1987, is evaluated as much closer to France 
than Turkey (Tekin, 2010). 
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Consequently, in the light of the discussions above, this study accepts the existence of 
different levels of Others, and argues that Turkey’s position in its relation to the 
European Self should be evaluated within their particular relatedness rather than a 
nebulous and broad binary of Self/Other. While admitting this, the study does not seek 
to impoverish the meaning of the Other. Seeing the relationship between the Self and 
the Other as a continuum does not ignore the very existence of both sides of the nexus 
as they are the actual reason for the emergence of ‘a positive Other’. 
 
4.3. Employing the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in this study 
Having explained what this study means by ‘a positive Other’ and the similar points in 
the liberal constructivists’ understanding of Self/Other nexus above, this section 
argues that the notion of ‘a positive Other’ can theoretically explain what this study 
deals with in its empirical work. As was outlined in the literature review, the majority 
of news organisations in the British media are in favour of Turkish membership of the 
EU. The mostly positive tone in the coverage generally represents a functionalist, and 
sometimes a Kantian approach to the Turkish issue. This is because the British media 
sees the EU in a cosmopolitan way in order to reach a “peaceful coexistence between 
diverse states through interdependence and law-governed relations” in Europe 
(Kylstad, 2010: 15; also see Delanty, 2006). However, the coverage of the same news 
organisations continuously highlight Turkey’s differences from Europe, and also in a 
sense orientalise Turkey in the EU membership context. In order to reach a better 
understanding of this controversial-looking situation, these significant findings require 
‘a positive Other’ as a sub-notion within the Self/Other nexus or Orientalism. 
 
 
 75 
 
4.3.1. Orientalism and positive othering 
Some of the existing research on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations, 
including the analyses of the British coverage, utilise the importance of Orientalism, 
especially Said’s Orientalism, in their theoretical background, (inter alia Baştürk-Akca 
and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Devran, 2007; Kejanlıoğlu and Taş, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010). 
This thesis also draws on Said in many cases since it acknowledges Orientalism’s 
“central importance for an investigation of representations of the Islamic world 
(specifically the Near and Middle East) as the cultural contestant against which 'the 
West' first had to define itself” (Bryce, 2009b: 67; also see Kösebalaban, 2007: 97). 
However, it would not be adequate to set the analytical framework of this thesis only 
within a view which is interested in an analysis of the exclusion of the Oriental (Turkey) 
from the Occidental (the EU), or exploring the media representation through the 
clashes between the Self and the Other.  
 
The long relationship between “'Europe and the Turk' is not one of perennial mutual 
hostility, of an undifferentiated Western anti-Turkish prejudice *…+” (Bryce, 2009b: 
115). The relations are often influenced by pragmatic expectations from both sides 
rather than only essentialist goals. On the contrary, Orientalism is mainly based on an 
analysis of a political doctrine which makes the differences between the East and the 
West much stronger (Said, 2003: 204). It is primarily motivated by the West’s relations 
with particularly the Arab Muslims within the colonial and post-colonial circumstances. 
Therefore, drawing on Orientalism or other theoretical approaches which focus on 
‘othering’ in the context of Turkey-EU relations in the British media fails to see a crucial 
point concerning ‘the British exceptionalism’ (Smith, 2005; also see Marcussen and 
Roscher, 2000: 345; Anastasakis, 2004: 8), namely the Eurosceptic character of the 
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British media and the awkward relationships between the UK and the EU. More 
importantly, building the analysis only as a critique of the Orientalist discourse in the 
media coverage beforehand may slant the research outcomes in a negative way. The 
section below elucidates the position of the Orientalist discourse in this study and 
discusses the extent to which it is – or is not – useful in explaining what this study deals 
with. 
 
4.3.2. Said’s view on Orientalism and how much this study can benefit from it 
The basic definition of Orientalism refers to activities such as teaching, writing or 
researching the Orient. Accordingly, the people who perform these activities are the 
Orientalists (Said, 2003). However, the concept’s meaning is not limited to an 
academic discipline or a group of people who are interested in discovering the Orient. 
Orientalism also refers to a way of thinking that is established on the ontological and 
epistemological differences between the Orient and the Occident (Said, 2003: 2). It is 
possible to see those differences in the works of many poets, researchers, 
philosophers, economists, political theorists, and administrators (Said, 2003: 2). There 
is also the third meaning “which is something more historically and materially defined” 
(Said, 2003: 3) compared to the other definitions above.  
“Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point 
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for 
dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, 
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in 
short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient” (Said, 2003: 3) 
 
Following this definition, Said mentions that he employs Foucault’s notion of discourse 
in order to analyse how European culture managed and even produced the Orient in 
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the post-Enlightenment (Said, 2003: 3). At this point, the notion of ‘power’ has a 
crucial role to play. Hall argues 
“*p+ower not only constrains and prevents: it is also productive. It produces 
new discourses, new kinds of knowledge (i.e. Orientalism), new objects of 
knowledge (the Orient), it shapes new practices (colonization) and institutions 
(colonial government)” (1997: 261). 
All in all, it can be argued that Said is interested in the analysis of a Western-originated 
discourse which identifies the Orient, makes comments on it, and furthermore 
dominates it.  
 
Orientalism sees the West as a natural born eminence when compared to the East. 
Therefore, Orientalist thought examines the West through the contrast between the 
'Self' and the 'Other' which is actually the categorisation of the 'advanced' and the 
'backward' (Hobson, 2004: 7; Aissaoui, 2007: 13). Moreover, in Hall’s words, it is a 
discourse which produces “racialized knowledge of the Other” (1997: 260). To put it 
mildly, Orientalist discourse is reductionist. It tends to represent the negative side of 
the Orient’s characteristics. It shows its reductionism in different fields such as arts, 
literature, media, politics, academia, etc. Said gives a striking example from an essay, 
published by Harold W. Glidden in the American Journal of Psychiatry in February 
1972, which can explain the level of this reductionism. The title of the essay is 'The 
Arab World'; it deals with the Orientalist frame of mind. Even though it is only four 
pages long, it claims to reflect the psychological portrait of 100 million Arabs for a 
period of 1300 years (Said, 2003: 48). There are other examples which illustrate the 
traces of Orientalism in some prominent Western scientists’ language. For instance, 
Weber “*…+ contrasted Islam with Western Europe in terms of modern social 
development” (Hall, 1995: 222). He thinks that features like 'rationality' and 
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'predictability' can be only seen in the West (Hobson, 2004: 15). According to his 
Orientalist view, the Occident world owns the rational science and rational individual 
while the Orient accommodates coercive religions and a collective way of life (Hobson, 
2004: 16). Similarly, 
“Montesquieu held that one could define the nature of any particular state, 
society, or individual with reference to an ahistorical, constant criterion such as 
climate or religion. Despotism was exclusively defined as an Oriental regime to 
be encountered only in Asia; it corresponded to the warm-climate zone” 
(Çırakman, 2001: 57). 
 
Insufficient remarks on Turkey in Said’s Orientalism 
Even though Said’s Orientalism is a widely acknowledged work, there are various 
critiques concerning its theoretical and methodological problems (Lewis, 1982; 
Bayoumi and Rubin, 2001). For instance, Mellor criticises Said’s Foucauldian approach. 
“*...] [H]is reduction of all knowledge and understanding to discursive 
representations of power interests not only substitutes a textual imperialism 
for colonial hegemony but also encourages an easy recourse to accusations of 
racism and ethnocentricism that actually limits rather than expands the 
intellectual possibilities of scholarship” (Mellor, 2004: 101). 
 
Another criticism performed by Mellor (2004) directs to the fundamentals of Said’s 
work. Said criticises the interest of Orientalists on Western sources while explaining 
the Orient. However, concerning this issue Mellor argues that Said “himself looks to 
Foucault and Gramsci rather than to Middle Eastern philosophers and theologians” 
(Mellor, 2004: 101). Elaborating these issues could lead this section to long and 
nebulous discussions while this thesis is more interested in the critiques on Said’s work 
related to its lack of references to Turkey and its status within the Orientalist 
discourse. Therefore, this section seeks to discuss what Said had written on Turkey and 
its position between the East and the West. 
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Even though Said had already mentioned in the introduction chapter of Orientalism 
that Germans and Russians had less to do with the Orientalist tradition (Said, 2003: 1), 
Orientalism was criticised by several scholars (e.g. Ahmad, 2000; Irwin, 2006; Varisco, 
2007) because of its limited scope of research material which overlooks examples from 
Germany and Russia while it focuses on Britain, France and the US (Lewis, 1982: 13; 
Bryce, 2009b: 65). The lacuna is not only limited to the sample on the Occident. Said’s 
work does not focus on Turkey as much as it does on other leading countries and 
nations of the Middle East. Bryce (2009b: 1) argues that the discussions on the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in Said are not satisfactory when compared 
to the continuous references to the Muslim Arab countries (also see Lewis, 1982: 9). 
Similarly, MacLean (2006: viii) argues “*…+ Said himself omitted any discussion of the 
Ottoman Empire from Orientalism”. The reason for Said’s lack of interest in Turkey 
could be related to “his close association of the Orientalist discourse with the 
extension of de-facto and formal colonial rule by European powers in the Arabic-
speaking Middle East” (Bryce, 2009b: 112). Even though the majority of this region 
used to be part of the Ottoman Empire, one can argue that Said’s discussions 
concerning those countries do not originate from his thoughts on Ottoman Turkey or 
Modern Turkey. Bryce (2009b: 112) explains the non-existence of Turkey in the centre 
of Said’s Orientalism by using the notion of liminality. He argues  
“It is not that Said necessarily neglects Turkey (it features as a unit of analysis 
where instrumentally relevant to his thesis) but that he does not consider the 
liminal, disruptive positions that the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of 
Turkey occupy vis-à-vis the reified notions of Europe or the West (materially 
and discursively) *…+” (Bryce, 2009b: 112). 
 
In the same vein, Said’s other seminal work Covering Islam (1997) does not deal with 
Turkey in the most crucial discussions of the book. For instance, Said does not mention 
Turkey when he argues that the Islamic world, from North Africa to South Asia, 
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‘excluding Lebanon’ (Said’s emphasis), articulates itself by using Islamic terms (Said, 
1997: 62-63). If he thought that Turkey was not part of this region but a member of the 
periphery, he could have at least referred to Turkey’s position in expressing itself 
through secular or Islamic terms. Turkey is mentioned in some sections of Covering 
Islam, such as Turkey’s decision to live a western way of life together with Israel in the 
Middle East (Said, 1997: 138). However, Turkey was never treated as one of the main 
countries discussed in the book. 
 
Similar to Orientalism, his book Covering Islam also puts forward immensely crucial 
arguments on how the West sees the East but these are not theoretically and 
empirically sufficient to adopt in the case of Turkey and its bid to join the EU. The very 
limited reference to Turkey in Covering Islam could be because of Said’s main interest 
in the oil crises in 1974, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Islamic fundamentalism and 
terror while explaining the stress between the Eastern and the Western world. One 
can argue that these issues are not directly related to Turkey and that is why Turkey 
was overlooked in most examples given in the book. Making the same explanation for 
Turkey’s status in Orientalism is probably inadequate. The reason for the insufficient 
focus on Turkey in his work Orientalism can be the fact that Turkey is not the most 
appropriate example to explain the differences between the East and the West. More 
analysis on Turkey could have even impoverished Said’s several arguments in 
Orientalism. Thus, Bryce’s (2009b) aforementioned point on Said’s lack of interest in 
Turkey’s liminality in its relationship with Europe is meaningful. Consequently, the 
disinterest in Turkey in Said’s works not only causes Turkey’s limited appearance in the 
discussions on the Oriental discourse but also leads to a lack of emphasis on Turkey’s 
special position between the East and the West. It can be argued that drawing on the 
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Orientalist thought for a study on the representation of Turkey-EU relations in the 
German or Austrian context, where “more exclusivist interpretation of European 
identity” (Schneeberger, 2009: 100) exists, would be more convenient (see Ramm, 
2009). Besides, employing the complete version of Said’s approach in Orientalism 
would have been an ideal choice if the case had been on the representation of 
Morocco’s EU bid in the French or German media. Therefore, this study requires a 
notion which can explain Turkey’s EU bid in the British coverage beyond simply saying 
that ‘Turkey is being orientalised’. 
 
4.4. Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ in the context of the British media 
When Neumann and Welsh (1991: 331) explained their notion of ‘a positive Other’, 
they referred to a ‘mutual fruitful interaction’ between the Self and the Other. If this is 
the main condition of transforming an Other into a positive Other, it can be argued 
that the British media’s and Government’s expectations of the results of Turkish 
membership of the EU are the aspects of this fruitful interaction. Before understanding 
why the British media sees Turkey as ‘a positive Other’, one should look at the special 
relationship between the British media and the EU. 
 
4.4.1. The British media and the EU 
There is a general acceptance of the awkward position of the UK in the EU. Compared 
to France and Germany, “the fundamental attitudes of the British elite towards 
European integration have remained essentially the same since the end of World War 
II” (Marcussen and Roscher, 2000: 344). Inevitably, this awkwardness has an impact on 
the constitution of the Eurosceptic approach of the British media in EU affairs (see 
Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Dougal, 2003; Öktem, 2005). This Euroscepticism 
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shows itself in the news coverage at different levels. There are some clear objections 
regarding further integration with the EU, which are “*…+ economic (with socio-
political undertones), political (mainly sovereignty and defence issues) and the historic-
cultural, including at its most extreme, a palpable dislike of foreigners, and of Germany 
in particular” (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 63). For instance, when the discussions 
about the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union in the EU) were on the agenda, it was 
emphasised that Britain had a strong currency and using the same currency with other 
members of the EU would weaken British control on the national economy. Moreover, 
there are some political discussions which argue that Britain has a sound parliamentary 
democracy and if the authority of the British Parliament is partly or fully transferred to 
the hands of Brussels’ non-elected bureaucrats, the power of the national parliament 
may diminish. Moreover, the Eurosceptic approach in the British press argues that the 
strong foreign policy of the UK may lose its power if further integration comes into 
force. In addition to this, it is claimed that the British military power can be more 
influential if it continues to cooperate with the NATO alliance instead of choosing an 
advanced military integration with other EU members (Anderson and Weymouth, 
1999: 5).  
 
There is an identity issue behind the practical issues mentioned above. Anderson and 
Weymouth (1999: 5-6) argue that the strong Euroscepticism in the British press 
contributes to the construction of an external ‘Other’ for the British which is 
‘continental Europe’. This is what two European Others –but within different contexts– 
‘Turkey’ and ‘the UK’ have in common. Since ‘their enemy’s enemy is their friend’, the 
situation establishes a ground for a pro-Turkish stance in the British coverage of 
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Turkey’s EU bid. Accordingly, this substantiates the conceptualisation of Turkey’s 
representation as ‘a positive Other’. 
 
4.4.2. Why is Turkey ‘a positive Other’ for the British media? 
Having discussed the British media’s approach to the EU affairs in brief, this section 
focuses on the rationale behind portraying Turkey as ‘a positive Other’. The reasons 
why the UK is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid, listed by Anastasakis (2004) and Öktem 
(2005) below, can also refer to why Turkey is ‘a positive Other’ in the British media: 
“*…+ the way in which Britain perceives (a) the future of the European Union 
(and the position of Turkey within this); (b) its strategic interests in the region 
of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (and Turkey’s compatibility 
with those interests) and (c) the British approach to ‘Other’ identities and 
cultures” (Anastasakis, 2004: 7). 
 
“The UK’s foreign policy objectives are decidedly trans-Atlanticist, and its 
economic interests are global rather than European. *…+ The case for Turkey’s 
membership bid then appears as the perfect template on which UK visions of 
Europe, clearly shaped by British Euroscepticism and, indeed, visions for global 
governance can be expressed. From this perspective, the accession of Turkey 
would make possible the transformation of the EU into a free-trade zone of 
democratic states and subvert Franco-German hegemony and perceived plans 
for a supra-national European state” (Öktem, 2005: 15-16). 
 
Thus, the British politicians advocate that “*…+ Turkey should be let in for the sake of 
British interests if it fulfils the entry criteria, regardless of whether it is culturally part 
of Europe or not” (Aksoy, 2009: 475). In order to elaborate on those reasons, one 
should point out that the UK’s and Turkey’s relations with Europe/the EU are relatively 
different compared to other major EU Member States and the positions of other EU 
membership candidates. On the one hand, Turkey is part of Eastern civilisation but has 
also been positioned awkwardly in the Western world since the Treaty of Paris in 1856, 
which is “commonly cited as the date at which the Sublime Porte was formally 
admitted into the European club of states” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 331; Ortaylı, 
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2008: 111). Besides, this can be proven by the political conditions of the contemporary 
world as Turkey is part of NATO, the Council of Europe, and an official EU membership 
candidate. On the other hand, the UK has an idiosyncratic status in Europe because of 
its history and contemporary position in Brussels (see Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; 
Ash, 2001; Anastasakis, 2004; Öktem, 2005; Wimmel, 2009). “Britain often challenged 
the motives of the EU and acted against the prospect of a supranational entity, fearing 
that it could dominate British national interests” (Anastasakis, 2004: 8). Therefore, the 
UK and accordingly the British media in general envisage a looser EU which promotes 
free trade together with a protection of national sovereignty. Furthermore, compared 
to its rivals in the EU, the UK’s “integrationist approach to different cultures explains 
the limited significance of culturalist arguments in the [British] public debate” 
(Anastasakis, 2004: 7). These reveal that the UK employs its European identity in a 
more functionalist way than an essentialist one. Therefore, one can argue that the UK’s 
European identity can be seen as an example of ‘postmodern collectivity’ (Rumelili, 
2004: 46). Even though this collectivity requires a difference from the Other, it does 
not see the Other as a threat to its European identity (Rumelili, 2004: 46).  
 
Seeing Turkey as a non-threatening positive Other in the context of its EU bid is related 
to how the Self considers the conditions of being accepted to be an extension of itself. 
The Self’s positive approach, in this case that of the UK and the British media, to the 
Turkish issue is primarily connected to what the British understand from the EU 
project. Continental Europe’s hesitations regarding Turkish membership and how the 
cultural borders of Europe are going to be defined (Lazarou, 2010: 27) is not generally 
an issue in the UK. Because of Britain’s inclusive understanding of European identity, 
Turkey’s differences from the EU are degraded into some temporary practicalities. 
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These practicalities can be amended according to written values (such as the 
Copenhagen criteria) and finally, the Other can be part of the Self if it fulfils its 
responsibilities.  
 
In addition to all these, Turkey’s own characteristics also contribute to the UK’s and 
the British media’s expectations. Keyman’s (2006) long sentence below summarises a 
long debate: 
“Turkey with its ability to achieve the co-existence of Islam, secular modernity 
and democracy constitutes an alternative modernity, and it is this characteristic 
of Turkey that creates its recent perception in academic and political discourse 
as an important actor whose experience of modernity should be taken seriously 
by any attempt aiming at going beyond the clash of civilisations, beyond the 
orientalist divide between the West and the East, and more importantly 
beyond the culturally essentialist and fundamentalist desires to codify 
difference as the dangerous Other” (Keyman, 2006: 206). 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey has been trying to dispose of its representation 
as ‘the Other’ – at least since the start of the Republican period (Aksoy, 2009: 471). Its 
representation concerning its EU bid in the British media can be seen as one of the 
most suitable domains to dispose of its image as ‘the European Other’. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The chapter has shown that the Other does not have to be a static entity. Its positive 
relationship with the Self and the changing circumstances which surround the Other’s 
characteristics can make the borders between being the Other and being the Self 
porous. It was proposed in the chapter that Turkey’s EU bid discussions in the British 
media is one of the suitable examples to explain the conditions above. Therefore, the 
notion of ‘a positive Other’ was employed in order to conceptualise how Turkey was 
represented in the British media.  
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The notion does not simply refer to being between the Self and the Other. The notion 
has to do with an entity that still protects its certain characteristics as an Other, but 
also transformed itself by meeting a set of desired norms (e.g. the Copenhagen 
criteria) in order to be accepted by the Self. Thus, the Other’s efforts to make itself ‘a 
positive Other’ is not possible before the Self admits this transformation. 
 
The notion of ‘a positive Other’ can be improved in further studies in order to better 
explain media content which includes similar issues. It can be useful in various 
contexts, especially when a media outlet supports an issue with several caveats in the 
coverage. It does not have to be related only to countries, it can be applied in any 
context which includes some positive aspects that can be added to the Other. 
However, the Other should be accepted by the Self even though the media represents 
its differences from the Self. 
 
All in all, this chapter claimed that the representation of Turkey’s EU membership in 
the British coverage cannot be understood by only employing the theoretical 
discussions covering the Orientalist thought or Self/Other nexus. Turkey’s special 
status between the Eastern and Western world, the UK’s awkward relationship with 
the EU and the British media’s overall Eurosceptic approach to EU affairs constitute a 
perfect domain to apply the notion of ‘a positive Other’. Therefore, it is a necessity for 
this study to draw on ‘positive othering’ in order to conceptualise Turkey’s 
aforementioned special status in the British media.  
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
A specific method employed in a research project cannot always be adequate to 
explore what the study seeks to uncover. Moreover, “a research method appropriate 
for one question may be inappropriate for another” (Gray, 2004: 33). Thus, 
triangulation is implemented and methods are usually supported by other methods in 
order to reach more reliable findings.  
 
According to Jensen, “*…+ triangulation is a general strategy for gaining several 
perspectives on the same phenomenon. In attempting to verify and validate findings, 
the strategy addresses aspects of both reliability and validity” (Jensen, 2002b: 272). 
Therefore, quantitative and qualitative findings can be merged and utilised within the 
consistency of triangulation (Gray 2004: 257). This increases the scope and quality of 
the research as using quantitative and qualitative approaches coherently together 
makes the analysis much stronger (Deacon et al., 1999: 134). 
 
In this study, the examination on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations in 
the British media is conducted by finding answers to supplementary research 
questions in each empirical chapter (see the research questions in chapters 6, 7, 8, 9). 
Even though all supplementary research questions seek to contribute to answering the 
main research question, they are grounded on a variety of topics. Because of this 
variety among the supplementary questions, the methodological framework requires a 
triangulation of different methods. Therefore, as part of its triangulation, this study 
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employs three methods to collect and analyse the data: Quantitative content analysis; 
Qualitative content analysis; In-depth interviews.  
 
The three sub-sections below explain why the three methods utilised in this study 
were chosen. Then, the chapter illustrates how the research sample was formed. In 
the last section, a detailed explanation regarding the application of each method to 
the research sample is put forward. 
 
5.1.1. Analysing the content 
As this study employs two types of content analysis, it would be useful to explain how 
much the quantitative content analysis and the qualitative content analysis need the 
help of each other in this study’s research framework.  
 
The quantitative content analysis in this study is employed to find and highlight broad 
aspects of the analysed material. The analysis seeks to put forward the ‘big picture’ 
only and the results may not reveal the essence of what is being analysed. Regarding 
this point, Deacon et al. argue “*…+ the [quantitative] method is not well suited to 
studying ‘deep’ questions about textual and discursive forms” (1999: 117). For this 
reason, there would have been a serious deficit in findings of this study if the research 
methodology had been only based on quantitative aspects of the news items about 
Turkey’s EU bid. Therefore, the research requires a qualitative textual analysis which 
can help to “overcome the common limitations of traditional quantitative content 
analysis such as limitation to manifest content and to quantifiable categories” (Fürsich, 
2009: 240-241). By employing qualitative methods in this research, the researcher will 
be able to learn “the intricate details of phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 19) 
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and “discern latent meaning, *…+ implicit patterns, assumptions and omissions of a 
text” (Fürsich, 2009: 241). While doing that, the findings from the quantitative content 
analysis can contribute to the qualitative work as the quantitative findings in Chapter 6 
can be seen as a manifest analysis (see Riffe et al., 2008) which helps to better 
comprehend the qualitative content analysis. Richardson explains how quantitative 
analysis on news coverage helped him in his work ‘(Mis)Representing 
Islam’(Richardson, 2004) in grounding his qualitative analysis: 
“*The research+ developed from quantifying the patterns across a sample of 
texts (content analysis) into a project aimed at examining meaning within texts 
and relationships between these meanings and the wider processes of 
newspaper production and consumption; it developed from summarising what 
newspapers write about Islam to a project aimed at analysing how newspapers 
write about Islam *…+” (Richardson, 2007: 20). 
 
5.1.2. Talking to the journalists in the field 
Fürsich (2009) underlines the importance of analysing a “single text” in media 
research, even though it is independent from production and reception analyses. She 
refers to “the autonomy of cultural practices or objects as signifiers in their own right” 
(Fürsich, 2009: 240), which considers the possibility of analysing a single text without 
looking at the aims of producers and the understanding of reception. However, others 
have drawn attention to the importance of studying how content is produced and 
consumed (see for example Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Philo, 2007; Firmstone, 
2008b). Greg Philo’s (2007) recent critical intervention, ‘Can Discourse Analysis 
successfully explain the content of media and journalistic practice?’, refers to the 
deficit of production and reception analyses when a qualitative study is conducted on 
content. As “the discursive practices of journalism are the processes through which 
journalists produce texts, and readers use and understand them *…+” (Richardson, 
2007: 75), Philo (2007) claims that even a detailed analysis performed on content is 
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not enough to explain the communicative event. He evidently criticises Norman 
Fairclough’s14 and Teun van Dijk’s approach in Critical Discourse Analysis, claiming that 
their work “does not include the study of key production factors in journalism or the 
analysis of audience understanding” (Philo, 2007: 175). His critique was actually 
“directed to any type of stand-alone, qualitative textual analysis” (Fürsich, 2009: 238) 
because Fürsich (2009: 238) underlines that Philo is in favour of an approach which 
sees research in media studies “as a totality” (Philo, 2007: 194). Regarding the same 
issue, Fowler (1991: 222) stresses the importance of other factors as news items are 
not just ‘reality but a product’. He suggests,  
“*News+ is produced by an industry, shaped by the bureaucratic and economic 
structure of that industry, by the relations between the media and other 
industries and [. . .] by relations with government and with other political 
organisations” (Fowler, 1991: 222). 
 
Philo’s (2007) comments regarding the importance of production and reception 
studies in the context of media analysis fit in well with the scope of this study. 
Therefore, by means of conducting interviews with journalists from the British media, 
the chapters of news production (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9) of this thesis seek to 
explain the production process of news items on Turkey-EU relations, and the 
journalists’ personal views on Turkish membership of the EU. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 In fact, Fairclough’s approach does take into account ‘productional’ and ‘interpretive’ processes on 
theoretical level (Fairclough, 1995). According to his approach,  
“*…+ *A+ media text such as a newspaper article or the transcript of a TV news bulletin is not a 
definitively accomplished entity. It is rather the product of interaction between a process of 
production and processes of interpretation in which participants draw on the resources of 
knowledge, belief, ideas, values and assumptions which are available to them. Texts in this 
sense occur as the interplay between the ‘traces’ they bear of their production and the ‘cues’ 
they provide for their interpretation” (Deacon et al., 1999: 152). 
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5.1.3. The deficit of reception 
Applying Philo’s approach of full ‘totality’, or in Fürsich’s (2009: 249) words a ‘multi-
step approach’ to media research might make this study more rigid. However, looking 
at reception while staying within the boundaries of this research project was not 
methodologically possible.  
 
As the news items chosen for the study are the starting point of both quantitative and 
qualitative news content analysis and the interviews conducted with the journalists 
who had written these news items, a reception study should also have been connected 
to these news items for consistency within the research. However, the research’s time 
sample, covering the period between 1999 and 2006, makes it problematic to conduct 
a reception study which can highlight what British readers understand from the news 
items about Turkey-EU relations. Some focus groups could have been organised during 
the research project (between 2009 and 2012) in order to identify readers’ opinions on 
the Turkish issue and see their interaction with news items. Yet studies focusing on 
historic news items cannot easily connect with audiences who can really contribute to 
the research (Fürsich, 2009: 245). Thus, it was felt that the unpopularity of the Turkish 
membership case since 2006 and the weakened audience memory would have made it 
hard to grasp what their opinion would have been within the relevant time sample of 
the research. 
 
All in all, it is obvious that the ideal media research study should include all aspects of 
the process from the beginning of the creation of the message to its content, and 
finally to its comprehension by an audience. Yet, several factors such as technical and 
economic issues usually prevent media researchers from covering all three steps. 
92 
 
Extensive research projects such as the Glasgow University Media Group have 
conducted studies which cover production, content, and reception aspects at the same 
time. However, ‘single site projects’ can be seen more often if the studies of media in 
the past are investigated (Fürsich, 2009: 239). 
 
5.2. Research sample 
Before elucidating how the methods were applied in this study, it would be useful to 
explain the research sample. Therefore, this section looks at how the research and 
time samples were designed and what techniques were used to collect the research 
material. The research sample constitutes the material for quantitative content 
analysis, the basis for the smaller sample of qualitative content analysis on news 
coverage and the interviews with the journalists. Even though the three methods have 
different samples, each method’s sample is connected to the others and they are all 
fed from the same source to different extents. The section firstly explains how the 
time period was chosen to collect the news items on Turkey-EU relations, published in 
the British media. 
 
5.2.1. Sample of events chosen for analysis 
A systematic analysis which is eligible to be validated requires to be based on a 
research design which was specified prior to starting the analysis. Employing such 
criteria of selection for material and time samples before collecting the data and 
conducting the analysis provides an investigation with a systematic approach and to 
some extent, a degree of objectivity (Gray, 2009: 500). Therefore, first of all, the 
research sample of this thesis should be based on sufficient representative period/s. 
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Attention to European integration on the news media increases when significant EU 
meetings happen or new rules come into force. Empirical studies show that news 
reports about the EU reach a peak when key events take place (de Vreese, 2001: 286). 
“*…+ *A+s full membership turned into a realizable prospect, the press gave increasing 
coverage to Turkey-related news and commentary, palpably to a greater extent than it 
did for any other candidate” (Aksoy, 2009: 470). Therefore, Turkey's EU bid has 
become an important topic on the EU agenda since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when 
Turkey became an official candidate for membership. Accordingly, the academic 
interest in the media representation of Turkey-EU relations started to grow from 2001 
on (see Gencel-Bek, 2001). Furthermore, as seen below, when “Turkey-EU relations" 
was searched in Google News Archives, it was seen that the distribution of this topic in 
news items that are in English had reached a peak in 2004 and started to decrease 
after 2006 (Google News Archives, 2008). 
 
Figure 5.1: Turkey-EU relations in Google News Archives 
 
Therefore, the sample selection for this study was based around six important events 
in Turkey-EU relations between 1999 when Turkey was accepted as an official EU 
membership candidate and 2006 when membership negotiations were damaged by 
the port crisis between Turkey and Cyprus. The events were compiled from different 
sources such as Birand (2001), Dedeoglu (2003a), Faucompret and Konings (2008), and 
chronological data of the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, formerly known as Secretariat 
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General for EU Affairs (Secretariat, 2010). In order to place these events in context, 
one week before and one week after the events were included in the time sample. 
Sundays were excluded. The events below constitute the time sample of the study 
(more details concerning these events were presented in Chapter 2). 
 
Table 5.1: Distribution of the selected events in the research sample 
Events’ date Events’ content 
The period added to the 
research sample 
10th – 11th 
December 
1999 
 
Turkey became an official EU membership candidate 
at the Helsinki Summit. 
 
From 02-12-1999  
until 20-12-1999 
3rd August 
2002 
 
The Turkish Parliament abolished capital punishment 
and gave broadcasting rights for different mother 
tongues and dialects, including Kurdish in order to 
meet EU standards. 
 
From 26-07-2002  
until 12-08-2002 
12th – 13th 
December 
2002 
 
In the European Council Summit in Copenhagen, it 
was declared that a decision for ‘Turkey – EU 
negotiations starting date’ would be made in 
December 2004. 
 
From 04-12-2002  
until 21-12-2002 
16th - 17th 
December 
2004 
 
In the European Council Summit in Brussels, the 
Commission’s report, which recommended start of 
membership negotiations with Turkey, was 
accepted. 
 
From 08-12-2004  
until 25-12-2004 
3rd October 
2005 
Turkey started membership negotiations with the 
EU. 
From 24-09-2005  
until 11-10-2005 
29th 
November 
2006 
 
Because of a lack of compromise on the Cyprus 
issue, namely the port problem between Turkey and 
Cyprus, the EU Commission froze some of the 
negotiation chapters with Turkey. 
 
From 21-11-2006  
until 07-12-2006 
 
5.2.2. Selection of media outlets 
Having decided on the time range of the sample, five national newspapers were 
selected for the analysis. These were The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, Financial 
Times (the FT, London edition), the Daily Mail, and the Daily Mirror. Moreover, BBC 
 95 
 
News Online was also included in the research sample in order to look at how the 
Turkish issue was covered in an online news resource which had never been previously 
used in studies of the media representation of Turkey-EU relations15. 
 
The media outlets’ political stance, especially whether they are Europhile or 
Eurosceptic, is the first criteria in order to make a balanced and representative sample 
selection. 
 
5.2.2.1. Eurosceptics vs Europhiles 
The newspapers which represent a notably critical view of the EU and its influences on 
the UK in general can be accepted as Eurosceptic newspapers. The Eurosceptic 
approach is seen in any type of newspaper in Britain but it can be said that it is much 
more common in tabloids (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 63). On the other hand, 
the papers which have a pro-European stance and which are relatively more positive 
to Britain’s participation in European integration can be named as Europhile papers. In 
terms of categorising some prominent British news organisations according to their 
stance in European issues, it is possible to claim that  
“*t+he discourse of the Independent, Guardian, Financial Times and the Mirror 
[...] is not unreservedly pro-European. [...] However this pro-European 
discourse distinguishes itself from the dominant Euroscepticism of the British 
press represented by the Telegraph, The Times, Mail, Express and Sun *...+” 
(Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 111).  
 
Following this evaluation, the table below was prepared according to market type, 
political stance on EU affairs (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Swatridge, 2003; 
                                                          
15 It should be clarified that most news items analysed in this study were not only published as hardcopy 
but also digitally on the websites of each newspaper. All news organisations included in the sample, 
excluding the FT, offer free access to their websites. This means that the news items are available for all 
English speakers from all around the world via the internet.  
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Anderson, 2004; Geddes, 2004: 219; Aksoy, 2009), and the circulation figures provided 
by the Audit Bureau of Circulations (2005). The figures originate from the average 
numbers per day in October 2005 – a month when the frequency of news items on 
Turkey-EU relations reached a peak in the British media. The highlighted papers in the 
table are the ones which were selected for the analysis.  
 
Table 5.2: Newspapers’ distribution according to their market type,  
circulation figures (October 2005) and broad stance
16
 on European integration 
 Total daily 
circulation 
(October – 2005) 
Broad stance on  
European integration 
TA
B
LO
ID
 The Sun 3,224,327 Eurosceptic 
The Daily Mirror 1,684,660 Europhile 
The Daily Star 820,028 Europhile 
M
ID
-
M
A
R
K
ET
 
The Daily Mail 2,246,243 Eurosceptic 
The Daily Express 810,827 Eurosceptic 
B
R
O
A
D
SH
EE
T 
The Daily Telegraph 847,311 Eurosceptic 
The Times 659,510 Eurosceptic 
The Guardian 387,524 Europhile 
Financial Times 384,615 Europhile 
The Independent 231,092 Europhile 
 
Among the news organisations in the research sample, BBC News Online is the hardest 
one to position between Europhile and Eurosceptic groups. During the interviews, 
conducted for this thesis, two journalists from the BBC persistently claimed that the 
BBC is impartial in European affairs. However, impartiality in media is a complex issue 
and it is almost impossible to use this concept without ‘relatively’ before it.  
                                                          
16
 No account is taken on the ownership of these newspapers because the sample represents a balanced 
view between Eurosceptic and Europhile newspapers. 
 97 
 
“The commercial sector was and is required by the law to present news and, 
generally, to treat controversial public issues with due impartiality [in the UK], 
whereas the BBC, through its governors, traditionally promised to behave with 
due impartiality on controversial matters” (Wilson, 1996: 39).  
 
Following an accusation that the BBC is systematically Europhile, an independent panel 
report (2005: 4) on the BBC coverage of the EU puts it clearly: “Although the BBC 
wishes to be impartial in its news coverage of the EU it is not succeeding17”. The report 
does not accept that the BBC has a systematic Europhile approach but it recommends 
that “*t+he BBC must not slip into construing its task as either one of counterbalancing 
‘ignorant anti-European’ prejudice stimulated by the eurosceptic section of the press, 
or as taking its agenda from that press” (Independent panel report, 2005: 5). Finally, 
the report advises that the BBC should cover EU affairs more noticeably impartially. 
Conversely, Anderson (2004: 169) argues that the BBC content is also influenced by the 
strong Euroscepticism in the British media (also see McLeod, 2003). Therefore, it can 
be argued that there is an ambiguity in the position of the BBC and that is why it is 
included in the research sample neither as Eurosceptic nor Europhile. 
 
The papers’ market type, circulation figures, and their stance between political right 
and left were the other criteria taken into account while choosing the news 
organisations for the research sample. The Guardian can be accepted as the leading 
paper of the British left while The Daily Telegraph represents the right wing (Negrine, 
2008: 631). Besides, the FT was selected because of its significant interest in EU affairs 
and international politics. One can argue that all these three quality papers in the 
                                                          
17
 The report explains the problem of impartiality under five headings which are “Institutional mindset”, 
“Over simplified polarisation of the issues and stereotyping”, “Westminster prism”, “Ignorance”, and 
“Omission”    (Independent panel report, 2005: 4). 
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sample have more influence on decision-makers, the elite, and accordingly the British 
political agenda than most other newspapers. 
 
Concerning the justification of the selection of tabloids, the Daily Mail is a powerful 
mid-market tabloid with a circulation of more than two million copies daily (Negrine, 
2008: 631). The Daily Mirror is a representative of the British left wing tabloids. 
According to Anderson and Weymouth (1999: 83), these two tabloids publish more 
reports on EU affairs than The Sun.  
 
5.2.3. Collecting the research material 
The databases LexisNexis, NewsBank, and Factiva were used to collect the majority of 
material from newspapers. The news items of BBC News were gathered from the 
online archive of BBC News. Some missing materials from The Daily Telegraph were 
provided from The Daily Telegraph’s own archive. In order not to overlook any news 
items in the time sample, three different statements which are "Turkey and the EU", 
"Turkey's EU bid", and "Turkey EU" were placed in inverted commas in electronic 
archive’s search engines. To be selected for analysis, the item must have more than 
100 words and the main context must be directly related to Turkey-EU relations. The 
items which only made a passing reference to Turkey’s EU bid were not included. All 
types of news items were incorporated into the sample as a unit of analysis while 
letters to editors and visual components were excluded. 
 
A special case: Financial Times 
Financial Times, an overt Europhile paper, is the newspaper of choice especially in 
Brussels for many EU institutions, business associations, think-tanks, NGOs, etc. 
 99 
 
(Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 103). It covers the EU in detail, “enjoys privileged access to 
EU institutions and has a strong record of publishing exclusive stories about European 
affairs, or publishing one-on-one interviews with Commissioners and other high-
ranking officials” (Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 104). The FT has also an enormous interest 
in Turkey and its bid to join the EU. It is perhaps the strongest supporter of Turkish 
membership and its support is significantly explicit compared to other British news 
organisations. In total, 127 news items about Turkish membership were eligible for 
selection criteria in the FT within the time sample of this study, which is far more than 
the number of news items published by all the other media outlets. However, it was 
risky to add so many items from one newspaper to the sample as it might have skewed 
the total outcomes of the analyses in a sample where the other five news 
organisations published 123 news items in total. Excluding all news items from the FT 
would have also damaged the validity of the research. Thus, it was decided that the FT 
could contribute to the research through an analysis limited to the items which were 
published in ‘the negotiations’ period18, when the discussions surrounding Turkey’s EU 
membership reached a peak in the British media. Finally, 107 items of the total of all 
127 items published by the FT were excluded and only 20 items were added to the 
research sample. As a result, the total of the research sample reached 143 news items 
which were published by six different news organisations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 In order to be aware of the FT’s position in other events, some news items were scanned and read. 
Although it was not a systematic analysis, it can be assumed that the FT’s position is not different from 
its coverage in the period which is chosen for this study. 
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5.2.4. Distribution of research sample among three methods 
Before explaining how different methods utilised the research sample in detail, Figure 
5.2 below summarises the distribution of the selected research material among three 
different methods. 
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of research material among different methods 
 
Research sample for quantitative content analysis 
All aforementioned 143 news items are included in the quantitative content analysis. 
 
Research sample for qualitative content analysis 
Because of the breadth of the sample for a qualitative analysis, instead of employing 
all 143 news items, it was decided to choose five ‘typical’ news items from each of six 
news organisations which amounts to 30 news items in total. Qualitative analysis 
focuses on “typical texts” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 23). Thus, these 30 items, selected 
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for the systematic analysis, should be the typical ones which cover most of the 
discussions concerning Turkey-EU relations. “What is typical in which social situation, 
and for which aspect of a social problem, however, frequently remains vague” (Wodak 
and Meyer, 2009: 23). In order to get rid of the vagueness, it was decided that the best 
examples for qualitative content analysis could be the news items19 which cover the 
highest number of ‘issues’ (such as ‘Democracy and human rights issues’, ‘the Cyprus 
issue’, ‘the Armenian issue’, etc.) that are listed in the Quantitative Content Analysis 
Chapter. 
 
In order not to exceed the quota of five news items per news organisation, the number 
of words was taken into account if the number of issues is the same for the news items 
(Say, each of A, B, C, and D covers five issues and they are included in the sample. If 
news item E and F cover four issues, then news item E was selected for the fifth 
position as it covers more words in the text). 
 
Apart from the systematic analysis of these 30 news items, other items among 143 
items were also scanned. In this way, it is possible to investigate if 30 news items can 
represent the whole sample and if there are some different points which could be 
useful in qualitative analysis that were not found in the sample of 30 news items. For 
instance, findings related to the ‘historical events and concepts’ in the qualitative 
content analysis were enriched by some of the items that were not selected for the 
qualitative analysis sample. 
 
                                                          
19
 Five news items, which include the highest number of ‘main issues,’ were selected from each news 
organisation. However, only four news items from the Daily Mirror include ‘main issues’. Because of 
this, even though the fifth item from the Daily Mirror did not include any issue, it was added to the 
sample in order to equalise the number of news items from each news organisation.  
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Research sample for production analysis 
The selection of the journalists for the interviews was made according to specific 
criteria. The aim was to talk to the journalists who had written the news items that 
were analysed in the quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the study. 
Therefore, the names of 62 different journalists who wrote the 143 news items were 
listed. Emails, telephone calls, and connecting with gatekeepers helped the researcher 
to contact these journalists. However, it was not possible to reach or get positive 
replies from all of them due to a variety of reasons. Some journalists had changed their 
career. Some had moved away or were no longer interested in the Turkish 
membership. Many journalists were always busy and some of them refused to talk. 
There was no response at all from 14 journalists and, unfortunately, one of them had 
passed away. 
 
Using the snowball technique was usually not possible due to the constraints imposed 
by the selection criteria in the research sample. The aim of the project was not to talk 
to any journalist who had, at one point in time, written about Turkey-EU relations; the 
aim was to talk to the journalists who had written the news items between 1999 and 
2006, particularly in the context of specific events which were selected for the content 
analysis sample of the study. In brief, the journalists must have been the ones who had 
written the news items that had been selected for the research sample of this study. 
Finally, 21 journalists who agreed to participate in the interviews formed the 
production step of the study. 
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5.3. Application of each method 
5.3.1. Quantitative analysis 
According to Holsti’s inclusive definition “content analysis is any technique for making 
inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of 
messages” (1969: 14). However, the definition of ‘content analysis’ is not very 
consistent within the academy. Some researchers’ definitions have a more general 
view and they argue that content analysis refers to all methods which examine 
content. According to some others, content analysis is associated more with a “specific 
analytical approach” (Deacon et al., 1999: 115).  
 
Even though the majority of definitions refer to the ‘systematic’ character of content 
analysis (Riffe et al., 2008: 23), it is not possible to expect that all readers and analysts 
understand the same from the same text. Krippendorff (2004: 23) argues “*i+f content 
analysts were not allowed to read texts in ways that are different from the ways other 
readers do, content analysis would be pointless”. According to him,  
“*c+ritical scholarship would be stifled if it could not go outside of what 
everyone accepts as true. Content analysis is in trouble only when expert 
interpretations fail to acknowledge the uses of texts by designated populations 
of readers or actors, particularly when content analysts fail to spell out the 
criteria for validating their results” (Krippendorff, 2004: 23). 
This research puts emphasis on the specific analytical approach of content analysis 
which gives great importance to being systematic. Following Krippendorff’s definition 
(2004: 18): “*c+ontent analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”, it can 
be argued that  
“quantitative content analysis is reductionist, with sampling and operational or 
measurement procedures that reduce communication phenomena to 
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manageable data (e.g. numbers) from which inferences may be drawn about 
the phenomena themselves” (Riffe et al., 2008: 23).  
Dealing with 143 news items of the research sample, and finding their general 
overview would be impossible without the quantification of data. Thus, quantitative 
content analysis is one of the methods that was employed in this study to perform a 
systematic examination of the coverage on Turkey-EU relations. At this point, it is 
worth asking what a systematic examination consists of. Riffe et al.’s explanation firstly 
refers to research design. They argue: 
“Whether testing theory-driven hypotheses or solving practical problems, one 
may speak of the researcher being systematic on *…+ research design: the 
planning of operational procedures to be employed. The researcher who 
determines in advance such research design issues as the time frame for a 
study, what kind of communication constitutes the focus of the study, what the 
variables are to be, or how precise the measurement must be—who, in effect, 
lays the ground rules in advance for what qualifies as evidence of sufficient 
quality that the research question can be answered—is also being systematic.” 
(2008: 25) 
 
In the light of their explanation, it can be argued that in order to conduct the analysis 
systematically and make it eligible to be validated, the research design should be 
specified before starting the content analysis. Having already explained the systematic 
selection of research material in the previous section, the preparation of the coding 
schedule, reliability test and presentation of the data are described below. 
 
Coding schedule 
Quantitative content analysis seeks to generate numerical data from a research 
sample. A coding schedule should be prepared to transform a text-based content into 
numbers because “[c]oding is the transcribing, recording, categorizing, or interpreting 
of given units of analysis into the terms of a data language so that they can be 
compared and analyzed” (Krippendorff, 2004: 220). 
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Before designing a coding schedule, a saturation sample was prepared in order to see 
what kinds of issues are discussed in news items. By this means, the coding schedule 
was designed by taking into account the saturation sample, literature review and 
research questions of the study. The categories in the coding schedule consist of 
several themes such as: distribution and frequency of news items; topics, statements, 
issues, labels that are associated with Turkey-EU relations; different countries’ 
approach to Turkish membership; reasons for being in favour or being against Turkey’s 
EU bid; and the mandatory conditions, which were underlined for Turkish accession to 
the EU. As new themes and issues emerged throughout the analysis, new values were 
added to the categories until the completion of the coding schedule for each news 
item. Coding per category was done by up to three or six values from the beginning of 
text depending on the question (see Negrine, 2008: 633; Kejanlıoğlu and Taş, 2009: 
44). The final version of the coding schedule can be seen in Appendix I. 
 
Inter-coder reliability test 
Validity and replicability are significant features of a systematic analysis. In order to 
make these features visible, analysts’ values and beliefs should not influence the 
results of analysis. Furthermore, when coders analyse the same material, there should 
be consistency among their answers on the coding schedule. These can be provided if 
“*r+esearch definitions and operations that were used *…+ *are+ reported exactly and 
fully” (Riffe et al., 2008: 26). In this way, the research can be repeated and tested when 
the same procedures are followed (Riffe et al., 2008: 26). Therefore, a content analysis 
needs reliability tests to be valid and replicable. According to Krippendorff (2004: 216-
217), “analysts must generate reliability data at least under test-test conditions and 
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account not only for individual instabilities but also for disagreements among 
observers, coders, or analysts”. In order to provide that in this research, three coders 
analysed six news items per person and filled in the coding schedule. The ReCal2 
software was employed so as to test the reliability of coders’ answers (ReCal2 website, 
2010). The software can present the outcome of reliability analysis through different 
ways such as ‘Krippendorff’s Alpha’ and ‘percent agreement’. According to 
Krippendorff (2004: 241), the reliability between variables should be at least α=.667. 
The majority of categories in the coding schedule provided acceptable reliability. 
However, in four categories, the consistency level was less than 70 per cent and below 
Krippendorff’s cutoff point (2004: 241). In these cases, the questions were either 
changed or deleted. For instance, coders’ answers were not consistent enough in the 
category of ‘statements’. The coders complained about the number of choices for this 
category on the coding schedule, which was up to three when they were coding, and 
they said that this could be the reason for different answers. Thus, the number of 
codeable values in the category of ‘statements’ was changed to ‘up to six’. The coders 
coded these categories again after the amendments. The final results satisfied the 
reliability test. 
 
Some questions were too open to interpretation and the result of the inter-coder 
reliability test was not satisfactory. For instance, coding the category ‘The overall 
approach of the news item to Turkish membership’ was a considerably problematic 
one. The consistency was even less than 50 per cent in that category. Coders said that 
they were not sure while they were coding this category as some news items included 
both pro and anti-Turkish membership statements. Thus, this question was omitted 
from the coding schedule and it was decided that it would be more reliable to find an 
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answer to this question by analysing the overall tone of quantitative and qualitative 
content analyses. There are several questions in the coding schedule that can help to 
make some assumptions concerning the position of each news item and accordingly 
each paper. 
 
Using SPSS and presenting the data 
The newspaper items were coded and the data was put into an SPSS file. In some 
categories, the number of values was greater than expected and this made it difficult 
to manage and analyse the data. For instance, there were 121 values in the “Main 
Topics” category and they were reduced to 33 by using the ‘collapsing values’ option of 
SPSS. Apart from these, using SPSS helped the calculation of the results and made the 
data easier to organise and analyse. The results obtained from SPSS will be presented 
in tables together with the inferences which are based on the results found in the data. 
All percentages which refer to the distribution of values in the tables were calculated 
by using the total number of news items (n=143). Thus, the percentages show the 
distribution of values among news items. 
 
5.3.2. Qualitative analysis 
5.3.2.1. Qualitative content analysis 
Qualitative analysis refers to any type of research which does not extract quantitative 
results (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 17). It is a technique that analysts investigate 
discursive constructions and latent meanings in text. It has still some problematic 
aspects and it would appear to be less scientifically robust and more subjective. First of 
all, qualitative content analysis is a huge methodological space where the researcher 
should find his or her own way by taking into account what exactly is required of their 
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research. It is usually not possible to find a concrete way to proceed or analytical tools 
that can fully lead the research as each research project has its own dynamics (Deacon 
et al., 1999: 178). In contrast to quantitative content analysis, the methods employed 
in qualitative analysis are usually explained inadequately and there are numerous ways 
to apply them to a research sample. Thus, “text analysis in the cultural-critical 
paradigm does not draw from a united intellectual and methodological tradition *…+. 
Its history is similarly fractured” (Fürsich, 2009: 240). However, there are several 
approaches and techniques used in qualitative analysis which are not completely 
“standardized logical or mathematical models’ but are [, at least,] grounded on 
systematic procedures” (Jensen, 2002a: 245; also see Gray, 2009).  
 
Performing the Analysis  
In the case of this study, the research framework requires a qualitative analysis in 
order to transcend the manifest findings gathered from the results of a quantitative 
content analysis (Richardson, 2007). In this way, conducting the investigation by taking 
into account the ‘context’ of the news items in the research sample can become 
possible. Thus, the lack of context in the results of quantitative analysis of this study 
will be enhanced by employing a qualitative method. In general terms, the research 
will benefit from the contributions of qualitative content analysis and will adapt this by 
providing deeper answers to the research questions. 
 
In this study, the application of the qualitative content analysis on news items is 
conducted in three steps. As the questions are available before starting the analysis, 
the first step has a deductive character while the second step is inductive. At the first 
step, by using the Qualitative Coding Scheme, the questions shown in Appendix II were 
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asked of each news item selected for the research sample. The second step is about 
coding. The answers gathered in the first step will be coded using NVivo, qualitative 
analysis software, so as to make connections efficiently between different coded 
materials (see more about data transcription, coding and NVivo in the section below). 
This step is also necessary in order not to generalise one example into the whole 
sample as NVivo allows the researcher to see how frequent were the findings and how 
much it is possible to generalise the inferences to the whole sample. Finally, the last 
step is about presenting the analysis. This step merges the material with the study’s 
analytical framework related to the notion of ‘a positive Other’. 
 
5.3.2.2. In-depth interviews 
Having explained the quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods for the 
investigation of news content, this section focuses on the methodological background 
to the in-depth interviews conducted for this study. Interviewing the journalists from 
the British media helps to explain how and why the Turkish membership issue is 
covered in a particular way. The two main aims of the interviews are to identify how 
the journalists, personally, approach the issue of Turkish membership of the EU and to 
examine how the production process of the news items concerning Turkey’s EU bid 
takes place. The interview questionnaire was prepared according to the discussions in 
the literature review and the findings in the content analysis of this study. In total, 17 
questions were asked of all journalists. The questions could be categorised under six 
groups:  ‘Individual level’, PR, British media and the editorial process, British politics, 
content and agenda, other discussions and journalist-specific questions (see Appendix 
III for the full list of questions). 
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Researchers rarely prepare a complete list of questions. Most qualitative interviews 
are flexible and their structure is changeable so that the interviewees can bring some 
unexpected points to the conversation (Mason, 2005: 62). Adding new questions, 
when it is necessary, could boost the quality of conversations, and it is worth giving 
more importance to certain questions when the context requires. For these reasons, 
the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion. The conversation flowed 
naturally to different areas in the interviews and this provided extra data that could be 
useful in the research.  
 
The news items written by the interviewees were reviewed by the interviewer before 
starting each interview. When some interesting points which were not related to the 
17 questions were found in the news items, these were noted as specific questions and 
were asked of the journalists in addition to the 17 questions. Specific questions were 
generally about some interesting concepts that the journalists used in their news 
items, or they were related to some issues which cannot be usually found in the news 
items on Turkey-EU relations. The questions were usually asked in the same order, 
excluding the specific questions for each journalist. If the journalists did not answer in 
enough detail or depth, the same question was asked in a different way again, or some 
examples related to the question were given in order to encourage the interviewee to 
answer the question. However, it could be too much to expect informative answers to 
all questions in interviews. ‘Knowledge questions’ sometimes cause awkwardness if 
the interviewees cannot give any answer. On these occasions, Gray (2004) advises that 
the interviewers should never be surprised and should never give clues which could 
make the interviewee feel humiliated. Some journalists wrote only one or two news 
items on Turkey’s EU bid. They are not experts on Turkey-EU relations and they wrote 
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these as part of their daily work while they were based in London. At some points 
during the interviews, these journalists could not answer some questions properly due 
to their lack of knowledge about the question. Although the interviewer tried to 
explain the question one more time, there was no insistence on receiving an answer.  
 
The interviewees do not always explain everything which an interviewer wants to learn 
(Becker and Geer, 1957). Some journalists refused to answer some of the questions 
even though they knew something about the topic. These questions were mainly 
about other media organisations’ view on the Turkish membership issue and the 
interviewees avoided making comments about their colleagues’ approach to Turkey’s 
EU bid.   
 
The majority of news items were written in London while some of them were sent 
from Brussels, Istanbul, Paris and Ankara. Many journalists had changed their places 
and postings, and reaching the ones based in London was more convenient. When the 
data that were being gathered in the interviews started to feel similar, and when it was 
obvious that no new views were emerging, it was thought that the saturation of the 
sample had been reached, and conducting interviews could be finalised. In the end, 21 
interviews were conducted with the journalists. Seven interviews were completed by 
telephone while, 14 interviews were conducted face to face. Interviewing by email did 
not work in this research. Some journalists agreed to answer the questions by email 
but they did not return the questionnaire. Only one journalist answered the questions 
by email but it was not included in the research findings. It was obvious that he did not 
spend enough time on it since he gave very short answers by writing ‘Yes-No’.   
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Meetings with the interviewees took place in different locations such as newspapers’ 
headquarters, the BBC, the House of Commons, restaurants, and the journalists’ 
homes. All the interviews were digitally recorded. The interviews usually took 45 
minutes with a few ranging between 30 to 70 minutes. The number of participants 
from each media organisation is approximately in line with the distribution of news 
items that were analysed. However, the Daily Mail was a special case. The majority of 
journalists from this paper were not accessible. Only two journalists replied and they 
said that they were not interested in participating in the interviews. The reason could 
be the general reluctance of midmarket and tabloid newspapers to become involved in 
EU issues or academic research. In his study called ‘Making Europe news’, Statham 
(2008: 416) also wrote that The Sun did not want to participate in his research project 
due to the paper’s Eurosceptic approach in its editorial line (also see Firmstone, 
2008a). 
 
The distribution of the number of journalists who participated in the interviews 
according to their news organisation at the time the news item was written is as 
follows: 
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of the interviewees and where they had published their news items  
about Turkey-EU relations, and the number of news items included in this research 
News  
organisation 
Number of 
journalists  
participated 
Number of 
news items 
analysed 
The Guardian 9 48 
The Daily Telegraph 4 32 
BBC News Online 4 23 
Financial Times 3 20 
The Daily Mirror 1 5 
The Daily Mail 0 15 
Total 21 143 
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It is also worth looking at how much these interviewees contributed to the whole 
sample. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of the interviewees20 and how many news 
items they had written within the time sample of this research. Some news items in 
the sample were published without including a byline. They were either written by 
wire services or published as anonymous. Moreover, the reason why some journalists’ 
names were counted less than the number of items they had published is related to 
the fact that they were active leader writers when Turkey-EU relations were popular in 
the agenda. All in all, at least 59 news items in 143 analysed items were written by the 
journalists who participated in the interviews. In order to keep them anonymous, the 
journalists will be referred to by their code names only throughout the thesis (e.g. J1). 
 
Table 5.4: Distribution of the interviewees and how many news items they had  
published about Turkey-EU relations within the time sample of this study 
Journalist Number of 
news items  
Posting while 
writing about 
Turkey 
J1 (The Guardian) 14 Brussels 
J2 (The FT) 10 Istanbul-Ankara 
J3 (The Telegraph) 7 Brussels 
J4 (The Telegraph) 6 Istanbul 
J5 (The Guardian) 3 London 
J6 (BBC News) 3 Istanbul 
J7 (The Guardian) 2 Paris 
J8 (The Telegraph) 2 Brussels-London 
J9 (BBC News) 2 Brussels-Istanbul 
J10 (The Guardian) 1 London 
J11 (The Guardian) 1 London 
J12 (The Guardian) 1 Istanbul 
J13 (The Guardian) 1 London 
J14 (The Mirror) 1 Brussels 
J15 (BBC News) 1 London 
J16 (BBC News) 1 London 
J17 (The FT) 1 London 
J18 (The FT) 1 Paris 
J19 (The Guardian) 1+Leaders London 
J20 (The Guardian) Leader writer London 
J21 (The Telegraph) Leader writer London 
TOTAL 59+Leaders  
All interviews were conducted in English except the one with a Turkish journalist. 
Although the questions were asked in Turkish, some explanations were made in 
                                                          
20
 The majority of journalists had also written about Turkey-EU relations in other periods which are not 
included in this study’s sample. 
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English if it was something specifically related to English language and the British 
media. 
 
Performing the analysis  
Analysing the data gathered from the fieldwork is as significant as conducting the 
interviews. However, finding the most appropriate way to do the qualitative analysis 
on the interviews is not an easy task. Qualitative research is usually inductive and it 
does not offer a broadly established strategy to analyse the data (Gray, 2009: 494). 
Richards (2005: 70) argues that there is no specific technique which can help 
researchers to deal with their data in qualitative analysis. She claims that after having 
gained experience, researchers can improve their own approach to work on data. 
However, it is immensely useful to get help from the methodology literature about 
qualitative analysis while improving a specific technique. 
 
The data transcription and coding 
The interview analysis in this thesis is grounded on four steps which are transcription, 
coding, post-coding, and interpreting. As a first step, all the digitally recorded data 
were transcribed by the researcher. Although it was a very lengthy job, transcribing 
the data made the researcher more familiar with what kind of data were collected 
(Gray, 2009: 496). Thus, it can be said that the analysis started while transcribing as 
that process had an initial impact on building the categories.  
 
The second step is coding. ‘Raw’ data cannot be easily interpreted or connected with 
other points within the data. For this reason, conceptualising the data is a crucial step 
of the analysis. “By breaking down and conceptualizing we mean taking apart an 
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observation, a sentence, a paragraph, and giving each discrete incident, idea, or event, 
a name, something that stands for or represents a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990: 63). Therefore, coding is required in order to conceptualise the material. 
 
Richards (2005: 88) uses three different terms to explain different kinds of coding 
which are ‘descriptive’, ‘topic’, and ‘analytical’. While descriptive coding deals with the 
general information about the speaker such as gender, age, and job, topic coding 
simply designates the main topics of the document or passage. Both of them require 
little interpretation which is not the case for analytical coding. Analytical coding, which 
was used in the qualitative analyses of this thesis, cannot be as automatic as 
‘descriptive’ and ‘topic’ coding. It deals with explanation and reflection on meaning 
which is different from the other two. Besides, analytical coding produces categories 
and extracts new thoughts about the elements in documents (Richards, 2005: 94). 
Emergence of categories during the analysis is in contrast with quantitative research 
where the categories were prepared beforehand or were set by a pilot study (Richards, 
2005: 86).  
 
In contrast to survey research, performing qualitative research is not sequential 
between research design and results. The aim in qualitative research is to learn 
something from the data and to employ the learned material in the whole research 
(Richards, 2005: 80). In order to learn from the data, the researcher needs to revisit 
the material until it is completely comprehended (Richards, 2005: 86). Revisiting is 
much easier and the data are better organised when they are coded in software. In 
this research, qualitative coding was performed with the help of NVivo, qualitative 
analysis software. 
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CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Analysis Software) 
Although the software for qualitative analysis may disappoint some researchers, they 
could be useful to some extent if researchers do not expect the software to analyse 
the whole material on its own. Qualitative computing is dependent on the limits of 
artificial intelligence of the software. Gray (2009: 518) says  
“*COQDAS+ do not generate codes for you – this, obviously is the task of the 
researcher. The researcher still also has to interpret the data. But CAQDAS 
software does cut out much of the drudgery of manipulating qualitative data”.  
 
Thus, CAQDAS can only assist researchers in clerical, mechanical works not in analytical 
processes (Richards, 2005: 69; Welsh, 2002). For instance, it is possible to reshape the 
categories in qualitative analysis by collapsing the codes in order to reach more 
functional codes (Richards, 2005: 86), and this is easier and quicker if COQDAS is 
employed. What software does is a mechanical process and it should not be thought 
that the ‘find’ button brings out the meaning. It actually simply refers to the 
occurrence of the searched characters in the database (Richards, 2005: 93). For 
instance, searching ‘Turkey’ could bring the bird ‘turkey’, or searching for ‘clash of 
civilisations’ without looking at the context can never explain whether it is used in a 
positive or negative way in the context of Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
NVivo, a recent qualitative analysis software, was employed in this study in order to 
perform coding more easily, and organise and analyse the qualitative data more 
reliably and practically. By using the software, annotations, memos, and links or 
pointers were utilised to conduct the qualitative analysis. Annotations are the records 
which relate to the content of the document (e.g. they could be related to the gestures 
of the interviewee, or they could be used to select the direct quotations from the 
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conversations). Memos are about other themes or ideas which emerge from the 
document that is analysed. Links or pointers help to make connections between two or 
more different important points within the document (Richards, 2005: 73-75).  
 
Other benefits of NVivo relate to revisiting the raw material. According to Wainwright 
and Russell (2010: 3),  
“the researcher can think analytically about the data while being immersed in 
the flow of the recorded interview, attending to utterances, silences, emotions 
and the interactive dialectic between interviewer and interviewee in ways that 
are difficult when reading even detailed transcriptions”. 
 
With the help of NVivo, the coder revisited the raw material easily, and tried to better 
understand the flow of the conversations by listening to them again and again when 
required. 
 
Getting help from qualitative computing brings some problems too. As it is easier to do 
coding with software, it is sometimes risky when the researcher codes too much 
(Richards, 2005: 100). In order to avoid too much coding, the researcher should keep 
asking ‘why am I interested in that?’ during the coding process (Richards, 2005: 101). 
The coded material should always be related to the aim of the research. 
 
Finalising coding, post-coding and interpreting 
It is always problematic in qualitative analysis to decide on the perfect time to 
conclude the coding and analysis. According to Glaser and Strauss, if no new 
categories, properties, and relationships could be found in the data, one could say that 
the research has reached the point of “theoretical saturation” (1967: 61). When coding 
is finalised, the post-coding process can be started as the third step in the analysis.  
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Coding in qualitative research does not present the data in one place that summarises 
the whole sample, whereas this could be expected from a survey result (Richards, 
2005: 96). Qualitative analysis seeks to learn more than what percentages or 
frequencies reveal. For this reason, after coding the data, and building the concepts 
and categories, the links between these should be identified in a post-coding process. 
In order to yield a theory or a conceptualisation from the data that is being analysed, 
links between categories and concepts should be found (Gray, 2009: 496).  
 
Interpreting is the last step of the interview analysis. As it is impossible to present all 
the data, the researchers must summarise what has been found while presenting the 
analysis of the interviews. Summarising the material requires selection and 
interpretation. For this reason, researchers’ own interpretations surround the findings 
in the interviews (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 22). Regarding this point, Diesing says 
“actually scientific knowledge is in large part an invention or development rather than 
an imitation; concepts, hypotheses, and theories are not found ready-made in reality 
but must be constructed” (1971: 14 cited in Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 59). 
 
After all steps are completed in the interview analysis, the findings are presented by 
employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model which is explained in 
detail in Chapter 8. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how research material was collected and analysed. A 
detailed explanation of this procedure has been given in order to clarify important 
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points such as triangulation, sampling, coding, reliability test, and CAQDAS before the 
analyses are presented in subsequent chapters. 
 
The chapter presented a comprehensive justification concerning the research sample, 
as an orderly sampling is one of the priorities of this research’s methodology. The 
research population was first narrowed by applying some criteria, discussed in the 
chapter, concerning when and where the news items were published. The first 
elimination of the material founded the research sample for the quantitative analysis. 
Afterwards, the second elimination created the basis for qualitative analysis and the 
sample for in-depth interviews. 
 
As was explained, this thesis employs three methods which are: quantitative content 
analysis, qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews. They are part of a 
triangulation which is utilized in order to answer the main research question of the 
study in a systematic way. The quantitative inquiry seeks to put forth the manifest 
meaning and findings concerning the representation of Turkey-EU relations in the 
British media. The method deals with several categories and explains how the issue 
was covered by employing frequencies and percentages. The general picture of a 
relatively large sample becomes easier to observe by providing these numerical data.  
In contrast, the qualitative content analysis looks at implicit and latent aspects of news 
items which are not quantifiable. This second method takes into account ‘the context’ 
of the materials which it is regularly not possible to reach by quantitative data. 
Accordingly, both content analyses have different goals but they act as complimentary 
methods in order to exercise the analysis on the coverage. As the last component of 
the triangulation, semi-structured in-depth interviews with journalists were included 
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as a method in order to look at how the analysed text materials were produced by the 
media.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses benefited from CAQDAS to provide a 
consistent inquiry. SPSS helped to perform the quantitative analysis on the news 
coverage while NVivo was useful for the qualitative work on news items and in-depth 
interviews. 
 
The following four chapters which present the findings and analyses of this thesis are 
methodologically grounded on the procedures discussed throughout the above 
chapter. The first one deals with the quantitative content analysis of news items on 
Turkey-EU relations. 
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CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE CONTENT 
ANALYSIS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a quantitative content analysis based on the research sample of 
143 news items. The findings in the chapter can be accepted as the outcomes of the 
first level of content analysis where the manifest meaning is put forward by 
frequencies and percentages. Therefore, what is presented here provides a basis for 
the following chapter which focuses on the latent meaning in the news items. 
 
The analysed data will be illustrated in tables and inferences concerning the meaning 
of these numbers in the context of the main research question “How Turkey’s EU bid 
was represented in the British media?” In order to find an answer to this question in a 
quantitative fashion, the analysis is constructed around these supplementary research 
questions:  
 
In the context of Turkey-EU relations in the news items published by the British media, 
RQ1: Which topics, statements, labels, issues and conditions shaped the news items? 
RQ2: What are the positions of different countries? 
RQ3: What kinds of differences and similarities do the news items represent? 
RQ4: What are the reasons for opposition to and support for Turkish membership? 
 
The chapter firstly looks at the distribution and frequency of news items according to 
news organisations and time periods. Then topics, statements, labels and issues that 
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are associated with Turkey-EU relations will be presented. It will be followed by the 
section about the approach of different countries to Turkish membership. Having 
clarified each country’s view, the chapter will then focus on the differences and 
similarities between Turkey and EU Member States and the reasons for support and 
opposition to Turkish accession. The final sections will be about the actors who shape 
the news items and the mandatory conditions that are noted for Turkish accession. 
 
Defining the concepts used in the content analysis is highly significant in order to make 
the research concrete and thoroughly understandable. Berger (1991: 26) says “*i+f we 
are to examine violent content, we have to define what we mean by violence…” Thus, 
the concepts that could be ambiguous (e.g. ‘Statements’ in Section 6.6) in some cases 
will be discussed in each relevant section in the chapter. 
 
6.2. Distribution of the news items  
As mentioned in previous studies (inter alia Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Kevin, 
2003; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008), upmarket newspapers are far more 
interested in ‘EU affairs’ or ‘Turkey-EU relations’ than are the tabloids. As Table 6.1 
shows, the research’s findings are in line with this point. More than 2/3 of all news 
items which are ‘directly’ related to Turkey-EU relations were published by three 
broadsheets (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and the FT). However, only 14 per 
cent of news items in the sample were published by tabloid papers (the Daily Mail and 
the Daily Mirror). The remainder were published by BBC News Online (16.1 per cent). 
The same table also shows that the majority of news items about Turkey’s EU bid were 
published by the Europhile papers. The categorisation was made according to the 
explanations in the Methodology Chapter. 
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Table 6.1: Distribution of the news items and the political  
stances of the news organisations in EU affairs (n=143) 
 Frequency % Political stance Frequency % 
Guardian 48 33.6% 
Europhile 73 51.04% FT 20 14.0% 
Mirror 5 3.5% 
Telegraph 32 22.4% 
Eurosceptic 47 32.86% 
Mail 15 10.5% 
BBC 23 16.1% Other 23 16.1% 
Total 143 100.0%    
 
The start of membership negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October 2005 received 
considerable attention in the European media. The deadlock between the countries 
which supported Turkish membership and the countries which were against was 
solved by British pressure in the period when the UK was holding the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU. The UK’s leading position also influenced the British media and news 
items, published in this period (42 per cent of the total sample), by far outnumbered 
the other events in the sample (see Table 6.2). The Copenhagen Summit (12th – 13th 
December 2002), where 10 new countries’ membership was guaranteed, was also an 
important platform to discuss what Turkey was going to get from the EU. Turkey could 
only achieve ‘a date for a date’ to start membership negotiations and the discussions 
had widespread coverage in the British media. In this period 24.5 per cent of the whole 
sample was published.  
 
It is worth underlining the point that the historic day for Turkish democracy when the 
death penalty was abolished and many other amendments came into force in the 
Turkish legal system through the decisions made in the Turkish Parliament (3rd August 
2002) did not resonate strongly enough in the British media compared to other 
European events in the time sample. This shows that Turkey’s own initiatives cannot 
get enough attention from the British media if Turkey does not discuss the issues with 
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EU Member States. Table 6.2 shows different events with frequency and percentage of 
news items published in the week immediately before and immediately after each 
event. 
 
Table 6.2: Distribution of the news items according to events in the time sample (n=143) 
 Frequency % 
 Helsinki Summit  
 (10th – 11th December 1999) 
9 6.3% 
Turkish Parliament  
(3rd August 2002) 
2 1.4% 
Copenhagen Summit  
(12th – 13th December 2002) 
35 24.5% 
Brussels Summit  
(16th - 17th December 2004) 
24 16.8% 
Negotiations  
(3rd October 2005) 
60 42% 
Port problem  
(29th November 2006) 
13 9.1% 
Total 143 100.0% 
 
6.3. Length of news items 
Including the news items from BBC News Online, nearly 87 per cent of all news items 
contain more than 300 words. It can be assumed that the media outlets which cover 
the Turkish membership issue in relatively longer articles have more interest in the 
issue. As the broadsheet papers usually publish much deeper analysis on political 
issues, the news items that include less than 300 words were mainly found in the Daily 
Mirror and the Daily Mail. The longest articles were published by The Guardian, the FT, 
and BBC News. The reason why the news items on BBC News Online are longer than 
The Daily Telegraph and almost the same as the FT could be related to online 
journalism’s advantage of space. 
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6.4. Appearance on the front page and type of news items 
Newspapers are not often read like books, and their international news pages might be 
skipped by readers (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 168). Thus, page numbers could 
influence readability of a news item. Excluding the 23 news items on BBC News, it was 
found that the Turkish issue was covered six times on the first page in the sample (The 
Guardian, three times; The Daily Telegraph, twice; The FT, once). 
 
An examination of 143 news items indicates that the research sample includes a 
greater variety of types which are reports (105 items), commentaries (18 items), 
leaders (9 items), reviews (7 items), and economic analyses (4 items). Being covered in 
leaders by broadsheets shows the media outlets’ editorial interest on the Turkish 
issue. However, no interviews were published about Turkey-EU relations in the British 
media. 
 
6.5. Main topics in news items 
This section deals with the main topics which were covered in the news items on 
Turkey’s EU bid. Table 6.3 shows that almost half of all news items (44.8 per cent) in 
the research sample referred to the support of some EU Member States (the UK is the 
main one) or the US for Turkey’s EU bid. ‘Efforts of EU Member States to block Turkish 
membership of the EU’, which is the opposite of the most common value mentioned 
above, is the second one (37.1 per cent). More data about the countries that support 
or oppose Turkish membership in the news items will be presented in Section 6.9.1 in 
this chapter. 
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Table 6.3: The main topics* in the news items 
 Frequency %** 
Support of EU Member States and the US for Turkish 
membership 
64 44.8% 
Efforts of EU Member States to block Turkish 
membership of the EU 
53 37.1% 
The start and the length of negotiation process for 
Turkey’s EU membership (or other major steps for 
Turkish membership) 
48 33.6% 
The EU’s internal issues 28 19.6% 
The Cyprus problem for Turkish membership and/or 
Turkey’s relation with Greece 
25 17.5% 
Turkey’s efforts for EU membership and westernisation 25 17.5% 
The EU’s critics on Turkey 13 9.1% 
Turkey’s reaction to the slowed down membership 
process 
13 9.1% 
Turkey’s internal issues 12 8.4% 
Alternative offers to Turkey instead of full membership 
(e.g. Privileged Partnership) 
12 8.4% 
The cost of rejecting Turkey for the EU 12 8.4% 
The relationship between Turkish membership and the 
clash of civilisations thesis 
9 6.3% 
Human rights issues in Turkey 8 5.6% 
Turkey as a bridge between East and West 8 5.6% 
Other topics 45 31.5% 
*Up to three topics were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of  
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
 
6.6. Statements 
This section looks at the statements which were mentioned in the news items. 
Although they can sometimes be hard to distinguish, the statements are different from 
‘the main topics’ as they include an argument and their structure is distinct from a 
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heading which summarises the notions it includes. Instead the statements usually 
reveal the political stance of authors and/or actors who addressed them in the news 
items. For instance, mentioning the suitable time for Turkish membership by saying 
“Turkish membership cannot happen before at least a decade” was evaluated as a 
statement as it argues and proposes something. There are 193 different statements 
found in all the news items in the research sample and the ones that featured in more 
than 10 per cent are shown in Table 6.4 below. As the statements elaborate the topics 
discussed in the previous section, in most cases, they refer to very detailed indications. 
For instance, while support for Turkish membership to the EU is a type of topic in the 
‘Main topics in news items’ section, this section includes more detailed findings such 
as a comment of a supporter of Turkey’s EU bid: ‘Turkish membership is a historic 
development / is a new era’. 
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Table 6.4: The statements* in the news items 
 Frequency %** 
There are different approaches to Turkish membership 
within the EU. 
39 27.3% 
Turkish membership cannot happen before at least a 
decade (Turkey should wait longer) 
37 25.9% 
Some EU Member States think that ‘privileged partnership’ 
or special or alternative partnership instead of full 
membership could be offered to Turkey 
36 25.2% 
Austria wanted to block the start of negotiations. 36 25.2% 
The UK’s diplomatic efforts helped Turkey to start the 
negotiations or helped Turkey to continue towards 
membership 
33 23.1% 
N.A. / Cannot tell 29 20.3% 
Germany and France have the same position - negative or 
sometimes positive but critical 'in terms of Turkish 
membership'. 
24 16.8% 
Turkish politicians do not want to accept everything 
directed from the EU. 
23 16.1% 
The majority of Europeans are against Turkey’s EU bid. 
/ A specific EU Member State is against Turkey’s EU bid. 
19 13.3% 
Turkish membership can contribute a possible solution to 
the Cyprus problem and other problems between Turkey 
and Greece 
18 12.6% 
Turkey’s bad human rights record postponed/postpones 
its EU membership. 
16 11.2% 
Turkish membership is a historic development / is a new 
era. 
16 11.2% 
Turkey has made a considerable progress in human rights 
and other political reforms in recent years. 
16 11.2% 
Turkey has been waiting for the membership for a long 
time 
15 10.5% 
Even though Turkey has started the negotiation process, 
the process can be interrupted by any EU Member State 
15 10.5% 
*Up to six statements were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of  
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
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In general, it is interesting to see that political affairs dominate the most common 
statements and no data that is directly related to cultural discussions was found at the 
top of the list. The results show that the British media has a special interest in 
underlining the existence of different ideas about the Turkish issue. More than a 
quarter of all news items indicated that ‘there are different approaches to Turkish 
membership within the EU’ (27.3 per cent).  
 
The second most common statement which was underlined in news items is ‘Turkish 
membership cannot happen before at least a decade’ (25.9 per cent). This statement 
was usually employed by European politicians who want to ease people’s minds when 
public opinion was not happy about the prospect of Turkish membership. Other most 
common statements refer to countries’ support or opposition for Turkey’s EU bid. It 
can be implied from all of them that readers are frequently reminded that EU Member 
States do not have a shared opinion on the Turkish case: ‘Some EU Member States 
support the idea of privileged partnership instead of full membership for Turkey’ (25.2 
per cent), ‘Austria wants to obstruct the commencement of negotiations’ (25.2 per 
cent), and ‘the UK’s diplomatic efforts helped to open the way for Turkish 
membership’ (23.1 per cent). Frequent emphasis on the last one reveals that EU affairs 
are a kind of battlefield for British media and British politicians in order to demonstrate 
the controversies between the UK and its European rivals.   
 
6.7. Describing Turkey through labelling 
Said (1997: 10) suggests that labels must be taken seriously. According to his view, 
“*t+o a Muslim who talks about ‘the West’ or to an American who talks about ‘Islam,’ 
these enormous generalizations have behind them a whole history, enabling and 
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disabling at the same time" (Said, 1997: 10). He argues that using these labels has 
another function which is 
“*…+ to produce a much more complex meaning. To speak of ‘Islam’ in the West 
today is to mean a lot of the unpleasant things *…+. Moreover, ‘Islam’ is unlikely 
to mean anything one knows either directly or objectively. The same is true of 
our use of ‘the West’” (Said, 1997: 10).  
 
Drawing on the importance of labels mentioned above, this section looks at the labels 
used to describe Turkey in the British media. The first sub-section employs a general 
level analysis by focusing on how Turkey was positioned between the Eastern and the 
Western worlds. Then, the second sub-section investigates more detailed descriptions 
about Turkey and presents quantitative data relating to the labels used to describe 
Turkey in the news items. 
 
6.7.1. Positioning Turkey between the East and the West 
The values used in this section consist of five identifications that describe and position 
Turkey in general ways. The majority of news items did not include any general 
description about Turkey’s place between the Eastern and the Western world. Only 
28.7 per cent of all news items include at least one description of Turkey about this 
issue. Among the descriptions ‘European’ is the most common one, which was found 
in 11.2 per cent of news items. It is followed by ‘Middle Eastern / Eastern’ which was 
seen in 7.7 per cent of the sample.  
 
When the papers are compared, the difference between The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph in terms of describing Turkey is significant. However, the low frequency of 
the values prevents the study from drawing valid deductions from these results.  
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Table 6.5: Distribution of the descriptions* about Turkey 
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%** 
 European 3 1 2 8 0 2 16 11.2% 
 Middle Eastern / 
Eastern 
2 1 0 2 0 6 11 7.7% 
 A mix of east and 
west 
0 2 0 3 1 2 8 5.6% 
 Asian 1 0 0 2 0 3 6 4.2% 
 Not European 1 1 1 0 1 3 7 4.9% 
 Total 7 5 3 15 2 16 48 - 
*Up to five conditions were coded in each news item. 
** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
 
Only the direct appearances of the descriptions were counted in the news items. For 
instance, calling Turkey ‘Muslim’ in a news item did not mean that Turkey was 
automatically coded as Middle Eastern. That is why the results of this table should not 
be seen as incompatible with the following section’s Table 6.6 where the label 
‘Muslim’ is topmost on the list. 
 
6.7.2. Labels that are used to describe Turkey 
This section seeks to understand how Turkey was described, by the labels which were 
used in the news items about Turkey-EU relations. All the 143 news items were 
analysed and the exact labels (adjectives, words or phrases) that refer to Turkey listed 
in Table 6.6 (without any truncation, collapsing or categorising) were extracted. It was 
found that 77.6 per cent of news items employed at least one label while describing 
Turkey. 
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According to the findings, Turkey is associated with its religion in almost half of all 
news items (48.3 per cent). In most cases, the label ‘Muslim’ was used in order to 
depict the cultural and religious differences. Occasionally, Turkey’s religion was 
stressed with the aim of proving that the EU is not a Christian club. The British 
politicians especially mentioned the issue of religion in order to propose a solution to 
the clash of civilisations. However, in most cases, the attribution to Turkey’s religion 
was made in order to depict Turkey’s difference from EU Member States. Thus, it is 
meaningful to ask the reason for this remarkable number of attributions to religion 
and culture and how it comes to outnumber other labels. 
 
Consequently, it is important to consider whether the British news media represents 
Turkey with its religion on purpose. No journalists confessed to this in the fieldwork 
but in practical terms, what journalists said can contribute some more contemporary 
and Turkey-specific explanations to Said’s (1997: 61) arguments on labelling the East. 
The journalists who had written some of these news items in the British media think 
that the high frequency attribution to ‘Muslim’ could be related to several reasons: 
Islamophobia; the situation in the post-9/11 era; some journalistic tricks; relevance of 
attribution to the Muslim identity of Turkey because of Turkey’s different position in 
Europe in terms of religion and culture; and European politicians’ continual attribution 
to the issue. There are more discussions about associating Turkey with its religion in 
Chapter 8 (on page 241) where the journalists explain the reasons for this continuous 
attribution. 
 
Although the news items did not usually explain whether they referred to people or 
the state when they used the word ‘Muslim’, in some news items Turkey was 
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noticeably represented as a secular country (11.9 per cent). However, this “antithetical 
knowledge” (Said, 1997: 157) produced by some journalists in the British media cannot 
be a strong alternative to the existing orthodox coverage of Turkey and Islam. This is 
because references to Turkey with words such as ‘Secular’ and ‘Secularism’ are almost 
four times fewer than those indicating that Turkey is Muslim. Regarding the labels, 
apart from ‘Muslim’ and ‘Secular’, which were seen in more than 9.8 per cent of all 
news items, it could be argued that there is relatively balanced distribution of labels in 
terms of positive and negative meanings. For instance, the total of relatively negative 
attributions ‘Large and populous’ (16.8 per cent) and ‘Poor’ (9.8 per cent) is not 
significantly different from the total percentage of relatively positive attributions ‘A full 
partner of Europe’ (13.3 per cent) and ‘Democratic’ (10.5 per cent). 
Table 6.6: Distribution of the labels* among news organisations 
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%** 
 Muslim 10 8 1 30 3 17 69 48.3% 
 Large and populous (or big, 
vast), (emphasising the 
population) 
3 2 4 7 0 8 24 16.8% 
 A full partner for Europe / 
Pro-western / European 
public / European power /  
A NATO member 
4 3 1 7 0 4 19 13.3% 
 Secular 1 1 1 8 0 6 17 11.9% 
 Democracy / Democratic 3 1 1 6 0 4 15 10.5% 
 Poor 2 2 2 5 0 3 14 9.8% 
 Different from Europe  
(Not European) 
2 1 1 1 1 2 8 5.6% 
 Other labels 11 12 6 23 2 22 76 53.1% 
*Up to 3 conditions were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of 
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
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As mentioned above, the labels coded for this category were not collapsed on SPSS. 
Thus, some labels, especially the least coded ones, may look remarkably similar to 
each other. The labels which were coded in less than five per cent of all news items 
mostly show the British media’s interest in underlining Turkey’s religion: “A bridge 
between two civilisations”, “Modern”, “A holiday destination”, ”Moderate Islam”, 
“Mildly Islamist Government”, “Moslem State”, “Islamic-tinted government”, “Islamic 
country”, “government of former Islamists”, and “the most relaxed Muslims”. 
 
Before concluding, Said’s consideration can help to improve the analysis in this section. 
He has argued that there is a tendency to compare ‘Islam’ with ‘the West’ instead of 
Islam with ‘Christianity’. He claimed that this is because of the acceptance of ‘the 
West’ over ‘Christianity’ and belief that ‘the Western culture’ has exceeded the power 
of its religion. However, the concept of ‘the East’ is still equated with ‘Islam’ (Said, 
1997: 10). These points can help us to understand why Turkey’s religion appears more 
often in news items and why Turkey is more associated with being ‘Muslim’ than being 
a member of ‘the Eastern world’, ‘the Middle East’ or being ‘a bridge between the East 
and the West’. Following Cahen and others’ suggestions, Said (1997: 61) argues that it 
would be more appropriate to describe Muslim societies as "Near Eastern," 
"Mediterranean," "medieval" or "preindustrial" societies.  
“For sociopolitical history, Islam can furnish some elements of explanation but 
by no means all that are needed. The institutions and policies of even the most 
fervently ‘Islamic’ states cannot be explained without taking into account 
geographical position, economic needs, and the interests of dynasties and 
rulers” (Said, 1997: 61). 
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6.8. Main issues 
One of the most important sections of this chapter focuses on the ‘issues’ that are 
highlighted in the news items covering Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Having discussed 
the points related to these issues in Chapter 3, this section’s findings reveal the degree 
of importance given by the British media to those issues in Turkey’s EU bid. It can be 
assumed that most arguments in the political agenda concerning Turkish membership 
had been shaped by issues such as ‘Democracy and human rights’ and ‘The Cyprus 
issue’ in the last decade. The majority of these issues are very critical to Turkey’s EU 
bid. For instance, 51.7 per cent of all news items refer to Turkey’s bad human rights 
record and only 1/5 of this percentage mentions Turkey’s efforts to rehabilitate it. ‘The 
Cyprus issue and Turkish-Greek relations’ is the second most commonly underlined 
issue in the news items on Turkish membership (43.4 per cent). The table below shows 
all 13 issues according to total figures and their distribution within each news 
organisation. The ratio of the issues within each media outlet21 shows that the news 
items with most issues (polemical) were published by The Guardian while the FT and 
the Daily Mirror covered the least tense discussions (see the last row of the table 
below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 It is calculated by dividing the number of issues referred by a news organisation into the total number 
of news items published by the same news organisation. 
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Table 6.7: Distribution of the main issues* in each news organisation and in total 
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 Democracy and human 
rights issues 
18 7 4 27 2 16 74 51.7% 
 The Cyprus issue / 
Turkish-Greek relations 
11 3 4 28 2 14 62 43.4% 
 Long term wait of Turkey 3 3 5 23 1 10 45 31.5% 
 Privileged partnership 3 4 10 16 1 7 41 28.7% 
 Clash of civilisations 2 8 2 18 1 7 38 26.6% 
 The Kurdish issue 5 2 2 15 1 8 33 23.1% 
 The Armenian issue 1 1 4 10 0 2 18 12.6% 
 Referendum in EU 
Member States for 
Turkey’s EU membership 
1 2 5 5 0 3 16 11.2% 
 Invalidity of clash of 
civilisations 
5 2 0 2 0 4 13 9.1% 
 Absorption capacity 0 1 2 4 0 3 10 7% 
 Islamic fundamentalism 2 2 0 3 0 2 9 6.3% 
 Suspicions on Turkey’s 
secular democracy 
0 0 1 5 0 2 8 5.6% 
 Proposed adultery law 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1.4% 
 Total number of issues 51 35 39 158 8 78 369 - 
 Total number of news 
items 
23 15 20 48 5 32 143 - 
 The average number of 
issues discussed in each 
news item 
2.22 2.33 1.95 3.29 1.6 2.43 2.58 - 
*Up to six issues were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of  
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
 
It was also found in the analysis that the distribution of the main issues changes over 
six different events in the time sample. For instance, most issues reached a peak in the 
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Negotiations period (3rd October 2005). In this period, issues such as privileged 
partnership, absorption capacity, the Armenian issue, and the referendum discussions 
overwhelmingly dominated the news items on Turkey’s bid for accession to the EU. 
‘The Kurdish issue’ and ‘Democracy and human rights issues’ are the only issues which 
appeared in every period. The Cyprus issue, without any remarkable fluctuation, 
showed itself in all periods except one. 
 
6.9. Countries and issues  
Many news items referred to countries, politicians or other people whose nationalities 
are obvious and who talk in the name of their country. So, the issues raised by these 
people (such as saying “Angela Merkel proposed privileged partnership…”) or the 
country itself (such as saying “Austria is against…”) were coded and linked to the 
country in question. In this way, the quantitative findings can reveal which issue is 
more important to mention for each country. Eight main countries are listed in Table 
6.8 below. Seven countries (Denmark, the Vatican, North Cyprus, Libya, Switzerland, 
Spain, and Sweden) which did not appear as often as the main countries in the news 
items were listed as ‘Others’. 
 
6.9.1. Countries 
The total column in the table below shows the total attributions to each country in 
terms of their position in Turkey’s EU bid. The numbers in this column also set out the 
extent to which these countries are associated with the discussions about Turkey’s bid 
to join the EU in the British media. It is obvious that the UK is at the top of the list and 
it is followed by Austria and France. Turkey’s position was not counted in this section 
as it is the party whose membership to the EU is discussed. 
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Table 6.8: The total attributions to each country in terms of their position towards Turkey’s EU bid 
 In favour Against Neutral 
In favour 
with some 
negative 
point/s 
Against 
with some 
positive 
point/s 
Total 
Attributions 
 UK 70 0 0 2 0 72 
 Austria 1 44 0 0 4 49 
 France 5 21 3 13 6 48 
 Germany 9 18 0 4 4 35 
 USA 24 0 0 0 0 24 
 Cyprus 2 12 0 0 1 15 
 Greece 6 1 0 0 1 8 
 Italy 4 1 0 0 0 5 
 Others 6 4 2 2 0 14 
  Total 127 101 5 21 16 270 
 
The columns in Table 6.8 designates the approach of countries to Turkish membership 
by their position in terms of being ‘in favour’, ‘against’, ‘neutral’, ‘in favour with some 
negative points’, and ‘against with some positive points (mainly refers to negative, 
critical countries)’. No news item mentioned that the UK is against Turkish 
membership and almost half of all news items in the sample underlined that the UK is 
in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. This strong support was mainly portrayed in speeches 
made by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. 
The antithesis of the UK’s approach to Turkish membership is Austria which was shown 
as an opponent to Turkish membership 44 times in 143 news items. Among the pro-
Turkish side, the UK is followed by the USA, Greece, Italy, and ‘Other countries’ group 
when the total of being in favour and against is calculated. On the opposition side, 
Austria is together with France, Germany and Cyprus.  
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Figure 6.1 below was designed using a point system by calculating five columns in 
Table 6.8. Accordingly, being in favour means ‘+1’, while it is ‘+0.5’ to be in favour with 
some negative point/s. The same point system was applied to the opposition side by 
using negative numbers. Figure 6.1 shows that the UK is almost alone in supporting 
Turkey among EU Member States as Greece’s and Italy’s support was seldom 
mentioned in the news items. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the Greek 
support is very conditional and strongly linked to the solution of the Cyprus issue. 
Because of the UK’s very high positive point, the average point when all countries’ 
points are aggregated is +19.5. 
 
Figure 6.1: The approach of countries to Turkey whether they are against (-) or in favour (+) of its EU bid 
in the news items of different periods between 1999 and 2006 (n=143 news items). (Countries that were 
found in items coded only once per news item). 
 
According to these results, Austria provides the strongest opposition to Turkish 
membership of the EU. However, Austria’s place in the figure is closely related to its 
inflexible stance during the period when Turkey was about to start membership 
negotiations in October 2005. The high frequency of news items in this period made 
Austria the main opponent, followed by France, Cyprus and Germany. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the non-appearance of France at the top of the list 
could be related to the research’s time sample. Since Nicholas Sarkozy came to power 
in France in 2007, the figures had shifted drastically in terms of opposition to Turkish 
membership when compared to France’s relatively positive approach in the Chirac era 
(Paksoy, 2011). However, this study’s sample does not include the period after 2006. 
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Moreover, even though Germany is on the opposition side, its value could be more 
negative if Gerhard Schröder’s mild approach -compared to Angela Merkel’s- to Turkey 
while he was in office between 1998 and 2005 did not coincide with this research’s 
time sample. Cyprus could not be the first or second one on the opponents list 
because of its conditional support for Turkish membership in some periods.  
 
6.9.2. The issues that were raised by countries 
Having looked at the main issues in Section 6.8 and the general approach of countries 
to Turkey’s EU bid above, this section seeks to elaborate on the countries’ views by 
examining the issues that were raised by those countries. The general overview of 
Table 6.9 shows how much certain countries are associated with some specific issues. 
For instance, Austria’s negative approach to Turkish membership is very associated 
with the issues ‘privileged partnership’ (along with Germany) and ‘absorption 
capacity’. Another remarkable association of issues and countries is the correlation 
between the UK and ‘the invalidity of the clash of civilisations’. 
 
The table shows that Cyprus (15 times) and Greece (7 times) are only interested in 
their own problems with Turkey, instead of making comments about human rights 
issues in Turkey, the possible results of Turkish membership or more abstract issues 
such as the clash of civilisations and its relationship with Turkish membership to the 
EU. Interestingly, similar to Greece and Cyprus, Turkey also referred to the Cyprus 
issue and the relations with Greece the most, compared to other issues. In addition to 
the importance of finding a solution to the Cyprus issue if Turkey wants to join the EU, 
this kind of deep interest in addressing the issue or allowing Turkey to make comments 
on the Cyprus issue more than other issues in the British media may mean that Turkey 
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has more to say, has more arguments to make to defend itself in this case than other 
issues. Thus, within the context of Turkey’s EU bid representation in the British media, 
it may be assumed that Turkey has less to say about ‘Democracy and human rights 
issues’ than ‘the Cyprus issue’ even though ‘Democracy and human rights issues’ were 
emphasised more than ‘the Cyprus issue’ in the news items (see Table 6.9). (See J9’s 
comments on the Cyprus issue as a potential ‘good case’ for Turkey in Section 9.3.2 in 
Chapter 9). 
 
After the ‘human rights issues’ (9 times), the issues that were referred to the most 
often by the UK are ‘the invalidity of clash of civilisations’ (8 times) and ‘long term wait 
of Turkey’ (8 times). ‘The invalidity of clash of civilisations’ was not addressed by other 
countries except the UK and Turkey, and while the ‘long term wait of Turkey’ was 
mentioned by the UK, Turkey was almost silent despite having waited on the European 
doorstep for many years and it did not use this fact as part of its arguments in order to 
explain that it deserves to join the EU. Table 6.9 shows the frequency of the most 
raised issues and the total per country. The reason why the total number of issues here 
and in Section 6.8 is different is because some issues were sometimes raised by 
authors without referring to any country. The general overview of the table illustrates 
that the countries which support Turkey’s EU bid underline the issues that are related 
to the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, the opposing countries’ (such as 
Austria, France and Germany) priorities are their public opinion and proposing 
privileged partnership to Turkey. 
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Table 6.9: The issues that the countries raised the most in news items about Turkey’s EU membership 
Countries Raised issue 1 Raised issue 2 Raised issue 3 
Total number 
of raising 
Austria 
Privileged partnership 
(30 times) 
Referendum in EU Member 
States for Turkish membership  
(9 times) 
Absorption capacity 
(8 times) 
50 times 
Turkey 
The Cyprus issue / 
Turkish-Greek 
relations 
(21 times) 
Human rights issues 
(6 times) 
Clash of civilisations 
(6 times) 
43 times 
The UK 
Human rights issues 
(9 times) 
Invalidity of clash of 
civilisations (8 times) 
Long term wait of 
Turkey (8 times) 
37 times 
France 
Referendum in EU 
Member States for 
Turkish membership 
(14 times) 
Clash of civilisations 
(7 times) 
Human rights issues 
(5 times) 
33 times 
Germany 
Privileged partnership 
(6 times) 
Human rights issues 
(5 times) 
The Cyprus issue / 
Turkish-Greek relations 
(4 times) 
21 times 
Cyprus 
The Cyprus issue / 
Turkish-Greek 
relations 
(15 times) 
N/A N/A 15 times 
Greece 
The Cyprus issue / 
Turkish-Greek 
relations 
(7 times) 
Human rights issues 
(Once) 
N/A 8 times 
The US 
Human rights issues 
(Once) 
Clash of civilisations 
(Once) 
Suspicions on Turkey’s 
secular democracy 
(Once) 
3 times 
Other 
countries 
Clash of civilisations 
(5 times) 
The Cyprus issue / Turkish-
Greek relations 
(3 times) 
Human rights issues 
(3 times) 
18 times 
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6.10. Differences and similarities between Turkey and EU Member States 
In this section, differences and similarities refer to what Turkey and the EU lack and 
hold in common in terms of various aspects such as culture, politics, economy, etc. 
Almost 60 per cent of all news items underlined at least one difference between 
Turkey and EU Member States. However, when similarities are analysed, it was seen 
that only 22.4 per cent of news items referred to at least one similarity. Because of this 
difference in the ratio -bearing in mind the possibility of the existence of insufficient 
similarities between Turkey and EU Member States in daily life and politics compared 
to differences- it can be assumed that the British media is more interested in 
representing the differences instead of the similarities. This is in line with what was 
mentioned by previous studies (Negrine et al., 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Scheneeberger, 
2009). 
 
6.10.1. Differences between Turkey and EU Member States 
How much Turkey is different from the EU Member States or how much they do not 
have in common were mainly highlighted in the news items which include critical 
views on Turkish membership. In total, 85 of 143 news items referred to differences 
between Turkey and EU Member States at least once. Nearly half of all news items 
refer to differences in terms of religion and culture. Differences in terms of economic 
level, geographical location, and human rights record are overshadowed by the 
attributions to Turkey’s different religion and culture. 
 
Table 6.10 shows the distribution of differences across the news organisations. It is 
interesting to see that The Daily Telegraph referred to religion almost as much as The 
Guardian even though the total of news items in the sample from The Daily Telegraph 
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is almost half of The Guardian. The average number of differences in each paper shows 
that BBC News and The Daily Telegraph are the most interested ones in mentioning 
differences. 
 
Table 6.10: Distribution of differences* between Turkey and  
EU Member States across the news organisations 
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TOTAL 
Frequency 
TOTAL 
%** 
Religion and culture 11 5 7 19 3 18 63 44.1% 
Economics 4 2 4 9 0 3 22 15.4% 
Geography 2 2 1 3 0 6 14 9.8% 
Democracy and  Human Rights 4 1 1 7 0 0 13 9.1% 
Demography (and the size 
of the country) 
3 0 3 3 0 0 9 6.3% 
Power of the army on political 
decision-making 
1 0 0 0 0 2 3 2.1% 
Other differences 3 0 2 1 0 1 7 4.9% 
Total number of the differences 28 10 18 42 3 30 131 - 
Total number of news items 23 15 20 48 5 32 143 - 
The average number of 
differences in each news item 
1.22 .66 .9 .88 .6 .94 .92 - 
*Up to three differences were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of  
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
 
6.10.2. Similarities between Turkey and EU Member States 
News items refer to similarities fewer times than differences. Only 32 news items refer 
to similarities in 143 news items of the sample. The most common similarity is Turkey’s 
European character which was found in only 16 news items (11.2 per cent). Other 
similarities refer to Turkey’s NATO membership (3.5 per cent), geographical proximity 
(2.8 per cent), and corresponding culture (2.8 per cent). These figures are very much 
less than those shown in Table 6.10 about differences. The average number in Table 
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6.11 below shows that The Guardian and the FT are the most interested media outlets 
in stating the similarities between Turkey and EU Member States. 
 
Table 6.11: Distribution of similarities* between Turkey and  
EU Member States across the news organisations 
*Up to three similarities were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of  
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
 
6.11. Reasons in support and in opposition to Turkish membership 
The idea of support and opposition were used in several categories. In the context of 
this research, these refer to positive or negative comments made by the author or 
different representatives of each country such as politicians, public, or sometimes a 
country’s name in the name of that country. This section looks at what kinds of points 
were addressed in order to explain and legitimise the authors’, actors’, and countries’ 
support or opposition to Turkish membership. 
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TOTAL 
Frequency 
 
TOTAL  
%** 
 Being a European state  3 2 2 6 0 3 16 11.2% 
 NATO membership 0 1 0 4 0 0 5 3.5% 
 Geography 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 2.8% 
 Religion, culture and identity 0 1 0 2 0 1 4 2.8% 
 Custom Union with the EU 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 2.1% 
 Democracy and  Human Rights 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2.1% 
 Economics 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 2.1% 
 Other similarities 0 0 1 3 0 4 8 5.6% 
 Total number of the 
differences 
3 5 8 20 0 10 46 - 
 Total number of news items 23 15 20 48 5 32 143 - 
 The average number of 
differences in each news item 
.13 .33 .4 .42 0 .31 .32 - 
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When a broader picture in terms of representing the reasons for support and 
opposition to Turkish membership is examined, one can see that 69.9 per cent of all 
news items refer to the reasons for support with at least one reason per news item. 
However, when the same is analysed on the opposition’s side, one can see that 81.8 
per cent of all news items attribute reasons for being in opposition to Turkish 
membership. Furthermore, when reasons about support and opposition in the 
following sections are compared, it is seen that the total attribution to reasons for 
opposition (338 times) is more than the total attribution of reasons for support (253 
times). Thus, this implies that the British media tend to signal the reasons for 
opposition more often than support for Turkish membership. 
 
6.11.1 Reasons in support of Turkish membership 
There are 33 different reasons to support Turkish membership found in the news 
items. As politicians were usually central to items, and due to the British politicians’ 
continuous references to the topic, the most common reason depicted in the items is 
Turkey’s possible contribution to solve the problem of ‘the clash of civilisations’ and 
the Turkish help to provide better relations between the Western world and the 
Muslim world (25.9 per cent). Secondly, 21 per cent of all news items underlined that 
Turkey has deserved to commence membership negotiations with the EU as it had 
fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and other conditions set for membership 
negotiations. Finally, the third most mentioned reason refers to Turkey’s strategic 
importance for today and future of the EU (16.1 per cent).  
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6.11.2 Reasons for opposing Turkish membership 
The most often mentioned reason why politicians, people or countries are against 
Turkish membership is not directly related to economics, culture, geography or 
political clashes but something that perhaps covers all those referred to above. More 
than a quarter of all news items highlighted that the main reason is the negative 
approach of the European public to Turkish membership (27.3 per cent). This can 
mean that the British media is interested in covering the public opposition and/or the 
quoted politicians usually employ public opinion when they legitimise their opposition 
to Turkish membership. However, it is worth noting here, as was also underlined in 
Negrine’s study (2008), no attribution to British public opinion concerning Turkey’s EU 
membership was found in the research sample even though the British media usually 
gives importance to continental Europe’s public opinion data in its coverage (Negrine, 
2008). 
The second most common reason cited is opposition to awarding Turkey full 
membership instead of some other option such as a restricted membership or a special 
agreement like ‘privileged partnership’ (24.5 per cent). Other reasons are related to 
what this study usually encounters in the qualitative and quantitative analysis, which 
are the bad human rights record of Turkey (23.8 per cent), cultural difference (21.7 per 
cent), the Cyprus issue (19.6 per cent), and economic problems (17.5 per cent). 
It is also worth looking at which reasons were mentioned on fewer occasions. For 
instance, according to the findings, among 143 news items, only one news item (0.7 
per cent) identifies the Turkish immigrants living in EU Member States as a reason for 
opposition to Turkish membership. Although the British media was not interested in 
this issue, “*…+ European-Turkish relations as well as conceptions of European identity 
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are affected by the over one million22 Turkish residents in Europe, and by other groups 
of resident Others” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 347). A Eurobarometer (2006: 71) poll 
shows that the strongest opposition to Turkish members is in Austria (81 per cent) and 
Germany (69 per cent). The opposition figures in these countries, where the majority 
of Turkish migrants in Europe dwell, might reveal the correlation between the higher 
number of Turkish immigrants and the higher degree of opposition of these countries’ 
public to Turkish membership. British media did not directly mention it but it should be 
kept in mind that the complaints about the people of Turkish origin living in Europe 
could be hidden in the most underlined reason for opposition: ‘European public’s 
negative approach’. 
 
The other interesting point is that ‘Opposing Turkish membership without emphasising 
any reason’ was only found in three news items. However, ‘Support for Turkish 
membership without emphasising any reason’ was found eight times in the category of 
‘the reasons in support for Turkish membership’. This could be related to quotations 
from politicians, which were summarised or truncated, or the other sources of news 
items, which do not explain the reason for their support. However, it can be claimed 
that elaborating on the reasons for opposing Turkish membership is more common in 
the British media.  
 
6.12. The actors in news items 
Politicians’ power and their ability to gain access increase their chance to be addressed 
in news items (Gans, 1979). “In their interactions with the media, political actors 
pursue their own goals and do frequently dominate media content” (Negrine, 1994: 
                                                          
22
 According to a more recent study, the population of Euro-Turks is almost four million in all EU 
Member States (Kaya and Kentel, 2005: 41). 
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12). Their interactions could usually be more than external influence, and political 
actors become the topic of the content. This is also a practice employed by journalists 
as they prefer powerful sources in order to make their reports more persuasive. 
Employing politicians as actors in news items will increase the reliability and 
worthiness of their reports (Gans, 1979). Dearing and Rogers (1996: 39) argue that the 
White House is one of the main institutions in the US in the media agenda-setting 
process. The same could be said for the position of Westminster. As it is hard to talk 
about the direct influence of the British public in Turkey‘s EU bid discussions, the 
Turkish issue is mainly narrated by British, Turkish or other European politicians. When 
using the concept ‘actors’, this section usually refers to political actors, who make a 
significant contribution to the coverage by being quoted or mentioned. Apart from the 
politicians, few actors represent the public, academics, or people from NGOs. The 
findings concerning the actors are going to be presented in three sections: the actors 
who support Turkish membership; the actors who are against Turkish membership; 
and Turkish actors. The reason for separating Turkish actors from other actors is 
because of the strong possibility that Turkish actors’ support for Turkish membership 
would skew the general outcome of the findings.  
 
6.12.1. The actors who support Turkish membership 
Tony Blair and Jack Straw, shown at the top of Table 6.12, were quoted and mentioned 
far more than other European politicians. The representatives of the Franco-German 
axis, the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the then French President 
Jacques Chirac, follow them in the table. Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s 
colleagues Joschka Fischer (former German Foreign Minister) and the period’s four 
different former French Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs appeared only once 
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and that left Jacques Chirac alone in supporting Turkish membership in the time 
sample of this study. It is understandable that the British politicians are quoted and 
mentioned more than other countries’ actors in the British media but, interestingly, 
including the other actors in the table below, the American politicians (23 times) were 
quoted and mentioned more than the French (15 times) and as much as Germans (23 
times). French support for Turkish membership was usually with caveats in this 
research’s sample; however Germany, particularly when Schröder was in office (1998-
2005), was one of the main proponents of Turkish progression for EU membership. 
Thus, the table shows the importance of the American opinion on Turkish membership 
for the British media. 
 
Table 6.12: Distribution of the actors who support Turkish membership 
 Quoted Mentioned Total 
 Tony Blair 24 32 56 
 Jack Straw 20 19 39 
 Gerhard Schröder  6 8 14 
 Jacques Chirac 4 9 13 
 George Bush 3 10 13 
 Joschka Fischer 6 2 8 
 Pope Benedict 2 5 7 
 Olli Rehn 4 2 6 
 Javier Solana 3 3 6 
 Other actors  20 12 32 
 Total 92 102 194 
 
6.12.2. The actors who are against Turkish membership 
The most mentioned and quoted opposition actor is not one of the active politicians of 
the period but the President of France between 1974 and 1981, Giscard d'Estaing. His 
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famous statement claiming that Turkish membership would be the end of Europe 
resonated in different circles when the Turkish issue was an important topic of the EU 
agenda (BBC News Online, 2002). The reason why so much significance was attached 
to what Giscard d’Estaing had said could be related to the findings in Section 6.11.2 
which deals with the reasons for opposing Turkish membership. The results in that 
section illustrated that the ‘European public’s negative approach to Turkey’ is the most 
mentioned reason for opposition in the British media while most European politicians, 
even the German Chancellor and the French President, were positive or at most lightly 
critical of Turkish membership in the time sample of this research. Thus, it could be 
assumed that Giscard d’Estaing was employed in the news items as the voice of strong 
opposition among the European public in this period by occupying the vacant position 
on the opposition side. It may be important to note, though, that Jacques Chirac was 
trying to straddle two positions. He was supporting Turkish membership but at the 
same time he was being very critical as he was undergoing enormous pressure from his 
own party members, other members of the Parliament and French public opinion 
before Turkey started the membership negotiations with the EU (Aissaoui, 2007: 1). A 
report of The Daily Telegraph describes how he straddled these positions:    
“*…+ France is emerging as the country most likely to scupper Ankara's bid, with 
two thirds of voters now hostile to accession. President Jacques Chirac, an 
increasingly lonely friend of Turkey, broadcast to the nation last night to 
explain the need to reach out to Ankara” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004c). 
 
Having appeared in the pro-Turkish actors Table 6.12, Chirac’s position at the centre 
also made him appear as one of the most quoted and mentioned persons in the 
opposing actors’ table.  
 
 
 
 
152 
 
Table 6.13: Distribution of the actors who are against Turkish membership 
 Quoted Mentioned Total 
 Giscard d'Estaing 10 9 19 
 Ursula Plassnik 7 10 17 
 Jacques Chirac 6 10 16 
 Wolfgang Schüssel 8 5 13 
 Angela Merkel 4 9 13 
 Nicolas Sarkozy 0 8 8 
 Edmund Stoiber 4 3 7 
 Pope Benedict 2 4 6 
 Other actors 15 5 20 
 Total 56 63 119 
 
The former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik and the former Austrian 
Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, who were strongly against Turkish membership when 
the membership negotiation process started on 3rd October 2005, outnumber their 
many other European counterparts. Although the Cyprus conflict is one the most 
topical issues in many sections of this research, it is clearly seen that the Greek and 
Greek-Cypriot politicians were not allowed to talk enough while they were supporting 
or opposing Turkish membership. Former Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos was 
quoted only once and mentioned twice as an opposing actor while George 
Papandreou, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece between 1999 and 2004, 
appeared only once in each in favour and opponent position. 
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6.12.3. Turkish actors  
The gap between the top actor and the other actors on the list is the biggest in the 
Turkish actors’ table. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister since 2003, had 
been mentioned 45 and quoted 31 times. Moreover, Erdoğan is also number one on 
the list if all Turkish and other actors’ tables are put together. Although Said (2003: 34-
35) argues that the Occident knows the Orient’s expectations and what can be better 
for them, and speaks in the name of the Orient in politics, this research’s quantitative 
findings shows that Turkish actors’ comments were covered at least as much as EU 
politicians. In the Turkish actors table, Erdoğan is followed by the then Turkish PM, and 
the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül who was referred 35 times in total. In a way, 
this contradicts Said’s comments and observations. 
 
Table 6.14: Distribution of Turkish actors 
 Quoted Mentioned Total 
 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 31 45 76 
 Abdullah Gül 19 16 35 
 Bülent Ecevit 6 6 12 
 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1 9 10 
 Rauf Denktaş 4 4 8 
 Abdullah Öcalan 1 7 8 
 
Turkish public (Regular 
people’s opinion) 
 
6 1 7 
 Orhan Pamuk 1 5 6 
 Other actors  21 18 39 
 Total 90 111 201 
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6.13. Conditions for Turkish entry to the EU 
The conditions that were set for Turkey to join the EU were analysed in this part of the 
research. It was found that 115 of 143 news items include at least one condition which 
refers to Turkish accession to the EU. Most conditions are expressed by EU Member 
States or EU institutions in Brussels. It could be argued that the conditions could be a 
sign of the possibility of Turkish membership. If a country is against Turkish 
membership and if it does not mention any condition, this may mean that Turkey does 
not have so much to do to persuade the country. News items, usually through EU 
Member States and regardless of whether they are for or against Turkish membership, 
mentioned at least one condition for Turkish membership in 80.4 per cent of whole 
sample.  
 
The most cited condition is about amendments to the Turkish legal system in order to 
increase the level of democracy and human rights (42.7 per cent). This is followed by a 
requirement for Turkey to deal with the Cyprus issue and other problems between 
Turkey and Greece (32.9 per cent). The third most cited condition is that Turkey should 
wait longer for EU membership (21.7 per cent). Almost all conditions in the research 
sample are related to politics except ‘Turkey must change culturally’ which was 
mentioned in five news items. Excluding this essentialist argument about culture, the 
requirements represented in the British media look achievable sooner or later. The 
conditions which were coded in more than five per cent of all news items are listed in 
Table 6.15 below. 
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Table 6.15: Distribution of the conditions* for Turkey’s entry to the EU 
  
Frequency 
 
%** 
Changing the law (and other reforms in 
terms of democracy and human rights) 
according to EU standards 
61 42.7% 
Finding a solution for the Cyprus issue 
(and for other problems between 
Greece and Turkey) 
47 32.9% 
Need for time for Turkish membership 
(or start of negotiations) 
(Implementation of reforms needed) 
31 21.7% 
EU Member States’ efforts to convince 
their publics 
18 12.6% 
Economic improvements 15 10.5% 
Accepting the start of Croatia’s 
membership talks 
12 8.4% 
The EU’s ability to absorb Turkey 10 7.0% 
Other conditions 47 32.9% 
*Up to 3 conditions were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of  
percentages is more than 100%.   ** n=143 (total of analysed news items) 
 
 
6.14. Conclusion 
The chapter quantitatively examined 143 news items which were directly related to 
the discussions on Turkey’s EU bid. In this way, four supplementary research questions 
were answered in the chapter. 
 
RQ1: Which topics, statements, labels, issues and conditions shaped the news items? 
The analysis highlighted that the most common topics in the news items were 
“Support of EU Member States and the US for Turkish membership” and “Efforts of EU 
Member States to block Turkish membership of the EU”. This shows that the British 
media portrays the Turkish issue by means of a challenge between European rivals, 
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mainly the British and Franco-German politicians. The statements which were found 
most often in the quantitative analysis referred to the different ideas on Turkey’s EU 
bid among the politicians in the EU. It is followed by another common argument which 
highlights that Turkey still has a decade to wait for membership. 
 
In terms of the adjectives, words, and phrases that were used most often to describe 
Turkey, it was ascertained that Turkey was usually associated with the label ‘Muslim’. 
Almost 50 per cent of all news items emphasised that Turkey is a Muslim country. As it 
may refer to an eccentricity, it would have been journalistically more interesting to 
underline that Turkey is ‘Muslim’ and ‘secular’ at the same time. However, the secular 
character of the Turkish Republic was underrepresented in the coverage compared to 
Turkey’s Muslim image. While the EU is clearly based on secular values (Tekin, 2008; 
Lazarou, 2010) and British politics is by and large free from religious motivations, why 
is Turkish accession associated with religion the most? This is one of the reasons why 
this study requires an analysis of news production, which will be discussed in Chapter 
8. 
 
The most common issues in Turkey-EU relations which were discovered in the analysis 
were related to democracy and human rights, the problems in Cyprus, and the waiting 
period for Turkey. These points were more or less the same as the conditions which 
were put forward for Turkish membership. The conditions which could open the way 
for Turkish membership illustrated that the rehabilitation of the level of democracy 
and human rights is a must. Besides, a notable number of news items suggested that 
Turkish membership would not be possible before a solution to the Cyprus issue was 
found. Interestingly, the same section revealed that a necessity for a cultural change as 
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a condition to join the EU was only covered in five news items. This means that even 
though the cultural issues are represented as the leading differences between Turkey 
and the EU, they are not shown as one of the criteria that Turkey must fulfil.  
 
RQ2: What are the positions of different countries? 
According to the quantitative results on each country’s view, the UK and the US are the 
strongest supporters of Turkey’s EU bid while Austria, Germany and France are against 
Turkish accession. Concerning the main issues raised by different countries, it was 
discovered that the pro-Turkish view underscores human rights issues while the 
opposing countries refer to the importance of European public opinion and alternative 
proposals to Turkey instead of a full membership.   
 
RQ3: What kinds of differences and similarities do the news items represent? 
As explained in the Analytical Framework Chapter, othering does not always have to 
refer to the negativity of the Other. Othering can be provided by exclusively 
representing the differences as well. The quantitative results showed that othering 
Turkey was performed via underlining Turkey’s differences from the European Self 
where the similarities between Turkey and the EU Member States were outnumbered. 
While ‘religion and culture’ was shown as by far the most common difference, Turkey’s 
‘European’ character was the leading one among the similarities between Turkey and 
the EU Member States. 
 
RQ4: What are the reasons for opposition to and support for Turkish membership? 
Even though the British media usually represents the British politicians’ strong support 
for Turkish membership, it was found that the British media is quantitatively more 
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interested in explaining the grounds for EU Member States’, politicians’ and public’s 
opposition to Turkish membership. In the news items, the reason for opposition mainly 
originated from the European public’s view on the Turkish issue and offering Turkey 
full membership instead of a limited type of proposal. On the other hand, the reason 
for supporting Turkish membership was related to Turkey’s special role between the 
Eastern and Western world. Moreover, Turkey’s latest performance in adapting itself 
to the European level of democracy was also shown as a reason for pro-Turkish views 
in the British media. 
 
All in all, the general overview of tables presented in this chapter showed some strong 
indications of Turkey’s ‘Other’ character in the British news coverage. Drawing on the 
discussions in the analytical framework of the thesis, it can be argued that these 
quantitative indications constitute the ‘Other’ half of the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in 
its usage in the context of this study. Tracing the ‘positive’ half requires a qualitative 
analysis on the news coverage which takes into account the political and cultural 
contexts. Therefore, the following chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the news 
items so as to examine the latent meanings in the news items on Turkey-EU relations. 
It examines the Turkish issue via the essentialist and functionalist approaches and their 
influences on representing Turkey as part of the European Other and as part of the 
European Self. In this way, a deeper and more contextual account can be given to the 
quantitative findings set out in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
While referring to Turkey-EU relations,  
former French President Jacques Chirac once said:  
“We are all, the children of Byzantium!” 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2004). 
 
7.1. Introduction 
A quantitative content analysis cannot reveal more than ‘what was said’ and/or ‘how 
many times it was said’ in a text. Thus, a quantitative analysis can help to answer only 
some of the research questions in this study. To develop the research only on the basis 
of quantitative work would probably be of limited value as it is important to relate 
findings to a text’s qualitative characteristics (Richardson, 2007). Therefore, an analysis 
of news items concerning Turkey-EU relations requires to consider the usage of words, 
inferences from sentences, and more importantly the ‘context’ of news items in order 
to get a deeper understanding of the meaning of texts. For instance, representing the 
fact that Turkey is a country of 70 million and the majority of the public is Muslim is 
not only a fact. They also have a meaning depending on the context. Therefore, in 
which context Turkey-EU relations were represented is what this study also takes into 
account.  
The research questions below set out why this study requires a qualitative content 
analysis alongside a quantitative examination on news items. The questions are 
interested in the construction of in-groups and out-groups and how social actors, 
events, and processes played a role in the demarcation of ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ 
within a sample of news items: 
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RQ1: What are the components that represent Turkey as the Other in the European 
context? 
RQ2: What are the components that represent Turkey as part of the European Self? 
 
The answers to the questions are presented in two main sections of this chapter. On 
some occasions, the same issues could be discussed in different sections by addressing 
the different aspects of the issues. For instance, ‘geography’ in Section 7.2.3 (Othering 
by Geography) has more to do with European identity, while the geographical 
dimensions in Section 7.3.1 (Geo-Strategic Considerations) are pertinent to politics. 
However, it is sometimes inevitable to avoid the overlapping of themes as some 
sections are to some extent similar. This can be accepted as a natural result since the 
authors did not write their news items according to this study’s categories of 
qualitative content analysis. 
 
Employing the concepts of ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ 
Turkey is the first official EU membership candidate whose Europeanness has been 
central to many discussions (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 6). Therefore, together with the 
notion of ‘a positive Other’, an analysis on the media representation of Turkish 
accession to the EU can be better explained by employing ‘the Self and the Other’ 
nexus in the research. The two concepts are going to be used to imply being or not 
being part of Europe –in particular the EU– in terms of religion, culture, history, 
politics, economy and other issues discussed in this chapter. Thus, when the concept 
‘the Self’ is used, it actually refers to the European Self and being part of it by means of 
identity and the other elements identified above. In contrast, ‘the Other’ addresses 
non-Europeanness, or in Gerard Delanty’s (1995) words being a ‘negation’ of Europe. 
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Therefore, in this study, ‘othering Turkey’ in the British media refers to the exclusion of 
Turkey in the European context by employing the different dimensions which are listed 
throughout Section 7.2.  
 
Arguing that Turkey was orientalised, shown as the Other, and depicted as distant 
from the European Self would have been much easier if this study had been grounded 
on other European countries’ contexts (e.g. Germany, France, or Austria). This does 
not mean that Turkey was not orientalised in the British media, nor that it was not 
represented as part of the European Self. The findings showed that it is not possible to 
draw a concrete conclusion about whether the British media represented Turkey as 
the Other or as part of the Self because of the British media’s stance in the Turkish 
issue which is possibly influenced by Britain’s special relationship with the EU and the 
Government’s unlimited support for Turkish membership. Thus, it would be fruitful to 
discuss the issue under two different titles where Turkey was shown as the Other or as 
part of the Self. Since the main discussions are richer (not necessarily quantitatively 
but qualitatively) in Othering Turkey than showing it as part of the European Self, the 
section covering the Other discussions comes first. 
 
7.2. Turkey as the Other 
This section seeks to discuss how Turkey was described as the Other in the context of 
Turkey-EU relations in the British media. It was found in the sample that ‘othering’ was 
performed through historical events and concepts, religion and culture, geography, 
politics, economic conditions, and by using quotations from the Turks. 
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7.2.1. Othering Turkey by using historical events and concepts 
As “*…+ journalism deploys history to maintain the coherence of its practice in the 
present” (Conboy, 2011: 517), looking at how Turkey was represented by using 
historical events and concepts can be an asset for this study. Fürsich argues that “*i+t is 
the task of the textual analysts to establish how current ostensibly innocuous 
representations can reverberate problematic historic discourses” (2009: 246). 
Moreover, Neumann (1999: 62) claims “*p+resent-day representations of Turkey *…+ 
carry with them the memory of earlier representations”. Following Fürsich (2009) and 
Neumann’s (1999) arguments, this section seeks to demonstrate the historic 
discourses by means of the historical events and concepts which were employed in 
creating Turkey’s EU bid representation in the British media. Therefore, it is argued 
that the historical events and concepts employed in the news items concerning 
Turkey’s EU bid actually refer to more than the memory of a historical term or 
phenomenon. They usually explain a current event by referring to negative incidents in 
the past. Moreover, as some of the historical events and concepts found in this study 
are metaphors (e.g. ‘Trojan horse’), the possibility of exaggeration by the newspapers 
“for the sake of emphasis” (Conboy, 2007: 40) increases. 
 
Historical events concerning the relations between Turkey and Europe are reduced to 
a mere few words which are full of meaning in the British media coverage. On some 
occasions, depending on the context, the historical events and concepts served the 
formation of Turkey’s representation as an Other; in some cases they were used in 
order to refer to the political problems that occurred in the relatively near future; and 
in some news items, the historical events and concepts were employed in order to 
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make the news items more interesting and/or informative. The historical events and 
concepts found in the analysis are the Siege of Vienna, Ottoman grand viziers and 
sultans, the Sick Man of Europe, the bazaar culture, and the mythological stratagem of 
the Trojan horse. Similarly, in her work on the French media, Tekin (2008) found 
several historical events and concepts used in the French discourse about Turkey’s EU 
membership such as “the Trojan horse metaphor, or the metaphoric use of 
‘Janissaries’, the ‘Sublime Porte’, or the ‘Sieges of Vienna’” (Tekin, 2008: 750) which 
historically refer to war and aggression. The sub-sections below present the examples 
found in the research sample. 
 
The Siege of Vienna 
The battles between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, specifically the ones in Vienna 
(the first in 1529, the second in 1683) have always been a popular association with 
Turkey's EU bid. “Many Europeans feel that the eventual entry of Turkey will be a new 
siege of Vienna” (MacLennan, 2009: 21). This connection also appears in 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid in different EU Member State’s media (Öktem, 2005; 
Kösebalaban, 2007; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Strasser, 2008; Tekin, 2008; 
Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a). While the agenda is on Turkey-EU relations, some 
headlines refer to this historical occasion in order to highlight the most western point 
the Ottoman Empire had reached in its enlargement to the west. In this way, the 
abstractness of cultural and religious discussions regarding Turkey's EU bid are 
objectified by the mythical meaning of the Siege of Vienna. Although Turks had had 
many wars with other Europeans (Venetians, British, Russians, etc.), fought together 
with Germans and Austro-Hungarians against the Allied Powers in WWI, these are 
usually overlooked in the public discourses (Schneeberger, 2011: 26). This could be 
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because of the fact that 'the Siege of Vienna' has more symbolic meaning as Catholic 
Europe strengthened its unity by defending Vienna.  
 
The examples in this study’s sample underline that ‘the Siege of Vienna’ by the 
Ottomans is still being kept alive in today’s Europe. In particular, the Austrians’ 
opposition to Turkish membership is clearly associated with the Siege: “In Austria, still 
affecting to be traumatised by the siege of Vienna in 1683 and where a referendum 
has been promised, opinion is six-to-one against *Turkish membership+” (The Guardian, 
2006). Interestingly, even some news items which strongly support Turkish 
membership include attributions to the existence of some Austrians who believed that 
they had saved Europe from the Turkish attacks at the gates of Vienna in 1683 
(Financial Times, 2005b). The framing of the item reveals that these reports do not 
support these Austrians’ thoughts but it is worth noting that Turkish membership is 
associated with a historical event which recalls a battle in the past no matter whether 
the content is in favour or against Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
Referring to the Gates of Vienna not only serves Turkey’s exclusion from the European 
contexts but it also helps, in Negrine’s words, the British press to differentiate the 
British history from that of other European countries:  
“Continental European history – e.g. the repulsion of the Turks at the gates of 
Vienna in 1683, which was mentioned in British press coverage as part of the 
rich tapestry of opposition [to Turkish membership] – was reported as the 
opposition, and the history, of others. It was their – Austrian, German, French, 
etc. history – not British history, nor European history” (Negrine, 2008: 642). 
 
According to this view, apart from othering the British history from the rest of Europe, 
underlining ‘the Siege of Vienna’ creates a specific understanding of the European 
history by the British in terms of deciding who was the Other, or who was the enemy. 
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It can be inferred that the Germans and the Austrians and other countries which were 
once part, or in danger of becoming part, of the Ottoman Empire met the Ottomans in 
person and that is why they have a different history of Europe (a personal interview 
with J5, 2011). 
 
Although it was mentioned above that ‘the Siege of Vienna’ associated Turkey-EU 
relations with war and hostility, this historical incident was also used by the same 
journalists who are in favour of Turkey’s EU membership in order to explain their 
critiques concerning Turcosceptics in Europe. In an example from the FT coverage, the 
author argues “Hapsburg history is no justification for the nasty prejudices of those in 
Vienna who seem to think the Ottoman hordes are threatening to tear down the gates 
of Christendom” (Financial Times, 2005d). Also, the incident was used in the Daily 
Mirror so as to show the battle between the British politicians who are in favour of 
Turkey’s EU bid, and the anti-Turkish membership initiative within the EU: “Straw 
played a blinder in lifting the Siege of Vienna” (The Daily Mirror, 2005). 
 
Linking contemporary Turkish politicians with the Ottoman leaders 
In an article published in The Guardian, two consecutive sentences towards the end of 
the commentary covertly link the Turkish PM Erdoğan with an ‘Ottoman grand vizier’. 
The author associates the danger of the grand vizier’s life with Erdoğan’s political 
career:  
"*…+ the defeat of 1683 *the Battle of Vienna+ cost the grand vizier his life and 
the sultan his throne. Having staked so much on Europe, the Erdogan 
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government would risk being swept aside by resurgent Kemalism or resurgent 
Islamism, or perhaps both23" (The Guardian, 2006).  
 
Among the news items concerning Turkey-EU relations which refer to the Ottoman 
leaders, the following example has an epic style narrative. This time BBC News 
connected Turkish PM Erdoğan, who successfully secured a date from the EU to start 
membership negotiations, with Mohammed the Conqueror who ended the Byzantine 
period in Constantinople and made Turks the dwellers of this significant European 
capital from 1453: “Erdogan has every right to return to Ankara in triumph. He gained 
the title of Mohammed the Conqueror, who five centuries ago passed triumphantly 
through the gates of the then world” (Simerini cited in BBC News Online, 2004). This 
kind of historical allusion usage was even observed during the interview with J17 (the 
FT). While discussing whether Turkey was taking an Islamic route and becoming more 
interested in the Middle East, he related the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s opinions with the ‘Ottoman Caliphate’ (see Section 8.3.3.1 in Chapter 8 for 
more details). All these attributions probably became more popular because of 
Turkey’s rising interest in relations with the countries in the Balkans and the Middle 
East which used to be part of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, going back to 500 years 
ago and finding political figures from Ottoman history –even though they were in a 
different political scene- should be an unmissable opportunity for journalists to 
enhance and colour their texts. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 This prediction, made in 2006, does not seem acceptable now as Erdoğan immensely increased his 
political power in Turkish politics even though the Turkish motivation for EU membership has 
extensively decreased since 2006.  
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The Sick Man of Europe 
Historical events and concepts are not consistent in positioning Turkey in the East or 
the West. The famous analogy ‘the Sick man of Europe’ is worth noting here because 
when Turkey becomes a patient, it is the patient of Europe, not of Asia (Mango, 2004; 
also see Said, 2003: 223; Çırakman, 2005; Mantran, 2005; Livianos, 2006; Bryce, 2007; 
Kösebalaban, 2007; Bryce, 2009b; Ramm, 2009: 103; Lazarou, 2010). The historical 
roots of the metaphor originated in a period when Britain was supporting the Ottoman 
Empire in order to stop the Russian expansion to the Balkans. Although it was claimed 
the term ‘sick man’ was firstly used by Tsar Nicholas I in 1835 (Neumann, 1999: 55), 
Livianos (2006: 299-300) argues that the ‘of Europe’ of the term was added afterwards 
by an unknown person. Besides, he claims that the term ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ could 
refer to the Balkan territority of the Ottoman Empire instead of imagining the whole 
Empire in Europe. Nevertheless, it can be said that the term ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ 
has a place in the discussions concerning Turkey in Europe and/or Turkey of Europe 
(Bryce, 2009b: 112).  
 
Still, ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ is a journalistic expression to use in the media to explain 
the state of Turkey-EU relations. Following the economic crises in Turkey in 2001, in an 
article published in The Guardian, Polly Toynbee discussed Turkey in the following way: 
“The sick man of Europe - sick maybe, amid its economic crash, but European?” (The 
Guardian, 2002). However, the usage of this historical concept does not always 
contribute to Turkey’s representation as an Other of Europe. In an article published in 
The Daily Telegraph, Geoffrey Lewis says “*Turkey+ was a European power for 500 
years. No one ever called it the Sick Man of Asia” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002b).  The 
same article’s headline is remarkably clear in order to show the support of the article 
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for Turkish membership of EU: “Turkey will not be the sick man of the EU” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 2002b). Similarly, while Martin Kettle, of The Guardian, was explaining the 
growth of the Turkish economy, he wrote “*u+nder Erdogan modern Turkey is one of 
the healthier men of Europe” (The Guardian, 2006). Even though ‘the healthier men of 
Europe’ contrasts with the past, it can be claimed that it reminds the reader of the 
popular naming of Turkey in the 19th century.  
 
The bazaar culture 
Some historical concepts were also used to explain Turkey’s behaviour and acts in the 
membership negotiations. A leader published by the FT includes the word ‘bazaar’. 
Although the word looks innocent at first sight, it could be seen as a metaphoric tool to 
orientalise and other Turkey from the European way and standard of negotiations. 
Moreover, the concept was employed while explaining how Turkey misunderstood the 
process of the membership negotiations. Thus, it may also refer to how backward and 
irrational Turks are while talking to the modern and rational Self: 
“*T+he Turks must realise at the outset what EU full membership means. Some 
of them seem to be under the illusion that negotiating it is a bit like bargaining 
in the bazaar: haggle and then split the difference” (Financial Times, 2005b).  
 
It should be underlined that this observation was made by the leader writer(s) of the 
FT. It was not quoted from or inspired by someone else. Therefore, one could argue 
that this item tried to explain the membership negotiations, one of Turkey’s most 
important steps in its history of westernisation, through a metaphor which is widely 
related to the Eastern culture: bargaining in the bazaar (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2012).  
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A Trojan horse 
Using the ‘Trojan horse’ in the context of Turkey-EU relations refers to the danger of a 
non-European intervention in the EU’s domestic affairs, such as the US influence on 
the EU via Turkey or the power of Islam that Turkey may bring to Europe (see ‘the 
Trojan Horse Syndrome’ in Kaleağası, 2006: 252). As an example of how this historical 
concept was used in the news items, there is a quotation from Libya’s ex-leader 
Muammar Gaddafi, published in the Daily Mail: “President Gaddafi warned yesterday 
that Turkey will be a Trojan horse for Islamic militants if it joins the EU” (The Daily 
Mail, 2004). Although they could also have used the concept while quoting from the 
anti-Turkish camp, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mirror did not 
cover the quotation concerning Gaddafi’s ‘Trojan horse’ argument (Negrine, 2008: 
638). However, instead of linking it with Gaddafi’s argument, in one item, The 
Guardian represented Turkish accession to the EU as “a Trojan horse in the heart of 
the West” (The Guardian, 2004a). Among the news items in the British media, John 
Casey’s article is the one which used the ‘Trojan horse’ most explicitly: “I respect the 
Turks and admire Islam, but I do not think we should ever break down the walls and 
admit this particular Trojan horse” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a). It can be seen that 
the ‘Trojan horse’ concept is generally used to underline Turkey’s difference from 
Europe and the danger it could carry to the heart of Europe. Previous studies on the 
same issue even found that the use of the ‘Trojan horse’ in news items refers to 
Turkish people’s accession to European land (“70 million Turks”) in both the Austrian 
and the French press (Bischof et al., 2010: 381).  
 
Consequently, one can argue that the historical events and concepts employed in news 
items in the British media link today’s discussions with the past, usually with the 
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Ottoman period. In a way, they are useful as a journalistic facility in order to explain 
long stories and histories with few words and make the texts more colourful to read. 
However, linking some contemporary issues in Turkey-EU relations with some 
historical events and concepts because of similarities between them may cause an 
obscuration of different conditions in two different periods (Pöttker, 2011: 531). 
Moreover, the news items usually employ the historical events in a remarkably 
summarised way without considering whether all the readers already know the story 
of these historical events. Thus, one can argue that the use of these historical events 
contributes to an inadequate representation of Turkey’s EU bid by means of superficial 
narration in news texts. Because of this, the items do not adequately represent what 
happened after the Siege of Vienna until today in relations between Turkey and 
Europe. The history of relations consists of more than wars and problems such as 
trade, diplomatic relations, and cultural exchanges (see Finkel, 2005: 283-284; Criss, 
2008: 69). Therefore, it can be claimed that the use of historical events and concepts in 
news items usually contributed to the exclusion of Turkey in the European context. In 
the same way, Turkey’s different types of relations with Europe and Turkey’s efforts at 
westernisation were overlooked in historical attributions. 
 
7.2.2. Othering Turkey by religion and culture 
“Despite Turkey’s attempts since the founding of the republic in the 1920s to project 
itself as European, Turkey and Islam have continued to be seen largely as synonymous 
as far as the dominant European perception is concerned” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 101). 
Therefore, it can be claimed that the religious and cultural difference is one of the core 
discussions in Turkey’s EU bid (Tekin, 2008; Lazarou, 2010). As was seen in the 
Quantitative Content Analysis Chapter, this situation inevitably appears in the media 
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representation too. The results of the qualitative content analysis also provide several 
examples to illustrate the representation of Turkey with religious and cultural 
differences compared to the dominant religion and culture in Europe. For instance, a 
report published in the Daily Mirror underlined that Turkey could become “the first 
Muslim nation to join the Union” (The Daily Mirror, 2002a). This emphasis overtly 
shows that the EU does not have any Muslim member at the moment and it is 
important to mention Turkey’s religion because of its difference compared to the bloc 
which Turkey wants to join. There are more explicit comments concerning how much 
Turkey does not fit in the European context. A commentary published in The Daily 
Telegraph is one of the most powerful items in terms of building an argument showing 
up Turkey’s otherness in religion and culture. In the commentary, the author tries to 
cover almost all essentialist discussions in order to exclude Turkey while he overlooks 
some advantages of Turkish membership for the EU. Thus, this article (The Daily 
Telegraph, 2002a) is probably the only news item in the sample whose context is 
similar to the former French President Giscard d’Estaing’s view (BBC News Online, 
2002) concerning the Turkish issue. It is overtly seen that the authors’ ideal Europe was 
shaped by Christian values even though he accepts the differences between different 
European countries. The headline of the article clearly underlines Turkey’s difference 
and incompetence for EU membership and calls Turkey “too different”, which is a 
signpost to deep discussions in the text: “Turkey must not join the Christian EU: 
Europe's political and cultural heritage is just too different to accommodate its Eastern 
neighbour” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a). However, in some sections of the article, the 
author’s justifications are not strong enough: “Turkey has a traditional pull towards 
both Central Asia and the Middle East” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a). Significant ties 
with the Middle East are undeniable. However, mentioning this without Turkey’s close 
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ties with Europe is not easily acceptable. Furthermore, arguing that Turkey has ‘a 
traditional pull towards Central Asia’ is too crude since Turkey’s cultural proximity to 
Central Asia is probably not more than Turkey’s cultural proximity to Europe and the 
Middle East. 
 
Even though BBC News is careful in its language when it refers to religious and cultural 
differences, its quotation from the Spanish daily El Mundo highlights an explicit 
othering by constructing its argument in an essentialist way:  
“Religion must not be an objection to Turkey's accession, but its history and 
culture, which are not European, can be. The EU can assimilate the entry of 
small countries like Romania or Bulgaria but not a population of 70 million, with 
a mentality and standards of behaviour alien to its identity” (El Mundo cited in 
BBC News Online, 2004). 
 
The first sentence in the quotation used by BBC News contains an overt contradiction. 
It is probably not easy to envisage or understand history and culture by excluding the 
impact of religion on societies. The second sentence has a more persuasive argument 
as the justification is supported by numbers, the population of Turkey. 
 
Excluding Turkey by using culture is not only associated with the Turkish people’s way 
of life or their spiritual choice. There are also examples that differentiate Turkish 
culture from European culture because of politics, namely the culture of the political 
act. For instance, as with the ‘bazaar’ concept mentioned above, the quotation from 
the Greek paper Kathimerini on BBC News criticises Turkey due to its attitudes in the 
membership negotiations. This time, othering is grounded on the equalisation of not 
being too much of a bargainer with being thoroughly European: “In effect, it *Turkey+ 
wants Europe with its rights, but without its obligations! Its stance shows how alien it 
finds the European culture” (BBC News Online, 2004). 
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Finally, an unusual example which is not representative of the whole sample is worth 
noting here because it is not easy to see the same argument in other items concerning 
Turkey’s EU bid. Without mentioning their name, a report in The Daily Telegraph refers 
to an EU diplomat who said “*w+ith a dismal human rights record, an overbearing 
military and a chaotic economy, Turkey would have faced blunt rejection if it had been 
Christian” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002c). As was found in the Quantitative Content 
Analysis Chapter, 21.7 per cent of all news items in the sample connected the reason 
for opposition to Turkish membership with religion, culture and Turkish identity. Thus, 
the argument made in The Daily Telegraph above is not a usual one within the general 
representation of Turkey-EU relations in the British media. It is even possible to argue 
that calling Turkey “’culturally too different’ *…+ in many circles in Europe has become 
a polite code word for opposing Turkish membership on the grounds that Turkey is not 
Christian and hence is not European and cannot actually become European” (Kirişci, 
2008: 19). The same diplomat in The Daily Telegraph also said “Turkey has been given 
kidglove treatment precisely because it is a Muslim nation. Europe has bent over 
backwards to prevent a clash between the Christian and Muslim worlds in the volatile 
climate since the September 11 attacks” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002c). The reference to 
the 9/11, referring to Turkey as a solution for the clash of civilisations, was uttered by 
the British politicians many times in the sample. However, this one claimed that 
Turkish membership of the EU would be rejected if Turkey had been a Christian 
country. 
 
All in all, what the diplomat said in the two examples above showed that trying to 
benefit from Turkey’s religion in politics and special position between the East and the 
West is the core reason for the functionalists’ pro-Turkish view. 
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The lack of Turkey’s secular character in the content 
Some items in the sample overlook Turkey’s secular character. For instance, calling 
Turkey a ‘Muslim country’ is common and acceptable but calling Turkey a ‘Muslim 
state’ is inappropriate: “Europe turning its back on a predominantly Muslim state 
would suggest the EU is a Christian club” (The Guardian, 2005a). Moreover, in the Daily 
Mail, the author portrayed Turkey using the issues that the majority of Muslim 
countries are usually associated with when they are covered in the Western media 
(e.g. fundamentalism, religious freedom for non-Muslims, problems with woman 
rights) (see Kirişci, 2008: 31). Therefore, it can be argued that the author does not 
evaluate each Muslim country with its own characteristics. However, at this point, one 
should take into account news reports’ general characteristics, especially their 
tendency to include negative events; i.e. negative framings about Turkey can bring 
conflict to news stories (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 163), or the 
importance of negativity as news value (O’Neill and Harcup, 2009: 166). The world in 
the post-9/11 environment has made relating political issues to Islam more interesting. 
Representing Turkey in this way may cause many generalisations and 
misunderstandings, especially if the discussion is about a country which is run by a 
secular state like Turkey (The Daily Mail, 2006). Nevertheless, there are a large number 
of news items which refer to Turkey’s differences from other countries when it is 
evaluated within the Middle East (see Section 7.3.1). 
 
7.2.3. Othering Turkey by geography 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Europe’s eastern border is vague and that is why it is “the 
only continent ‘not to be a continent at all from the point of view of most 
 175 
 
geographers’” (Bruter, 2005: 81 cited in Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 157). 
However, there is also a generally accepted version of European borders which 
considers the great part of Turkish land Asian (Delanty, 1995: 49). Therefore, deciding 
on the boundaries of Europe is a matter of subjectivity (Bryce, 2009a; 2009b) and this 
makes geography one of the most important trump cards in the hands of politicians 
who are against Turkish membership of the EU. In addition to the numeric findings 
concerning geography in the quantitative content analysis, the analysis in this section 
seeks to explore how geography is used in the context of othering Turkey.  
 
A news item in the Daily Mail includes an expression referring to Europe’s historical 
frontiers when it was mentioning Turkish accession to the EU: “*…+ the EU expand*s+ 
beyond Europe's historical frontiers” (The Daily Mail, 2005). Similarly, a leader in The 
Daily Telegraph succinctly puts it: “*Turkey+ whose territory lies mainly outside 
Europe” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004b). Moreover, another leader, published by the FT, 
underlines that Turkey’s duty to prove its Europeanness is harder than former 
candidates because it is not from the “conventional boundaries of Europe” (Financial 
Times, 2005b). This example demonstrates that even the explicitly pro-Turkish news 
organisations such as the FT may sometimes employ an essentialist view concerning 
the Turkish issue.  
 
Geographical exclusion of Turkey was not only framed by Turkey’s location out of 
Europe’s conventional borders. Some news items also claimed that Europe is being 
brought to the Middle East by opening the doors to Turkey. An article, published in The 
Daily Telegraph, argues that Turkish membership will push “the EU's borders deep into 
the Middle East” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004a). It can be inferred that the EU comes 
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closer to its Other (the Middle East) via Turkey. The same argument could be found in 
the Daily Mail when it referred to its hesitations about extending “Europe's frontiers to 
Iran, Iraq and Syria” (The Daily Mail, 1999a). It is worth asking at this point whether the 
same discussion could have been made when Greece and Bulgaria were waiting for 
membership as they share a border with Turkey, a country which is largely situated out 
of Europe. The same argument could be made for another EU member Cyprus which is 
relatively close to Syria, Israel and Egypt, and sharing a border with the Turkish sector 
of Cyprus. 
 
The news items also covered the politicians’ thoughts regarding the geographical 
boundaries of the European Self. One item touched on a comment made by the then 
European Parliament president Nicole Fontaine: “*She was+ suggesting it was time to 
define the EU's geographic limits. If not, she said, North African nations will soon be 
knocking on the door, posing greater problems” (The Daily Mail, 1999a). Her comment 
is more about who will then ask to be let in but the comment also categorises Turkey 
in the same group with the North African ‘others’ of Europe. Fontaine is not alone in 
putting forward this kind of argument. In an opinion piece in The Daily Telegraph, John 
Casey employs the Middle Eastern countries in order to justify his exclusion of Turkey:  
“If you break away from history and apply purely universal criteria for 
membership - democracy, minority rights etc. - so that Israel could be admitted 
now, Egypt in due course, and even, one day - who knows? - a liberated Iraq, 
you will have destroyed even the slim possibility there now is of Europe's being 
a true community” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a).  
 
Casey points out the necessity for Europe to retain a core identity and being a 
community, since that will be diluted if the EU goes beyond what its current borders. 
However, his comments entirely overlook Turkey’s special position between the East 
and the West. His argument is similar to Fontaine’s and other French politicians’ 
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examples such as recommending the EU to welcome Morocco if Turkey is accepted 
(see Rumelili, 2004; Tekin, 2008; Tekin, 2010). 
 
Sometimes geographic othering is attached to the EU’s criticism of other countries. For 
instance, European politicians’ anger concerning the US intervention in Turkey’s bid to 
join the EU was discussed in a geographic framing. A quotation from Pascal Lamy, the 
French EU Commissioner at the time, was used in the Daily Mirror in order to highlight 
his response to the US intervention in EU affairs concerning the Turkish issue. He says 
"Can you imagine the reaction if we told them [the US Americans] to enlarge into 
Mexico?" (The Daily Mirror, 2002a). Here Turkey’s separation from the European 
context is defined by Mexico’s separation from the Northern American context. 
Although the raison d’être of NAFTA cannot be seen as the equal of the EU, it is worth 
noting that Mexico and the US are in the same economic bloc. Thus, the US and 
Mexico have already enlarged into each other in an economic way. The Mexico 
example was also mentioned by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of 
Denmark, in order to exclude Turkey from Europe: “He (Rasmussen) asked: ‘If you are 
so keen on us letting the Turks into the EU, why don't you let Mexico into the United 
States?’” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002c). 
 
All in all, it can be argued that geographic exclusion, as one of the main pillars of the 
essentialist perspective regarding Turkey’s EU membership, was explored as a 
problematic matter in the media representation in almost all different periods of the 
research sample. It is a strong case for the opponents, and some aspects of this issue 
are almost facts which are mentioned in the news items even by neutral or pro-Turkish 
membership news items.  
178 
 
 
7.2.4. Othering Turkey by political reasons 
Underlining political reasons in order to exclude Turkey from Europe is mainly 
employed by German, French and Austrian politicians who are against Turkish 
membership, and the journalists who are suspicious or not in favour of Turkey’s EU 
bid. As the British politicians are usually on the side of the ‘in favour’ discourse, the 
British media quote from other European countries’ media or other European 
politicians when it needs to cover the political reasons for opposing Turkish 
membership. For instance, a quotation from Berliner Zeitung has a strong argument in 
terms of the negative geo-strategic influences of Turkey’s EU membership for Europe:  
“The extension of the territory of the EU towards the crisis regions of the 
Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia holds out more risks than 
opportunities... No European politician is in a position to say confidently 
whether the Turkey operation will be successful and the EU patient will still be 
alive after the operation” (Berliner Zeitung cited in BBC News Online, 2004). 
 
However, the examples covering the issue with the help of foreign press do not mean 
that the reports in the British media or the British media’s own columnists never refer 
to the political disadvantages of Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, in The Daily 
Telegraph, as a counter argument to George W. Bush’s insistence on Turkish 
membership of the EU, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen said 
that the meaning of the EU “involves sharing a law-making parliament, a currency and 
a supreme court in a close-knit union” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002c). By means of this, 
Rasmussen implicitly referred to the reasons why they are suspicious of Turkey’s 
accession.  
 
There are also some extreme examples in the news items which exclude Turkey from 
the European Self by using political reasons. Although this example is not in line with 
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the general overview of the items published by The Daily Telegraph, the item overtly 
or covertly associates Turkey with terrorist attacks and intensifies the danger with a 
vague expression which makes a connection between Turkish membership and radical 
Islam in the name of public opinion: “The offer to embrace Turkey flies in the face of 
public opinion across most of Europe, where antipathy to radical Islam has risen 
sharply since the terrorist attacks in America and Madrid” (The Daily Telegraph, 
2004a). 
 
Similarly, the Daily Mail goes beyond discussing religion within the boundaries of 
cultural differences between Turkey and Europe and associates Turkey with Islamic 
fundamentalism without illustrating any specific example. The author asks “*w+ill 
Europe be the solution to Turkey's fundamentalism problem, or will Turkey simply take 
its fundamentalists into the EU?” (The Daily Mail, 2006). It can be inferred that the 
author assumes that there is a ‘fundamentalism’ problem in Turkey without deepening 
the discussion or giving some concrete examples in order to make the claim stronger. 
Some items illustrate specific examples while discussing the same issue. For instance, 
an item in The Guardian tells the reader that even the Turkish liberals support the 
Turkish PM who used to belong with radical Islamists. Without knowing Turkish PM 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s full story, it would be hard to comprehend this comment: 
“Turkish liberals who still support a prime minister who, as a youthful radical, sat at the 
feet of the proto al-Qaida warlord Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, as the best way of 
safeguarding the country's secular democracy” (The Guardian, 2005b). 
 
Othering or welcoming Turkey by political reasons can be discovered better by looking 
at the news items’ approach to the main political issues in Turkey’s EU bid. For 
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instance, in a leader published in The Daily Telegraph, the author listed the main areas 
that Turkey must improve. One of the obligations in the third one is confusing. It claims 
that Turkey “must settle minority and historical issues better than it has so far 
managed to come to terms with its Kurds and the Armenian question” (Financial 
Times, 2005b). There is no direct attribution in Copenhagen Criteria concerning 
historical issues and the EU has not referred to the Armenian issue in the negotiating 
framework (Aybet, 2006) even though the European Parliament released a report on 
28th February 2002 and advised Turkey to have neighbourly relations with Armenia 
(Chiclet, 2005: 171).  
 
Othering Turkey by political reasons also includes the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s human 
rights record. For instance, Turkey was represented as an occupier when the Daily Mail 
was referring to the Cyprus issue: “Turkey occupied its *the island’s+ northern Third” 
(The Daily Mail, 1999b). Moreover, the Daily Mirror employs a much more transparent 
language. Although calling the military operation to Northern Cyprus in 1974 an 
invasion was found in several news items in the British media, employing the adjective 
“brutal” (The Daily Mirror, 2002b) in order to describe the operation was found for the 
first time in the research’s sample. Furthermore, regarding the human rights issues in 
Turkey, the Daily Mirror uses the word ‘appalling’ which intensifies the degree of 
Turkey’s bad human rights record (The Daily Mirror, 2002b). Concerning the Kurdish 
issue within the human rights discussions, the Turkish state, in one example in the 
Daily Mail, was shown as the only party responsible for the loss of lives. Furthermore, 
the report used the word ‘guerilla’ while talking about the PKK24 and represented the 
clash as the war for Kurdish people’s homeland: “Thousands of people have been killed 
                                                          
24
 The PKK is accepted as a terrorist organisation by several countries and the EU (Dedeoglu, 2003b) 
 181 
 
in a ruthless campaign against Kurdish guerrillas fighting for a homeland” (The Daily 
Mail, 1999b). 
 
Lastly, an excerpt quoted from Die Presse on BBC News underlines Turkish 
membership’s possible impact on the distribution of power in the EU’s political and 
economic structure. Austria, in particular, is unhappy with the economic burden of 
Turkish accession: 
“*Turkish membership+ will massively shift the balance of power. For Austria 
these shifts are particularly interesting from the financial point of view. With 
Turkey, the recipient countries will be hugely strengthened. Today's net donor 
countries, of which Austria is one, could then be outvoted by those who receive 
the money” (Die Presse cited in BBC News Online, 2004).  
Having quoted the example above, other issues concerning the negative economic 
influences of Turkey’s EU membership are discussed more in the following section.  
 
7.2.5. Othering Turkey by economic conditions  
The Self and the Other demarcation, by pointing to economic differences, does not 
appear in deep discussions. The news items in the sample do refer to the economic 
aspects of Turkish membership of the EU, however, they do not go beyond calling 
Turkey poor or under the average GDP of EU Member States. A leader article published 
in the FT includes the labels “the Union's poorest and most populous member” 
(Financial Times, 2005b). Similarly, in The Guardian, Turkey was named as “the EU's 
poorest member” (The Guardian, 2005d). The author wondered if Turkey “can fit into a 
club dominated by wealthy, industrialised nations” (The Guardian, 2005d). Here, the 
commentary predicates the EU members as “industrialised nations”. However, it can 
be argued that the author overlooks the enlargement in 2004 and the following one in 
2007 (the item was written in 2005), and is being unfair by failing to see the GDP and 
182 
 
industrialisation level of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe compared 
to Turkey. Figure 7.1 below illustrates the GDPs of four countries calculated according 
to the average GDP of all EU Member States (100 unit).  
 
Figure 7.1: The GDPs per capita of four countries and the EU average  
in PPS in 2010. Index (EU-27=100) (Eurostat Website, 2012) 
 
Unlike the previous example from The Guardian, another item from the same paper 
has a stronger argument. It criticises Turkey’s economic weakness by referring to 
numbers to empower its argument: “In the UN development project's human 
development index, Turkey ranks 92nd, well below every other European nation, 
including Albania” (The Guardian, 2006). 
 
The last example is from the Daily Mail, which usually considers the economic 
consequences of new members’ accession in terms of an immigration issue. The 
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paper’s general hesitation concerning the enlargement, especially the ex-communist 
countries, inevitably targets Turkish membership too (The Daily Mail, 1999a). It is 
crucial to note that the item was written in 1999 when the Eastern European members 
were not part of the bloc. That is why the author is overtly critical of the expansion 
including Turkey. 
 
7.2.6. Othering Turkey by using ‘vox pops’ from Turkey 
This section looks at how the news items used quotations from Turkish people and 
how these quotations served Turkey’s exclusion from the European Self in the British 
media. This allows the study to become familiar with the comments from the Turkish 
side and representation of their opinion regarding Turkey and the EU and being 
between the Self and the Other. The data qualitatively analysed for this section consist 
of a selection of quotes (‘vox pops’) from Turkish people on Turkish streets. Turkish 
people’s reactions were usually in anger and tiredness which served to position Turkey 
as an out-group country in the European context. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
‘vox pops’ represented a Turkish public opinion which is in contrast with that claimed 
by Christensen (2006: 66) and Karlsson (2007: 82) in Chapter 3. 
 
In a report on BBC News, a Turkish newsagent in Istanbul says: “I don’t wanna join the 
EU, it is a Christian club” (BBC News Online, 2005a). When the context in the news 
item is taken into account, it can be argued that the news item used this person in 
order to reveal the reaction of Turkish people to the deadlock in Turkey-EU relations 
just one day before 3rd October 2005 while Turkey was waiting to start membership 
negotiations. The example shows how the term ‘Christian Club’ is used as a label or 
metonym among Turks. 
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The usage of personal pronouns by Turkish people on the street can help to 
understand how Turkish people were represented in terms of their understanding of 
Turkey in Europe as the Self or the Other. The examples found in the British media 
constantly refer to the EU by using third person plural pronoun ‘they’, and Turkish 
people who talked to the British media exclude themselves from Europe by using ‘we’ 
and ‘us’. Here are some examples from BBC News’ street interviews: "They don't want 
us! They keep playing games. They claim we were bad to the Kurds, they talk about the 
Armenians” (BBC News Online, 2005a). "They will give us such long dates to become 
members. They will make us come crawling and then wring everything out of us" (BBC 
News Online, 2005a) (Italic emphasis added). 
 
The majority of the quotations from the public could be evaluated as remarkably 
crude. Even the examples from The Guardian appear as if they are from a tabloid 
newspaper: "The conditions they're placing on us are becoming comical. Soon they'll 
be saying Turkish men should cut off their moustaches and change their hairstyles" 
(The Guardian, 2004b). 
 
Contribution to the differentiation was not only made by means of the Turkish public. 
The Daily Mirror chose quotations from the Turkish leaders which represent 
themselves as different from the Europeans: “*H+e *, former Turkish PM Abdullah Gül,] 
said the ruling was blatant ‘discrimination’ against a Muslim country by a ‘Christian 
club’” (The Daily Mirror, 2002a). This example shows that employing religious 
differences is not only a discursive strategy of the politicians from the EU but also of 
the Turkish politicians.  
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This section presented the qualitative analysis regarding how Turkey was othered in 
the news items about its EU bid. As the study is not only interested in how Turkey was 
shown as the Other, the following section seeks to explore how Turkey was positioned 
as part of the European Self in the British news media. 
 
7.3. Turkey as part of the European Self 
In addition to the explanations in the Analytical Framework Chapter, it would be useful 
to identify what this study means by the European Self. First of all, understanding if 
Turkey is or can be a part of the European Self “*…+ is dependent on Europe’s self-
definition” (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 6). Thus, it is not possible to evaluate Turkey’s 
European characteristics and describe how Turkey is made a component of the 
European Self without explaining the meaning of the European Self. Moreover, while 
elucidating what can represent the European Self, “what needs to be explored is not 
only how the idea is being configured but also who has the power to define what the 
idea of Europe is” (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 153). For a contemporary 
definition of the European Self, the EU and its mechanism can be seen as a strong 
representative of this power. Therefore, bearing in mind Delanty’s (1995: 30) term 
“the westernisation of Europe”, one can argue that being a member of the EU, or 
preferring not to join the bloc while having the capacity to do so (e.g. Switzerland and 
Norway), has an impact on being accepted as thoroughly European. Thus, the 
countries such as Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Armenia are seen as disputably 
European since they do not have the above-mentioned capacity. When more historical 
and cultural criteria are taken into account, 
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“*r+eferences are made to Europe’s heritage of classical Graeco-Roman 
civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Science, Reason, 
Progress and Democracy as the core elements of this claimed European legacy. 
There are subtexts of racial and cultural chauvinism, particularly when 
confronted with Islam. Europe acquires distinction and salience when pitted 
against the Other” (Stråth, 2002: 388). 
 
This historical and culture-based explanation of the European Self excludes the 
different ones which do not hold Europe’s core values. However, when it encounters 
differences within the countries which fit the historical and culture-based criteria, the 
differences are evaluated “in the form of unity in diversity” (Stråth, 2002: 388). 
Accepting or rejecting this historical and culture-based understanding of Europe 
unavoidably influences the support or the opposition of Europeans for Turkish 
membership. The ones who envisage a Europe grounded on the inheritance of 
Christian culture do not accept welcoming Turkey to the EU. However, the others who  
“anchor their understanding of a distinct European culture in the 
Enlightenment heritage of secularism and civil liberties, which make Western 
Europe stand out with its long-term democratic traditions and comparatively 
evenly distributed economic welfare” (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 6) 
are more open to accession of new countries, including Turkey if the political and 
economic criteria are met. All these different approaches while defining Europe brings 
to mind the aforementioned essentialist-functionalist demarcation. 
 
Making Turkey a part of the European Self  
As discussed in the Analytical Framework Chapter, “the images of the Other might be 
perceived as a ‘continuum’, a long-abominated enemy could turn into an ally, an 
extension of the Self, over time” (Tekin, 2010: 14). The media representation of 
Turkey’s relations with the EU in the British media can be shown as a significant 
example for this argument. However, writing about Turkey as part of the European Self 
in media representation is difficult while several studies in the literature concerning 
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East – West demarcation or European identity touched on Turkey’s otherness (see 
Huntington, 1993; Delanty, 1995; Neumann, 1999; Tekin, 2008; Tekin, 2010; Robins, 
1996). Even though the British news organisations published many news items which 
show Turkey as part of the European Self, the degree of seeing Turkey in that way, as 
might be expected, has different levels and reasons.  
 
The welcoming discourse concerning Turkey as part of the European Self in the British 
media is mainly grounded in the British politicians’ utterances. For instance, excluding 
Turkey from the EU because of Turkey’s religion is usually strongly criticised by British 
politicians. Their determined discourse once more proves that there is a significant 
degree of opposition to Turkish membership in Europe because of Turkey’s religion. In 
an example, published in BBC News, Jack Straw used the term "theological-political 
divide” while he was talking about the Austrian opposition. He said “*this division+ 
could open up even further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage 
states and those of Islamic heritage" (BBC News Online, 2005b). Similarly, Tony Blair’s 
speeches give a strong support for Turkish membership especially if it is being 
excluded due to the religious issues. Blair’s approach sees Turkey as an in-group 
element regardless of Turkey’s dominant religion: “We are stating as a fundamental 
principle that the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country does not mean it should be 
barred from the European Union” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004a). A condensed version 
of the same quotation was published by the Daily Mirror too (The Daily Mirror, 2004). 
 
On some occasions, Turkey was seen as a component of the European Self by denoting 
actual facts. According to a commentary in The Guardian, even though Turkey is 
defined as a country between in-group and out-group, its participation in many 
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European events “from the Champions League and the Eurovision Song Contest to 
NATO and the Council of Europe” (The Guardian, 2006) proves that it is an in-group 
country. In the same way, BBC News portrays Turkey as part of the European Self by 
referring to Turkey’s NATO membership and the associate EU membership status (BBC 
News Online, 2005b). This view is in line with representing the possibility of Turkey’s 
adhesion to the European Self if it obeys the club’s rules and meets the standards: 
“The EU accepted Turkey as a formal applicant for membership but insisted that it 
must improve its record on human rights and relations with its neighbours” (The Daily 
Mail, 1999b). 
 
Some examples argue that the European Self should not be constituted by excluding 
the Other. In an item published in The Guardian, Andrew Finkel discusses the issue of 
constructing European identity by excluding Turkey. He criticises “those who still think 
Europe should define itself by whom it can exclude, not whom it can embrace *…+” 
(The Guardian, 2005b). More attention-grabbing comment in terms of welcoming 
Turkey as an in-group country was to be found in The Daily Telegraph. Although his 
article’s context was based on being sceptical about Turkish membership, John Casey 
cited the Bishop of Oxford who made pro-Turkish remarks by accepting “Turkey's 
admission on grounds of Christian ‘inclusiveness’” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a), the 
Bishop’s comments totally clash with the other approaches which employ Christian 
values of Europe in an essentialist way, found in the research sample. 
 
7.3.1. Defining Turkey as part of the European Self by geo-strategic considerations 
As mentioned in the Quantitative Content Analysis Chapter, Turkey’s role to help to 
deal with clash of civilisations was shown as the most common reason for support for 
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Turkish membership. Therefore, it can be argued that accepting Turkey as part of the 
European Self has more geo-strategic reasons than other justifications. Even though 
explaining the geo-strategic dimension is not an easy one, it can be claimed that it 
refers to different examinations of Turkey’s geographical position while taking into 
account political strategies (Tekin, 2010).  
 
In this section, the geo-strategic dimension will be examined by focusing on this 
question: How can the British media representation of Turkey still include the points 
that designates Turkey as part of the European Self while the British coverage also 
represents Turkey by extreme characteristics such as the most populated and the 
poorest of Europe “with the biggest vote in the Council of Ministers” (Financial Times, 
2005b) and being culturally different from Europe? It can be argued that this is 
because Turkey is always on the extreme side. It is extreme in terms of its geo-political 
contribution to Europe and it is extreme in terms of its characteristics which make it 
unsuitable to be accepted to the EU, such as cultural differences and the negative 
public opinion in Europe. Moreover, the answer to the question could be related to the 
support for Turkish membership by the British Government is not because of Turkey’s 
European character. It is because of political benefits for Britain. That is why Turkish 
membership can be welcomed by the Europeans who see the EU with a more 
functionalist approach than an essentialist one. Therefore, Turkish membership of the 
EU is different from previous candidate countries in the EU expansions in 2004 and 
2007, which makes Turkey an unusual case. Inevitably, this geo-strategic game has a 
reflection in the British media.  
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The geo-political reasons for the UK’s support for Turkish membership in the British 
media 
Claiming that Turkey’s accession can make the Western world’s image better in the 
eyes of the Muslim world or arguing that Turkish membership can make the EU’s 
communication with the Islamic world better are common examples to explain support 
for Turkish membership (e.g. The Guardian, 2005d; The Daily Mail, 2002). The British 
politicians, in particular, contributed to that kind of representation by referring to the 
multicultural character of Europe in the British media. Blair’s positive comments on 
welcoming a Muslim country to the EU is a strong example of how some British 
politicians approach the Turkish issue: he claimed that “*t+his is a good day for Europe, 
Turkey and the wider world” (The Daily Mirror, 2004) on the day when some problems 
were solved in order to start the membership negotiations with Turkey. 
 
Other examples found in the British media also clarify the reasons for the British 
politicians’ support for Turkish membership. It is argued that if Turkey becomes a 
member of the EU, “no longer will the jihadists be able to speak of the Christian west 
pitted against the Muslim rest” (The Guardian, 2005d). Correspondingly, in Blair’s 
words, Turkish membership is “an example of the West's positive engagement with 
the Muslim world at a time of heightened tension” (The Daily Mail, 2005). He uses ‘we’ 
the third plural pronoun in his utterance in order to explain that Muslims and 
Christians can cooperate and Turkish membership is an important way to realise his 
proposal and says ‘we can work together’ (The Daily Telegraph, 2004a). Therefore, 
Turkey’s transformation into an in-group country is possible if it functions as a 
conciliator between the East and the West. Another report, published in the Daily 
Mirror, implicitly represents Turkey as an in-group country in the context of Western 
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alliance against terrorism. It refers to the US and British support for Turkish 
membership of the EU due to Turkey’s possible help to the alliances during the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (The Daily Mirror, 2002b). Therefore, it can be argued that 
Turkey’s role as part of the European Self is recalled when the politicians’ agenda is 
related to some political clashes. The problems and conflicts between the East and the 
West to which Turkey's characteristics might be a solution are usually emphasised. 
Thus, the British support for Turkish membership is not thoroughly essentialist but 
geo-strategic. Because of the UK’s kind of approach to the Turkish issue, one can argue 
that Turkey is welcomed to be part of the European Self for the sake of its ‘Other’ 
character. This situation influences the representation of Turkey-EU relations in the 
British media and Turkey inevitably appears to be a fragile partner of the European 
Self. 
 
Turkey’s fragile belonging to the European Self 
The reason of fragile belonging is closely linked to politicians’ decisions and it is 
especially dependent on the position of the British Government. A report published in 
the Daily Mirror argues that a possible rejection of Turkey by the EU could have easily 
made Turkey an out-group but Jack Straw’s efforts did not allow it (The Daily Mirror, 
2005). Turkey’s belonging to the European Self is again fragile in its representation in 
the British media because Turkey’s EU membership is seen as Turkey’s only chance to 
specify itself an in-group or out-group country within the context of Europe (The 
Guardian, 2006). This fragile belonging includes suspicious presupposition about what 
happens if Turkey turns its face from the EU –suspecting whether Turkey can be 
pushed to eastwards if it cannot join the EU (The Guardian, 2005b; The Daily Mirror, 
2005) (also see Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 5). These kind of comments can be seen as 
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an example of the Orientalist approach since the author covertly, possibly 
unconsciously, serves the Eastern image of Turkey by stating that Turkey’s only 
alternative is the East if it turns its face back from Europe. 
 
Turkey in Between 
Another dimension of Turkey’s geo-strategic importance for the EU can be described 
by referring to the discussions which envisage Turkey as in between two continents. By 
using the Anatolian peninsula, Istanbul and the Bosphorus Bridge as metaphors, 
Turkey was portrayed as a country which connects the Eastern and the Western world.  
“This motif has been extensively used by Turkey to promote her [sic] 
international relations or simply explain her [sic] 'multifaceted' foreign policy. It 
has often been necessary, for example, to explain to the west Turkey's Islamic 
orientation, and to the Muslim nations the state's alliance with the west. But 
the bridge motif has also been offered as an answer to Turkey's identity 
problem in general” (Kushner, 1997: 231). 
 
In the findings of qualitative analysis, several news items represented Turkey by 
employing the bridge rhetoric instead of positioning Turkey as only external to Europe 
(e.g. The Guardian, 2006; The Daily Mail, 2005). However, representing Turkey by the 
bridge rhetoric only appears when Turkey serves the European Self by using its non-
European characteristics.  
 
Because of the bridge rhetoric, the British media intensifies the vagueness of Europe’s 
eastern border but contributes to finding a place for Turkey between two worlds. 
Concerning the bridge argument, Timothy Garton Ash’s expression in The Guardian is 
highly illuminating. He does not believe that Europe ends at a concrete point. Instead, 
it gradually disappears and leaves the scene to Asia in a transitive way. He says:  
“*A+t its eastern and south-eastern borders Europe does not end, it merely 
fades away. It fades away across the great expanses of Turkey and Russia. 
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Somewhere between Moscow and Vladivostok,25 somewhere between Istanbul 
and Hakkari,26 you find yourself more in Asia than in Europe” (The Guardian, 
2005c).  
 
This kind of representation leads Turkey to be positioned as part of the Self and the 
Other at the same time.  
 
Leaving Turkey in between has a direct political reflection in Turkish accession to the 
EU too. Even Austria, the main opponent of Turkey’s EU bid according to the majority 
of the news items in the research sample, cannot say an implacable ‘no’ to Turkish 
membership and it proposes an alternative relationship (privileged partnership). What 
the proposal means is still vague but in Wolfgang Schüssel’s, former Chancellor of 
Austria, words this alternative relationship should “ensure that Turkey would remain 
bonded as strongly as possible to the EU” (Financial Times, 2005c). This can show that 
Turkey is actually not entirely excluded from Europe. The issue of ‘privileged 
partnership’ was already explained in the Background and Literature Review Chapter 
but it should be argued here that the term ‘privileged partnership’ also includes ‘the 
Self’ and ‘the Other’ dimensions. Not welcoming Turkey as a full member but also not 
fully closing the door created the concept or proposal of ‘privileged partnership’. Even 
though it is still not a clear proposal, one can argue that ‘privileged partnership’ refers 
to a quasi-ingroup or quasi-outgroup position of Turkey which neither makes Turkey 
completely the Self or the Other in the European context.  
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Vladivostok is located in the southeastern Russia near Russian borders with China and North Korea. 
26
 Hakkari is located in the most southeastern corner of Turkey by the Iranian and Iraqi borders. 
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Turks are ‘the good Muslims’ 
Turkish version of Islam sometimes appears as a crucial example concerning the 
representation of Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ in the coverage. Historically, Turkish 
Islam has less to do with state affairs compared with the situation in most other 
Muslim countries (see Heper, 2004: 4). This is a significant way for Turkey to 
differentiate itself from Middle Eastern countries. “*…+ Turkey does not have a 
tradition of Islamist violence and there is a synthesis of Islam and democracy that goes 
back to the Ottoman Empire” (Akyol, 2009: 188). Therefore, Turkish contribution to 
the radical Islamic movements around the world is extremely small (Roy, 2005: 21). 
This image of Turkey was not underrepresented in the British media. According to the 
findings in the sample, the Turkish version of Islam is the one that Europeans want to 
see. It is the Islam which is friendly with the Western world and relatively less 
connected with politics. Thus, according to some news items in the sample, the 
characteristics of Turkey’s religion are suitable to be accepted into the European Self 
as Turkey can make it easier to constitute the European version of Islam:  
“Turkish Islam is different from the one which bred the fundamentalist 
movements which threaten us... If it hopes to continue to live with its values in 
a world which would not only be made up of antagonist civilisation blocs, 
Europe has everything to win from this Islam, and, who knows, from building 
with it a European Islam to challenge the one promoted by fundamentalists” 
(Le Temps cited in BBC News Online, 2004). 
Even though it was not always defined by the expression ‘good Muslims’, Turkey is 
sometimes represented in the British media as the ‘good’ one and the model one in 
the Islamic world. This usually happens because of the British politicians’ discourse 
when they explain their support for Turkish membership. A leader article, published in 
The Daily Telegraph, argues: “As the war between Islamists and the West continues 
unabated, the Prime Minister [Tony Blair] has rightly recognised the strategic 
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importance of reaching out to a moderate, secular Muslim nation” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 2004b). The same issue was mentioned by Joschka Fischer, former Foreign 
Minister of Germany, in the excerpt from The Guardian, however he was criticised by 
the author as Fischer’s approach to Turkey does not make Turkish people happy:  
“Morris quotes Joschka Fischer: "To modernise an Islamic country based on the 
shared values of Europe would be almost a D-Day for Europe in the war against 
terror." This is not an argument that appeals to Turks, who feel patronised by 
attempts to depict them as the well-behaved Muslim nation. They already see 
themselves as an important part of the European economic zone” (The 
Guardian, 2005b).  
These examples illustrate how the Turkish Other is being employed/exploited by 
European politicians. This time exploitation of the Turkish Other in the European 
context seeks to transform the Turkish Other into a component of the European Self. 
 
The responsibilities of the EU and the promises to Turkey 
According to the findings in Tekin’s study (2008) regarding Turkey’s EU bid in the 
French political discourse, backers of Turkish accession think that the EU is responsible 
for rehabilitating Turkish democracy (Tekin, 2008). When the British media is analysed 
concerning the same issue, it can be said that the proponents’ voice is much stronger 
than in France in emphasising the importance of the EU’s responsibilities concerning 
the efforts to make Turkey part of the European Self. In a report published by the FT, 
some European diplomats took responsibility for transforming Turkish democracy even 
though they were still not sure if Turkey could ever join the bloc: “Many European 
diplomats believe the only way to guarantee Turkey continues to reform is to make a 
serious offer of membership. But they are still deeply unsure if Ankara will ever join” 
(Financial Times, 2005a). Furthermore, a leader article in the same paper refers to the 
EU’s responsibility by motivating the EU to continue going further in Turkish accession. 
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Otherwise, the leader argues, Turkey’s improvements in human rights and democracy 
would be harmed (Financial Times, 2005b). Similarly, some news items published by 
the Daily Mail have underlined the EU’s responsibility to encourage Turkey to become 
a member. Hence, it would be easier to solve problems between Turkey and Greece, 
and improve human rights level concerning the minority rights in Turkey. 
 
According to some news items, Turkey can be part of the European Self because of 
promises given to Turkey a long time ago. They are mentioned by the journalists who 
are in favour of Turkish membership and their argument is mostly grounded on a 
principle of Roman law, pacta sunt servanda. According to this view, the EU has 
promised Turkey membership many times and it should keep its promises. In his article 
published in The Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash refers to these promises given in the 
past. He argues that a special relationship could, idealistically, be offered to Turkey and 
Russia as they are the countries between Europe and Asia, however it is too late for 
this in the Turkish case. He says:  
“We have promises to keep. For more than 40 years we have assured Turkey 
that it will belong to our European community. We have repeated, 
strengthened, made concrete these promises over the past decade” (The 
Guardian, 2005c).  
 
Philip Stephens (the FT) underlined the same issue. He refers to Turkey’s long EU 
journey and how European politicians accepted that Turkey is part of Europe long time 
ago:  
“It begins, just begins, to redeem a promise first made 40 years ago when the 
then six members of the common market declared, without equivocation, that 
’Turkey is part of Europe . . . This is a geographical reality as well as a historical 
truism’” (Financial Times, 2005d). 
 
Moreover, the same argument was used by British politicians too. For instance, Jack 
Straw tried to legitimise his support for Turkish membership by referring to promises: 
 197 
 
“keeping a membership promise made to the country [Turkey] in 1963” (BBC News 
Online, 2005c). 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings from the qualitative content analysis on the news 
coverage. The chapter illustrated the material by separating them into two sections 
which are ‘Turkey as the Other’ and ‘Turkey as part of the European Self’. Under these 
categorisations, the chapter answered two research questions. 
 
RQ1: What are the components that represent Turkey as the Other in the European 
context? 
It was found in the qualitative analysis that several components were used in order to 
represent Turkey as part of the European Other. First of all, the historical events and 
concepts (e.g. the Siege of Vienna, a Trojan horse) were examined. It was seen that the 
British media made use of historical events and concepts in order to enrich the stories 
and explain long discussions with some historically loaded examples. The historical 
links were mainly based on the relations between the Ottomans and its European 
rivals. One can argue that the interest of the British media in the examples from the 
Ottomans can be related to the ‘Neo-Ottoman’27 approach in Turkish foreign policy in 
recent years. However, the general tone of the examples refers to war, violence and 
                                                          
27 Since former Turkish PM and President Turgut Özal’s active policy towards the former Ottoman lands, 
Turkey has become more interested in the regional crises around its borders (Roy, 2005: 20). However, 
according to Taspinar,  
“Neo-Ottomanism does not call for Turkish imperialism in the Middle East and the Balkans. 
Similarly, it does not seek to institute an Islamic legal system in modern Turkey. Instead, neo-
Ottomanism favors a more moderate version of secularism at home, and a more activist policy 
in foreign affairs. In this neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more ‘soft power’—political, 
economic, diplomatic, and cultural influence—in formerly Ottoman territories as well as in 
other regions where Turkey has strategic and national interests” (2008: 14-15). (Also see Yavuz, 
1998; Laçiner, 2001).  
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problematic issues rather than collaboration between the Turks and Europeans. 
Therefore, it can be claimed that these examples contributed to the representation of 
Turkey as the European Other in the British media.  
 
The strongest othering examples were probably found in the ‘Othering Turkey by 
religion and culture’ section. It was seen that Turkey’s Muslim character was 
represented as a significant difference in the news items even though it was not 
depicted as a danger to the European Self in general. The same section also argued 
that Turkey’s secular character was underrepresented and accordingly, in some cases, 
the coverage overlooked Turkey’s differences from other Muslim countries. The 
section about geography revealed that even the pro-Turkish papers, which do not have 
an essentialist approach, referred to Turkey’s non-European geographical position. The 
same section also stressed a functionalist view concerning the risk of sharing borders 
with countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria if Turkey joins the bloc. 
 
As the British politicians are the fervent supporters of Turkish membership, the British 
media used continental European politicians’ or European media’s comments while 
referring to Turkey’s otherness in terms of politics. Othering was performed by 
underlining Turkey’s non-European negotiating culture in politics and Turkey’s links 
with fundamentalist Islamic movements. Besides, the section also highlighted how 
Turkey was represented as a European Other because of its problematic relations with 
its neighbours.  
 
The economic aspect in portraying Turkey as the Other was chiefly related to Turkey’s 
low economic power and insufficient industrial level compared to the EU average. It 
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was seen in the sample that calling Turkey “poor”, “big” and “densely populated” is 
common in the coverage no matter whether the media outlet is in favour of Turkish 
membership or not. Finally, the last sub-section of ‘Turkey as the Other’ focused on 
the examples in the British media which utilised ‘vox pops’ from Turkey. It was seen 
that Turkish people on the street also exclude themselves from Europe by means of 
using the third person plural pronoun. The quotations from the Turks usually 
represented Turks as part of “we” while the EU was associated with “they”. Several 
examples were remarkably simplistic. Therefore, it can be argued that the British 
media used Turkish ‘vox pops’ as a contribution to its content which represents Turkey 
as ‘different’ compared to the EU Member States. 
 
RQ2: What are the components that represent Turkey as part of the European Self? 
The second section of the chapter dealt with the examples from the British coverage 
which highlighted Turkey’s characteristics to be part of the European Self. Apart from 
Turkey’s Europeanised politics and the promises which were given long time ago, it 
was seen that the main component that represent Turkey as part of the European Self 
is Turkey’s geo-political importance. The British politicians’ functionalist understanding 
of the EU shaped the overall tone of the coverage concerning why Turkey is suitable to 
be part of the European Self.  
 
British politicians’ comments (e.g. Tony Blair’s usage of the first person plural pronoun 
while referring to the collaboration between the East and the West), and accordingly 
the British media’s representation, put forward the idea that Turkish membership 
would have a significant role if the EU wanted to end the clash of civilisations and 
develop better relations with the Muslim world. This was portrayed in the coverage 
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which suggested that Turkish help in the EU’s global objectives would be enough to 
allow Turkey to enjoy EU membership, provided that it also met the Copenhagen 
criteria.  
 
The section also underlined Turkey’s ‘in between’ character and its capacity to be a 
bridge between the two civilisations. Besides, it was found in the coverage that the 
British media tend to represent Turks as the ‘good Muslims’ by differentiating Turkey 
from other parts of the Muslim world.  
 
All in all, almost all pro-Turkish ideas ended up with a functionalist expectation of 
Turkey. Therefore, it could be argued that the British media does not see Turkey as 
genuinely part of the European Self. However, it would become so if it obeyed the 
functionalist rules of London’s EU game.  
 201 
 
CHAPTER 8: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INFLUENCES 
ON JOURNALISTS WHILE REPORTING ON 
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS 
 
“All knowledge of other cultures, societies, or religions  
comes about through an admixture of indirect evidence  
with the individual scholar's personal situation, as well  
as the overall political circumstances. What makes such  
knowledge accurate or inaccurate, bad, better, or worse,  
has to do mainly with the needs of the society in which  
that knowledge is produced” (Said, 1997: 168). 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Academic works on mass media usually focus on media outputs and their influences on 
the audience while news production is usually overlooked (Shoemaker and Reese, 
1996: 3; also see Richardson, 2004: 34). Similarly, the research on Turkey’s EU bid 
representation in the media mainly focuses on the content (inter alia Chaban et al., 
2005; Öktem, 2005; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Christensen, 2006; Koenig et 
al., 2006; Aissaoui 2007; Devran, 2007; Ergül, 2007; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 
2008; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce, 2009b; Kejanlıoğlu and Taş, 2009; 
Schneeberger, 2009, 2011; Walter and Albert, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Bischof et al., 
2010; Tekin, 2010; Hinrichsen, 2012). These research findings were gathered through 
different textual analyses (e.g. content analysis, critical discourse analysis). The 
production process of news content concerning Turkey-EU relations, and its reflection 
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on the reception are usually ignored.28 It seems that researchers tend to be more 
interested in the news content of Turkey-EU relations instead of asking questions 
about how this news content occurred, and how journalists approach the Turkish 
issue. This could be related to the fact that analysing news content could be relatively 
less time consuming and more economical when it is compared to organising and 
conducting interviews with journalists. Regarding the same issue in media studies in 
general, Philo (2007) refers to the deficit of production and reception analyses and 
discusses if it is possible to analyse an issue only within the boundaries of the content. 
In the words of Verschueren, a study which focuses only on the content would 
probably miss the “structural and functional properties of the news gathering and 
reporting process” (Verschueren, 1985 cited in Richardson, 2007: 40). Therefore, it can 
be argued that the ideal news media study should not only be limited to a focus on the 
content (for multi-step approach, see Fürsich: 2009).  
 
After listing the above reasons, it can be claimed that obtaining journalists’ views on 
Turkey’s EU bid in general and getting to know how the news items concerning Turkey-
EU relations emerge can help to make the issue of Turkey’s EU bid representation in 
the British media easier to understand. Thus, one of the important points that this 
study seeks to contribute to the field is to find out what occurs in the journalists’ 
milieu where media content on Turkey’s EU membership is produced. In this way, the 
‘source’ level of the basic communication model can be better exposed in terms of the 
media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media.  
 
                                                          
28 Several studies which look at the British media and its relation with the EU employed interviews as a 
research method (inter alia Morgan, 1995; Gavin, 2001; Raeymaeckers et al., 2007; Firmstone, 2008a; 
Statham, 2008; Corcoran and Fahy, 2009;). However, their focus was not on Turkey-EU relations. 
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Research Questions 
The chapter attempts to answer the following three research questions by presenting 
the findings in the interviews conducted with journalists working for the British media. 
As seen below, the first research question refers to the concept ‘socialization’ while 
the second and the third one are related to ‘attitudes’.  
RQ1: Who is selected to write on Turkey and what are the most important influences 
on them while they are writing their news items? (Socialization) 
RQ2: How do the journalists who have written on Turkey-EU relations view Turkey and 
its bid to join the EU? (Attitudes) 
RQ3: How do the journalists who have written on Turkey-EU relations view the 
coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media? (Attitudes)  
 
In order to answer these research questions, the data found in the interviews 
will be presented by employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model. 
Founding the production analysis on the model’s ‘individual level’ makes it possible to 
learn the journalists’ views on Turkey’s position between the European Self and the 
European Other. Together with the following chapter on ‘media routines level’ and 
‘extramedia level’ influences, journalists’ overall view concerning how the news items 
on Turkey-EU relations are produced can help to disentangle how and why Turkey is 
perceived and represented as ‘a positive Other’ in the British media.  
 
8.2. Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model 
Inspired by Gans (1979) and Gitlin (1980), Shoemaker and Reese (1996) categorised 
different theoretical perspectives regarding the formation of media content. The 
perspective which refers to individual media workers’ influence on news content 
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explains this influence by employing media workers’ ‘socialization’ and ‘attitudes’ 
during news production. This is a media worker-centred approach and it claims that 
the media workers’ professional, personal, and political positions direct them to 
construct a social reality (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 6). Therefore, the analyses on 
news production in this thesis are positioned within the theoretical perspective which 
argues that individual media workers influence the media content. Thus, accepting the 
importance of the individual in the formation of news content is an assumption of the 
study. Therefore, this influence is seen as a given in the research framework. By 
following Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and unpicking the concepts ‘attitudes’ and 
‘socialization’ while looking at the influence of individual level that shapes news 
content, this study can help to reach a better understanding of how media workers’ 
personal views and interaction with the world influence news production. The study 
defines ‘attitudes’ as the internal influences shaped by individual journalists’ personal 
ideas, including their political views. The term ‘attitudes’ is not employed in this study 
as wide as its meaning in Shoemaker and Reese (1996) as this study seeks to discover 
individual journalists’ attitudes regarding a specific case, Turkey and its bid to join the 
EU, instead of focusing on journalists’ personal characteristics or wider attitudes. On 
the other hand, ‘socialization’ refers to the external influences related to journalists’ 
daily praxis which can affect journalists’ writings within the boundaries of the 
individual level (see Donsbach, 2004). At this stage, it would be useful to explain 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model in detail. 
 
What does the model cover? 
Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model “establishes a theoretical framework for 
analyzing media based on levels of analysis *…+” (Reese, 2001: 178) and describes 
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influences on media content through five levels which are individual, media routines, 
organisational, extramedia, and ideological. “From micro to macro, these levels 
address what factors shape media and news content *…+” (Reese, 2001: 173; also see 
Reese, 2007: 35). The individual level -or in Cottle’s (2003) categorisation: the micro-
level analysis of news production- is founded on the individual employees working for 
the media industry. Their preferences, social background, working experience, and 
praxis in daily work are some examples that the model’s individual level looks at 
(Williams, 2003: 97). The second level, ‘media routines’, refers to the routinised, 
repetitive events that are taking place while media workers produce the media 
content. These events are generally constraints on the individual media employees 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 105). The third level, ‘organisational influences’ “seeks 
to explain variations in content that cannot be attributed to differences in routines and 
individuals” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 139). Besides, this level is interested in the 
influence of ownership, organisational goals, roles, and the structure of media 
corporations on media content. ‘Extramedia influences’ which represent the fourth 
level of the hierarchical model refer to issues that are extrinsic to the media 
organisations, including the sources of information that contributes to media content 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 175). The fifth level that covers all circles in the model is 
‘ideological level’. “Ideological analysis involves assumptions about power and how it is 
distributed in society” (Reese, 2001: 183). According to Shoemaker and Reese, the 
ideological level seeks to examine the position of the media in spreading ideology. The 
level aims to identify “how media people, practices, and relations function 
ideologically” (1996: 221). Further discussions regarding each level will follow in the 
relevant sections of this chapter and in the following chapter.  
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Figure 8.1: Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model 
 
8.2.1. Why this model? 
Several publications concerning production studies, media organisation and media 
work (inter alia Berkowitz and Limor 2003; Ibrahim, 2003; Whitney and Ettema, 2003; 
Williams, 2003; Fahmy and Johnson, 2005; Firmstone, 2008a; Preston, 2009; Hanitzsch 
and Mellado, 2011; Keith, 2011; Seo, 2011) refer to Shoemaker and Reese’s model 
(1996) when they explain the emergence of media content. Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996: 271) argue that no research can employ all their levels and explain the 
influences on the media production at once. The model is flexible and open to be 
reconceptualised which make it easier to apply it to this research. Thus, it could be 
argued that the model’s levels are suitable for separation and analysis of each level. 
Keith’s work (2011), based on reconceptualising Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical 
model, shows that the model is ripe for updating. She argues that the model is still 
useful but is not adequate to explain the routines of new media which have enormous 
differences when they are compared with the traditional media. For this reason, 
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Keith’s work (2011) proposed an updated version of the model. In addition to her 
approach, reconceptualising the model by giving more importance to ‘individual level’, 
this research adapts Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model by increasing 
the coverage area of individual level (see Figure 8.2 below). The reasons why individual 
level is more important are explained in the following section. 
 
Figure 8.2: An updated version of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model for this study 
 
8.2.2. The importance of ‘individual level’ for this study  
If media content is seen as a construction, comprehending it requires dealing with how 
the content is constructed (i.e. understanding the ‘construction’) (Reese, 2007: 33). 
Therefore, in this study, Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model is used in 
order to comprehend how the construction of news occurs within the limits of 
individual media workers. By exploiting a ‘levels-of-analysis’ approach, the data will 
become easier to organise and explain at different levels. Besides, “*o+nce researchers 
begin to understand their questions and studies within a levels-of-analysis framework, 
it becomes easier to compare them to other research, [and] see connections among 
different levels *…+” (Reese, 2007: 37). More importantly, performing the analysis by 
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employing different levels will help the researcher to be aware of mistaken causalities. 
As Reese (2007: 38) points out “*t+he policies of a media organization, for example, 
may not directly translate into knowing the political views of its employees”. 
 
In this study’s level-of-analysis approach, the individual level is at the centre and is the 
main focus. However, in Shoemaker and Reese’s model, the dominance of individual 
level, compared to other levels, is a matter of controversy. Although it was not overtly 
explained, it could be argued from the name ‘hierarchical’ that Shoemaker and Reese’s 
model includes different levels which have different ranks of power in influencing 
media content (Keith, 2011). Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011: 406) argue that the earlier 
research on media production found that the impact of individual level was more 
powerful. According to their research, the influence of ‘organisational level’ has 
become more important in recent years. However, there are several studies which 
refer to the influential role of individual level when it is compared to other levels in 
Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model (inter alia Donsbach, 2004; Fahmy and 
Johnson, 2005; Firmstone, 2008a). For instance, concerning how much the editors give 
a political slant to news reports, a survey illustrated that only one per cent is ‘often’, 
and six per cent is ‘occasionally’ under editorial pressure among the journalists who 
work in the British media (Donsbach, 2004: 144). In the same survey, 
“not more than 10 percent of the respondents in all five countries [including 
the UK+ stated that ‘pressure from senior editors’ or from ‘management’ are 
‘very important’ as limitations to their professional work” (Donsbach, 2004: 
144).  
In addition, in her research about the influence of editorial process on the opinions of 
the British press towards Europe, Firmstone (2008a: 220) argues that individual media 
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workers have a crucial impact on shaping the level of editorial importance in news 
items about European issues. According to her findings, 
"[...] in the day-to-day production of opinion, individual journalists have greater 
opportunities to directly shape newspapers’ opinions than is attributed to them 
by studies of news production which see individuals as ‘replaceable cogs in the 
wheel’ and suggest that ‘‘news changes very little when the individuals who 
make it are changed’’ (Golding and Elliot, 1979, p. 209). These findings suggest 
that the opposite is true of opinion leading, and that a newspaper’s style of 
giving opinion on Europe may alter if key individuals involved in its production, 
such as leader writers, change” (Firmstone, 2008a: 225-226). 
 
Having given some examples from the literature concerning the importance of 
individual journalists in media production, the section below explains why the 
individual level is more important compared to other levels for this study: 
 
a) The case of Turkey-EU relations:  
According to Keith (2011), the media routines level is more powerful than the 
individual level in terms of influencing the content. However, a single individual 
journalist can be more influential if there are some absences in other levels (Keith, 
2011). One can assert that this argument depends on the issue which is covered in the 
media. For instance, according to Firmstone’s study, “*…+ individual journalists play a 
dominant role in shaping the level of editorial importance attributed to Europe at the 
majority of newspapers, and often take the lead in editorial policies to campaign on 
specific issues” (2008a: 220). 
 
Even though it has been shown that the British media does have a direct approach to 
EU affairs in general, this study also argues that Turkey-EU relations specifically is not 
an issue that all news organisations in the UK have a strong and direct ideological view 
of. This view of the Turkish issue is related to their understanding of the EU. Besides, 
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Turkey-EU relations is usually part of the foreign news section and it could be argued 
that foreign policy issues are likely to be less politicised. Moreover, the Turkish issue 
cannot have an impact on circulation figures or the organisational chart of the paper. 
Thus, organisational and ideological levels cannot be as influential as they are in a 
domestic issue which can be directly related to British people’s life. That does not 
mean that the ideological level does not have an influence on the Turkish issue at all. 
However, as the study is mainly focused on individual media workers, the ideological 
level is not discussed in a specific section. 
 
b) Media freedom: It could be assumed that the individual level has a greater influence 
where media freedom has a relatively better record because “when communicators 
have more power over their messages and work under fewer constraints, their 
personal attitudes, values, and beliefs have more opportunity to influence content” 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 91). Regarding this point, Hanitzsch and Mellado’s 
(2011: 418) research puts forward a well known notion that political influences are 
stronger in less democratic states with low levels of press freedom. According to an 
index published by ‘Reporters Without Borders’ (2012), the UK is the 28th country 
among 179 countries in terms of the level of press freedom. Thus, it can be argued that 
the relatively free environment of the British media increases the influence of the 
individual level. However, one should also take into account the organisational and 
cultural factors which may mediate the broader ‘freedom of media’ argument. In this 
sense, where the UK stands is only one of many possible indicators of individual level 
freedoms. Also, journalists are ‘employees’ and their work is as restricted as the work 
of all employees is. 
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c) Possibility of an examination: The influence of organisational and ideological forces 
could be easily seen but it is usually hard to examine them systematically. By contrast, 
observing and examining individuals in media organisations is relatively more viable 
(Reese, 2007: 37). Moreover, the interviewees who participated in this research are, by 
and large, senior journalists. They acquire levels of autonomy and are less prone to 
pressures from organisational forces (see Tunstall, 1971). However, this does not mean 
that the organisational level is less important and invisible in this research’s findings. 
Organisational level influences were sometimes depicted through the voices of the 
individual journalists.  
 
Finally, one should also bear in mind that the levels of the hierarchical model are not 
very solid and some issues may appear at different levels with different degrees. 
Therefore, even though the interview analysis is grounded on the individual level, the 
research also makes use of focusing on other levels in order to thoroughly explain the 
news production step (see Ibrahim, 2003). 
 
8.2.3. Problems in employing the hierarchical model  
Employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model for this study raises a 
number of problems. First of all, the majority of examples which explain the model 
were based on the US media. Secondly, the model was developed in the pre-internet 
age (or in the period when internet media was not as powerful as today) and this could 
be a problem as the research sample also includes a news website. Thirdly, it is tacitly 
seen in Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) explanations that the individual level has the 
least influential power since it is surrounded by other levels. Finally, in this study, as 
explained before, the individual level will have a special emphasis while the other two 
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levels (media routines and extramedia) will have complimentary contributions, based 
on journalist’s views (see Chapter 9). 
 
Before concluding this section, it is important to pay attention to what Shoemaker and 
Reese advise: 
“Many studies make observations at one level of analysis and interpret those 
findings at a higher level. For example, many scholars have examined individual 
journalists and then drawn conclusions about media organizations as a whole. 
Individual bias, however, does not translate automatically into media bias. 
Similarly, ideological analyses may yield elegant theories of media and society, 
but individuals still have latitude in their behavior. Their actions, although 
constrained, are not automatically determined by higher-level social forces” 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 271). 
 
Therefore, this study does not seek to draw concrete conclusions about the news 
production mechanisms of media organisations by means of interviewing only 
individual journalists. Since making an analysis of the whole media production system 
is a much more complex process, the results of the interviews could only explain the 
journalists’ experiences and views. However, as mentioned before, the journalists who 
participated in this research are generally senior staff (some of them are even leader 
writers) and their views, to some extent, can represent a broad picture of their news 
organisations. Consequently, even though this study accepts the importance of all 
levels of news coverage, the primary focus of the research concerning the production 
step is on individual journalists. 
 
8.3. Individual level influences on journalists 
Having discussed the characteristics of Shoemaker and Reese’s model and how it can 
be applied to this study, this section will look at the first step of the levels-of-analysis. 
According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), the concept of ‘individual level’ includes 
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different intrinsic elements about journalists such as their personal background 
(education, sexual orientation, etc.), personal attitudes (political views, religious 
beliefs, etc.), and professional orientations and how they define their roles in 
producing media outputs. Because of the research questions, this study is interested in 
the journalists’ personal attitudes in politics, i.e. their approach to Turkey’s EU bid, and 
their professional orientations in order to see how they shape media representation of 
Turkish membership of the EU. The section firstly deals with how the journalists, who 
write on Turkey’s EU bid, are chosen. Secondly, it focuses on the influences on 
journalists while they write news items on Turkey. Then, the section looks at the 
journalists’ views on Turkey and its bid to join the EU. Finally, the chapter illustrates 
what journalists said about the coverage on Turkey-EU relations. 
 
8.3.1. Who is selected to write on Turkey-EU relations? 
Although this section appears to represent the organisational level, the focus of the 
questions answered in this section mainly concern individual journalists. Why does a 
journalist write about Turkey and the EU? How are they selected? What makes them 
special? Is it a complicated process to be selected or is it just because of daily routine 
in a media organisation? Do the news organisations choose journalists to create a 
policy in the Turkish issue or do the journalists decide themselves to write about 
Turkey? A discussion on these questions can also reveal how much importance the 
British media give to the Turkish issue.  
 
Journalists’ location is an important key to start answering these questions. The 
majority of news items about Turkey-EU relations were written by London, Brussels or 
Istanbul-based journalists. This study shows that the news items that were written in 
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London are simply a matter of who is free on any particular day to write about the 
Turkish issue. Therefore, it could be said that there were no special criteria used to 
select the journalists who were to be based in London and who wrote about Turkey’s 
EU bid. In Brussels, the news items on Turkish membership of the EU were written by 
EU correspondents while in Istanbul Turkey correspondents of the British media 
organisations or freelancers had written the news items. 
 
All commentary writers claimed that writing about Turkey was their decision. They said 
that it was an interesting topic when the discussions were on the EU agenda. However, 
concerning long articles, deep analysis, or special supplements about Turkey and its 
bid to join the EU, the newspapers used the journalists who are experienced in EU 
affairs. J11 (The Guardian) who published a survey project about Turkey, says that he 
was chosen to write on Turkey because he used to work in Brussels and had many 
contacts in TÜSİAD. He said “I was experienced and was interested. *…+ Not because I 
was pro Turkish membership or anti Turkish membership. It has to do with 
professionalism. Who is the best person to do this?” What J11 underlines by the term 
professionalism in his comments is related to the experience and skills of journalists 
that help them to cope with news stories which demand an area of expertise. 
However, when choosing a journalist to send to Turkey, the decision is usually based 
on practical reasons instead of looking for Turkey experts. Almost all interviewees said 
that the choice of people for foreign posts, including Turkey, is usually made randomly. 
Apart from some desired characteristics of some news organisations, especially the FT, 
there appear to be no special criteria for selection as a Turkey correspondent of a 
British news organisation. Although it is not applied in most media organisations, J18 
(the FT) assesses the desired characteristics of a journalist that they want to send to 
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Turkey as follows:  
-A level of existing expertise about Turkey,  
-Being able to speak Turkish,  
-Some previous reporting experience in Turkey. 
 
8.3.1.1. Relationships with Turkey before working there 
Some journalists confessed that they did not have a special interest or knowledge 
regarding Turkey before being posted there. These journalists said that the reason why 
they went to Turkey was personal and/or a vacant position. For instance, according to 
J6’s (BBC News) experience, there are probably two ways for correspondents to go into 
a foreign country. One is being an academic expert and the other one is going to an 
unknown country like a blank sheet of paper, in other words with the similar level of 
knowledge as the audience. J6 said that he started to work in Turkey with no prior 
knowledge of the country. He said:  
“I will tell you very frankly. I had never been to Turkey before I got the job as 
the BBC's Turkey correspondent *…+ You sort of take the audience along with 
your discovery. [...] I certainly was not Turkey expert when I got the job. I didn’t 
come in, in my view, with any strong ideological opinion about the place one 
way or another”. 
 
Another BBC journalist J9 who worked in Turkey for three and a half years also said 
that he did not know much about Turkey before going there as a correspondent. He 
says: “I applied to go Turkey because someone told me that the last correspondent 
had a great view of the Bosphorus. I thought that sounds good. And the job was 
coming up”.  
 
Another journalist, J2 (the FT), also confessed that he was not a Turkey expert before 
going there. He says: 
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“Totally practical reasons. I was not a Turkey expert. The paper at the time had 
upgraded the posting29. It used to be just a stringer or super stringer job. It was 
made a staff post when I went there. That was very important. We were taking 
Turkey more serious[ly]”. 
 
As “[u]nfamiliarity with a subject can *…+ lead to inaccurate reporting” (Negrine, 1994: 
127), going to a country as a correspondent without knowing much about that country 
could negatively influence the depth of news items. However, starting to work in a 
country as a blank sheet of paper could also increase the possibility of relatively 
unbiased writing. This claim can be also supported by the discussion below about the 
problems of working in a country as a correspondent for a long time. 
 
8.3.1.2. The length of period the foreign correspondents spend in Turkey 
The importance of changing foreign journalists’ working places was highlighted by the 
interviewees. For example, J18 (the FT) said that the FT has a policy that they try to 
move correspondents every four or five years to different countries. The reason is that 
a new correspondent will see a country with a fresher perspective and they will 
understand the country in a different way. Also, he argues that if a foreign 
correspondent has been in a country too long, they would become uninterested and 
could think that they know that debate, and have written about this many times 
before. According to J12 (The Guardian) the aim of this shift is to avoid foreign 
correspondents being more loyal to the place they live in than to their readers. 
 
J15 (BBC News) has a different view concerning the length of period the foreign 
correspondents spend in Turkey. Even though many Turks simply think that the 
                                                          
29
 In 2004, the FT upgraded the status of its staff in Turkey. It was the time when Turkish membership 
issue was on the verge of becoming one of the most popular issues in Brussels and other capitals in the 
EU. 
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Western media always represent the problematic sides of Turkey, what J15 argues is a 
reverse angle of this kind of thought. He explains why some foreign correspondents 
tend to be biased (being too much pro Turkey), and avoid seeing the problematic sides 
of Turkey through complaining about two extreme types of foreign correspondents. He 
says: 
“I have a private theory about Western journalists who lived in Turkey. They 
tend to go to one of two extremes. Some Western journalists who live in 
Turkey, they adapt extremely well, in some ways too well. They learn very good 
Turkish. They appreciate the Turkish way of life. They even live in a nice house 
on the Bosphorus. They enjoy everything positive about there. And they 
become very very defensive of Turkey and they become in a way excessively 
pro-Turkish to the point where they refuse to see any false (bad things). They 
become very angry when other people criticise Turkey. And that is quite a 
common syndrome. And there are other Western journalists who are living in 
Turkey for a while. For some reason or other, they just don’t settle. The place 
doesn’t suit them. They have a kind of antagonistic relationship with the 
authorities. They become sort of anti-Turkish. *…+ I suppose, to learn Turkish 
and to learn Turkish reality is a big personal investment. And if you make that 
effort, then you have a certain stake in sort of good personal relationship with 
Turkey. If you are a Western journalist and living in Istanbul or Ankara, and you 
have a good life, and you are enjoying Turkish culture, it takes a lot of bravery 
then to go to Diyarbakir and write about the bad things which Kurds are 
suffering”.  
 
Finally, J15 (BBC News) summarises his observation by claiming that the Western 
journalists who write on Turkey are torn by two different impulses. On one hand, there 
is a sensitivity to human rights questions in Turkey especially in the darker times when 
the war with the PKK was at a peak. But at the same time, there is a great belief in 
Turkey's potential. He said that people talk of Turkey as a model Muslim democracy 
and a bridge between the East and the West. According to J15, when journalists use 
these expressions, it is partly reflecting reality but partly it is a wishful thinking which 
tries to create reality by using certain expressions. 
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Consequently, this section revealed that British news organisations do not have a 
specific set of criteria to select journalists who will be sent to Turkey. Moreover, it was 
seen that the journalists who worked in Turkey did not have any special relationship 
with the country before starting their Turkish experience. Finally, it was found that 
there is a tendency to change the place of correspondents every four or five years as 
staying too long in one place may influence the journalists’ critical view on the country 
they live in. 
 
8.3.2. Influences on journalists 
One of the aims of conducting interviews with the journalists working for the British 
media was to investigate the most important constraints on the journalists who have 
published news reports on Turkish membership in the British media, and to reveal the 
sources of their data while writing about Turkey. Various influences and sources were 
put forward by the journalists. The most important ones are ‘politicians and the 
political establishments’, ‘journalists’ visits to Turkey’, and ‘the media (including 
books)’.  
 
Different journalists said that they used the information flowing from the MPs in 
Westminster, the Turkish Government, Turkish opposition parties, the European 
Commission, the MEPs in Brussels, and progress reports about Turkey written by 
Brussels. Especially the journalists who had worked in Brussels highlighted the EU’s 
different bodies as their main sources of information. 
 
Half of all the interviewees underlined the importance of their visits to Turkey while 
explaining what influenced their writings on Turkey. A Turkish journalist (J4) who used 
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to write for The Daily Telegraph thinks that foreign journalists’ visits to Turkey have 
importance in terms of dispelling the prejudgements and seeing different aspects of 
the country. She says: 
“They (foreign journalists) are the most affected by the [Turkish] people, 
because they are influenced by the interest and warmth which is manifested by 
Turkish people. Even though the journalists might come here with some 
prejudices, they receive a positive impression right at the beginning. They 
forget the stereotypes. But throughout the time they spend here, they get to 
know Turkey, they explore different aspects, different levels of Turkey”.  
 
J10 (The Guardian) also underlines the importance of visits and interaction with 
Turkish people. He thinks that there is neither a big nor heterogeneous enough Turkish 
community in the UK, and journalists can identify Turkey better by visiting it.  
 
Among the influences on journalists, the media is the third most important one. 
Regarding this issue, Shoemaker and Reese argues: 
“To a certain extent, each news organization acts as a source for the others. 
Journalists read, watch and listen to news, from their own and from competing 
organizations; and when a story breaks first in one medium, it may quickly be 
picked up by other media” (1996: 189).  
 
Half of all journalists claim that what they read in books and what they follow in the 
media has a strong influence on their approach while they are writing about Turkey’s 
EU membership. This shows that different media can influence other media while the 
media content is being produced. Sometimes this could be useful for wider media 
debates. Firmstone’s study (2008a) of the influence of the editorial process on the 
British press’ approach to EU affairs underlines the impact of wider media debates on 
each newspapers.  
“Journalists from two pro-European newspapers explicitly commented on how 
their judgements are influenced by the tone of opinion leading and treatment 
of Europe in news coverage by other newspapers (Guardian and Independent). 
They felt that their newspaper’s editorial voice should respond and retaliate to 
negative coverage of the EU because they have a duty to take part in the 
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national debate in a proactive and positively orientated way” (Firmstone, 
2008a: 222).  
 
Other factors that shape journalists’ knowledge and view but that are less common 
than the three main ones discussed above are diplomats, readers, personal interests, 
personal observations, Turkish business leaders, conferences, academics, Turkish 
think-tanks, journalists’ Turkish friends, experts and haphazard things. It is also 
important to ask what does not influence the journalists when they write about 
Turkey. Similar to underrepresentation of the public opinion in the British coverage on 
Turkey-EU relations (also see Negrine, 2008), no journalists said that they were 
influenced by the British public. 
 
As a result, this section showed that the journalists are influenced by political events, 
its actors and institutions the most while writing about Turkey’s EU bid. It means that 
no matter what Turkish authorities expect from the coverage, the construction of the 
news content is mostly related to how Turkish, British and other European politicians 
contribute to the political and media agendas. However, these political acts are not 
represented by a mirror effect in the media. How these events are mediated and 
become a media representation of Turkey-EU relations by the influence of journalists 
and editorial lines will be explained in the following sections and Chapter 9.  
 
8.3.3. Journalists’ view on Turkey and Turkish membership of the EU  
In Section 8.3.1 above, J11 (The Guardian) referred to the importance of 
professionalism. Even though most journalists can be seen as professionals, Donsbach 
(2004: 135) argues that individual journalists’ subjective beliefs influence their 
decisions while producing the news content. Accordingly, it can be argued that 
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journalists’ understanding of Turkey should have a positive or negative influence on 
the news items they write on Turkey’s EU bid. Interviewees were asked what kind of 
personal associations they have about Turkey in general. The aim was to explore the 
‘attitudes’ dimension of influences on the individual level by looking at what sort of 
metaphors, images, socio-historical understanding they have when they think of 
Turkey.  
 
8.3.3.1. Journalists’ views on Turkey 
Several well known clichés about Turkey were mentioned such as ‘being a bridge 
between the Eastern and the Western world’, ‘crossroads of civilisations’, and ‘being a 
melting pot’ while some journalists defined Turkey as ‘a vibrant, strong, growing 
economy’, and ‘a new emerging market’. The journalists’ overall view of Turkey 
significantly coincides with the findings in the news coverage (see 7.3 on page 185). 
 
The majority of the journalists positioned Turkey between the East and West. The 
journalists who visited or lived in Turkey mentioned their associations according to 
their personal experience in Turkey. For instance, J21 (The Telegraph) refers to 
contradictions that cannot be seen in many countries such as being a Muslim country 
where everyone drinks beer. J15 (BBC News) thinks of Turkey as a country of great 
charm and violence. He supposes that Turkey is an Eastern country in the sense of 
warmth and politeness, and dignity. However, he also thinks that Turkey contains a 
great potential of violence. Furthermore, J2’s (the FT) personal experience associated 
Turkey with how crowded it is. He thinks “*Turkey has+ a very competitive society 
because the resources are relatively limited, the population is very large, and 
everybody is fighting for their share of resources”.  
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Regarding the image of Turkey and its bid to join the EU, J17 (the FT) expresses his own 
observation which underlines a shift from the secular military power to the rise of 
Islamism in Turkey. He says: 
“One of the things that will influence [British] public opinion *…+ in the next few 
years will be whether Turkey is still seen as a secular as well as a Muslim state. 
If Turkey goes down the road of increasing Islamism, then I think that will be 
reflected in a greater hostility to membership. *…+ It really is crucial what 
Turkey does in the next five to ten years in its domestic governance. When I go 
to Turkey, I meet people from sort of all secularist establishments. They are 
deeply pessimistic. Because they say ‘Turkey is taking Islamist route’. Then you 
read some of the stuff that Davutoğlu, the Foreign Minister, says. I have been 
to various conferences where he speaks and it does sound a bit like sort of 
Ottoman Caliphate. I think, the big danger for Turkey is that the old image, the 
military dictatorship, gives way to one of a sort of Islamist”. 
 
In addition to J17’s (the FT) comments, also J15 (BBC News) points out that there is 
increase in Islamophobia in European politics and their only choice is to support the 
secular Turkish state. However, he thinks that the argument has become harder to 
make in recent years because he argues that Turkey appears to be growing more 
religious. 
 
This section revealed how journalists view Turkey. Although various images were 
underlined, the main image of Turkey for the journalists was related to Turkey’s 
position as a bridge between Eastern and Western worlds. Finally, these are the other 
associations about Turkey which were highlighted by the interviewees only a few 
times: Human rights issues, regional power, history, the main country of Southeastern 
Europe, culture, sunny weather, chaotic vibrancy, not being completely European, 
young generation, the Bosphorus, food, friends, and plastic flowers.  
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8.3.3.2. Journalists’ views on Turkish membership of the EU 
The individual level in Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model also refers to 
journalists’ political views. In order to understand their general view about Turkey’s EU 
bid, it is important to look at what the journalists think about the possible benefits and 
damages of Turkey’s EU membership to the UK. The interviewees mostly underlined 
the political and economic advantages and disadvantages. Although cultural impacts 
were frequently mentioned in the results of the quantitative and qualitative content 
analyses, very few journalists were interested in the cultural impacts while they were 
explaining the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey’s EU membership. 
 
Advantages 
There are different kinds of advantages overemphasised by the journalists. First of all, 
J19’s (The Guardian) point is worth noting. He discusses the general advantages that 
Turkey can provide for the UK in the context of EU membership. These advantages 
originate from the similarities between the two countries concerning their 
understanding of Europe. J19 says: 
“Britain and Turkey, in many ways, are not similar societies but they have 
similar relationships to the European project. They are large countries of the 
periphery. They look outward away from Europe as well as inward towards 
Europe. The British look across the Atlantic, the Turks look into the Middle East 
and the Black Sea region. The British are instinctively very comfortable with the 
notion of a country like Turkey being part of the EU but also having other 
alliances and other trading partnerships and other relationships [...+”. 
 
Some journalists believe that Turkish membership can be advantageous in solving the 
problems between the East and the West. Clearly, Turkey within the EU, and bound 
close to Europe would be a rejection of the idea that Islam and Christianity are 
doomed to clash. J5 (The Guardian) believes that a modern, democratic Muslim state 
within the bloc is good for both the West and the Muslim world. He thinks that a 
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democratic Turkey can be shown as a good example for Turkey's Arab neighbours. This 
time, it is not the content but a journalist’s view that ‘a positive Other’ is used in order 
to evaluate the Orient. 
 
It was also underlined in the interviews that Turkish membership of the EU could make 
Turkey a new ally for the UK in Brussels. Therefore, with the help of Turkey, the UK can 
be more powerful against the Franco-German axis of the EU. Besides, the federalist 
views in Europe could weaken if Turkish membership happens. Thereby, the British 
Eurosceptics who are afraid of further integration in the EU could ease their fears by 
welcoming Turkish membership. J6 (BBC News) thinks that welcoming Turkey is a real 
advantage for the UK in order to water down the idea of Federal Europe. Also, in the 
words of J17 (the FT), Turkish membership means “a vision of Europe that the UK 
would embrace which is an outward looking Europe” and this can make the EU more 
powerful in international issues.  
 
Almost all journalists believe that the UK sees the EU as a trade bloc and this is in line 
with Turkey’s motivations for EU membership which is also mainly led by economic 
expectations. For this reason, the journalists think that the Turkish accession would 
help the UK to make the EU more concentrated on economic issues rather than 
political integration. It was also underlined that Turkey’s energetic and entrepreneurial 
features, a young educated work force, will be beneficial for the UK. However, the 
journalists’ economic expectations from Turkish membership indicate long term 
outcomes. J8 (The Guardian) highlighted that 70 million Turks will get richer over the 
next 30 years and this would be a primary advantage for British companies. J13 (The 
Guardian) thinks that the future of the world will be shaped by the emerging markets 
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and the EU should not lose an emerging market like Turkey if it wants to compete with 
future superpowers. She says: “*E+merging markets are becoming more powerful. *…+ 
Turkey is becoming more powerful. *…+ All European nations want to trade with 
Turkey. They can see a new market right at their door step”. According to J18 (the FT) 
if the EU wants to increase its growth rate in the long run, it should admit Turkish 
membership because the growth rates in Turkey are remarkably higher than anywhere 
else in Europe. 
 
Two interviewees connected Turkish membership with giving more importance to the 
market economy instead of state intervention. J21 (The Telegraph) argues that when 
Turkey joins the bloc, social protection and stuffy bureaucracy would be weakened. 
Moreover, the EU will not be able to apply the same agricultural subsidies, and there 
will be fewer restrictions on labour. J9 (BBC News) also thinks that the UK has a lot in 
common with Turkey in terms economic approaches. He says: “I think, [Turkey is] now 
less in favour of state intervention, *…+ and more in favour of sort of freeing up 
individual enterprise. And in that sense *…+ it is on the British political scale of things 
rather than, say, France where state intervention is heavy”. 
 
All in all, the general tone of the journalists’ comments concerning the advantages of 
Turkey’s EU membership for the UK is mainly related to political and economic 
benefits, and the meaning of the EU. It was underlined by the journalists that an EU 
including Turkey would be to the benefit of the UK as its understanding of the EU is 
relatively similar to Turkey’s. This view is strongly in line with the functionalist 
approach of the UK which was discussed in previous chapters. 
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Disadvantages 
The interviews showed that the political disadvantages of Turkish membership for the 
UK are not significantly important. The journalists, who think that there are 
disadvantages, argued that it would be naive to assume that if Turkey walks into a new 
association that it would not change its character. According to their view, the changes 
may not always be what the UK wants to see. In terms of tangible consequences, the 
disadvantages that would influence the UK if Turkey joins the EU are mainly based on 
the migration issue. As there is no doubt that the accession of Eastern European 
countries led to a huge flow of migration to the UK, the journalists emphasised the 
sensitivity of the British public on this issue. Therefore, the interviewees mentioned 
that migration to the UK should be handled sensitively; otherwise it could be a massive 
disadvantage for the UK. J9 (BBC News) said: 
“Britain has had enormous upheaval in the last ten years with the movement of 
workers across the European Union. And clearly, individuals and institutions 
have faced great difficulty adapting to what is being the greatest number of 
people coming into the UK at such a time, such a speed probably in all our 
history. I think there is a great concern about that”. 
 
Some journalists mentioned that if Turkey joins the EU, it will enjoy much more than it 
contributes to EU funds. For instance, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU 
may be especially affected by the Turkish accession and this can have an impact on the 
British economy. Regarding this issue, J16 (BBC News) argues: “Given Britain’s hostility 
to the Common Agricultural Policy, and the general agro-bias of the EU, I think another 
country (Turkey) with a large agricultural sector that might require financial support is 
something that might be a problem to the UK”. 
 
J10 (The Guardian) has a different view from other journalists. Although he supports 
Turkish membership and accepts its several benefits, he is not sure if the UK will get 
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benefits or damages from Turkey being a member of the EU. He says: “I think it is an 
issue which is a very marginal significance to Britain whether or not Turkey is in the EU 
or not. That’s why it is not a big issue in the media; it is not a big issue in politics”. 
 
All in all, 17 of 21 journalists clearly said that they were in favour of Turkish 
membership. Among those, 10 journalists are strongly in favour while seven of them 
support Turkish membership while mentioning some negative points. Interestingly, 
only one journalist was against Turkey’s EU bid whereas the others were unclear. J17 
(the FT) succinctly put the journalists’ general view in the Turkish membership issue: “I 
am in favour of Turkey joining the EU but I am only in favour when it meets the 
criteria”. Even though it cannot be a commensurable comparison, J17’s (the FT) and 
majority of other journalists’ approach in the sample bring to mind the results of 
qualitative content analysis in Chapter 7. How the British news coverage denotes 
Turkey as part of the European Self is not significantly different from the journalists’ 
comments on the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey’s EU membership for the 
UK. Nevertheless, compared to the content, there is less highlighting on positioning 
Turkey as the Other. This could be related to the fact that othering Turkey in the news 
items are mainly performed by quoting from European politicians and European media 
that are against Turkey’s EU bid. During the interviews, the strongest emphasis on 
Turkey’s Other character was made by J9, former Turkey correspondent of the BBC. 
However, according to the context during the interview, he was talking in the name of 
a general overview of different circles regarding Turkey. Hence, it was not necessarily 
his personal opinion:  
“Twenty years ago the European Union was a Western European Union. It is 
now a Central and Eastern [one]. So, the dominated one, it would become even 
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further east. It is difficult to see whether that can hold us together because 
Turkey is 'Other'”.  
 
8.3.4. Journalists’ views on how Turkey-EU relations are covered in the British media 
Another dimension of the analysis on the individual level is related to journalists’ views 
on the coverage of Turkey-EU relations. Analysing the journalists’ views on the 
coverage can help to clarify the points concerning the representation of Turkey’s EU 
bid. Thus, this section focuses on the research question ‘How do the journalists who 
had written on Turkey-EU relations view the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British 
media?’ The discussion starts by examining the reasons why Turkish membership has 
lost its popularity. Then, it continues by focusing on the changes in the topics that 
Turkey is politically associated with. Finally, by referring to journalists’ views, the 
section will analyse more specific issues concerning the content which are the 
drawbacks of Turkey’s EU bid, the clash of civilisations thesis, and constantly 
associating Turkey with Islam.  
 
8.3.4.1. Journalists’ views on the decrease in Turkey-EU relations’ popularity in the 
British media and the changes in the content  
When membership negotiations with Turkey were due to start on 3rd October 2005, 
there were tense discussions in the EU, including the media agenda. Interestingly, after 
Turkey started membership negotiations, Turkey’s EU bid weakened in the EU’s 
political agenda, and the same happened in the media agenda. As the majority people 
receive most information about recent political affairs -especially international 
relations or elite discussions- from the media, the decrease in news items concerning 
Turkey‘s EU bid means that EU citizens are likely to know less about Turkish 
membership. This situation may have an impact on how EU citizens see Turkey in the 
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context of the EU. If Turkey-EU relations become less prominent on the agenda, the 
importance of Turkey‘s EU bid could be perceived as less important than before. The 
news items about Turkish membership are not only about agreements, diplomatic 
affairs, or discussions between politicians. When Turkey-EU relations are on the 
agenda, the European media also covers the positive changes in Turkey in terms of 
legislation, better human rights record or broadly speaking, ‘Europeanisation’ of 
Turkey. If the number of news items about Turkey‘s Europeanisation decreases, this 
could mean that the readers would read fewer news items which emphasise the words 
‘Turkey’ and ‘the EU’ in the same sentence or paragraph. As Turkey‘s position between 
the East and the West is a matter of discussion, the readers from EU Member States, 
possible voters in a possible referendum about Turkish membership in the future, may 
not become accustomed to the idea of Turkey as a European country without long 
term media cultivation. Although the news items about Turkey‘s EU bid do not always 
support Turkey, it can be assumed that any type of news item could contribute to the 
association of Turkey with the EU if the coverage is not overtly based on an anti-
Turkish membership approach. However, the news items that associate Turkey more 
with the Middle Eastern issues, which have recently become overly common, could 
make Turkey more related to the Middle East in readers’ minds. 
 
The alleged reasons for the reduction in coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British 
media 
According to the journalists, the main reasons why Turkish membership became 
uninteresting in the British media are the rejection of the European Constitution 
referendums, the results of the biggest EU enlargement in 2004, the Cyprus issue, 
Turkey’s domestic problems, new Turkish policy towards the Middle East, and finally 
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the financial crisis in the EU. Regarding the last reason, J17 (the FT) argues that the 
Turkish issue is now bound up with the financial crisis in Europe, in other words he 
connects the problem with Europe's lack of confidence. He thinks that Europe does 
things when it feels confident about its own role. Furthermore, Turkey has now 
focused on political clashes at home since the motivation for Turkish membership 
disappeared on both sides and it has become more interested in the Middle East. Thus, 
these make Turkey-EU relations a side issue, and it is harder for Turkey to grab 
headlines. 
 
J1 (The Guardian) says: “I have a lot of articles about Turkey. That is because it was an 
interesting story [in 2005]. *…+ It was a huge battle about what your vision is for the 
future of Europe [between the UK and the Franco-German axis+”. However, concerning 
the situation of Turkish membership of the EU in the British media in recent years, J9 
(BBC News) argues “*…+ to be honest, for most people and most media outlets, *…+ 
Turkey is just off the radar! Just off the radar!” He adds “writing stories about 
improving human rights in Turkey, or writing stories about a [membership] process 
which is now being effectively blocked is not a story”. Moreover, the news items 
related to human rights issues themselves are now not as attractive as in the past. A 
Turkish journalist, J4 (The Telegraph) thinks that one of the reasons why Turkey is not 
significantly popular in the European media anymore is that there is not as much 
violence in recent years as in the past in Turkey. She also thinks that Turkish 
membership has been discussed for more than 60 years and both Turks and Europeans 
are becoming bored of this issue. She adds “there is nothing left to write about Turkey-
EU relations except the Cyprus issue. And when you talk about Cyprus, all people 
yawn”.  
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All in all, when the overall alleged reasons are evaluated, it can be argued that the 
factors for the reduction in coverage of the Turkish issue in the British media are 
related to both Turkish and EU parties’ lack of motivation due to various reasons. As a 
result, Turkey’s EU bid is no longer a news story. This is also related to the fact that the 
interest of the British media in EU affairs in general is not strong enough to cover 
issues which are becoming less important in the political agenda such as Turkey’s EU 
bid.  
 
The change of content in the news items about Turkey 
It is not just the decrease in the number of news items about Turkish membership. A 
shift can also be observed in the content. Turkey was strongly associated with its bid to 
join the EU in the first half of the 2000s. Since some important chapters in the 
membership negotiations have stalled in 2006, the coverage on Turkey has become 
more related to other issues in the Middle East. J9 (BBC News) thinks that from 2000 
until 2004 and 2005, most of the time the coverage was on human rights, the Kurdish 
issue, to some degree Armenia, and to some degree Cyprus. He argues that these 
issues would often come together under the umbrella of EU accession. However, in 
recent years, there has been an explosion of coverage about Turkey's new role in the 
Middle East, relations with Russia, Turkey’s strategic position, its economic strength, 
and the popular term Neo-Ottomanism. 
 
The reasons, proposed by the journalists, why Turkey has become embroiled in the 
Middle East while it was actually in the EU membership negotiation process are not 
significantly different from the reasons accounting for Turkey-EU relations becoming 
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less popular in the European media agenda. In general, journalists listed the four main 
reasons for the shift: Firstly, huge problems with the opposition from France and 
Germany; secondly, the vicious circle in the Cyprus issue; thirdly, the financial crisis in 
Europe which was particularly emphasised by the journalists from the FT; and finally, 
the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. At this point, it is meaningful to ask what has really 
changed in Turkey’s orientation according to the journalists’ understanding. Can all 
these changes be interpreted as Turkey moving further away from the West? J15 (BBC 
News) thinks that Turkey is perceived to have moved towards the Muslim camp, in a 
sense, ‘the radical camp’, and it left the pro-Israeli camp. In addition to this, J20 (The 
Guardian) emphasised that Turkey has become a strong voice of the Palestinian 
people, and Turkey, as a regional power, has more influence on shaping Iraq’s future. 
 
Although the shift is accepted by several journalists, they are still not sure that Turkey 
has completely drifted from the Western world. According to them, Turkey is, 
economically and politically, still connected to Europe with strong ties. For instance, 
J17 (the FT) rejects a fundamental change in Turkey’s position between the East and 
the West. He says:  
“Although some people think Turkey abandoned Europe for the Middle East, I 
don’t believe that. So, when I go to Turkey and talk to business leaders, they 
emphasise how much of Turkey's economic development still depends on 
Europe. *…+ What is happening is that Turkey is also seeing opportunites in the 
Middle East. Some people say ‘alternatives’, some people say ‘additional 
opportunities’. Some people say ‘it is a zero sum. Turkey has to be with the 
Middle East or has to be with Europe’. But I remember, [Turkish] President Gül 
was here (in London). He emphasised ‘it is both’. It is not either/or. It is both".  
 
J10 (The Guardian) also supports this argument. He accepts that Turkey is rebalancing 
itself between the Middle East and Europe. However, J10 does not think it affects the 
way British opinion looks at Turkey. J2 (the FT) is also on the same line. He argues that 
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although Turkey is increasingly identified as a Middle Eastern player, this has not 
affected Turkey's image as a Western country where you can go on a holiday and have 
a great time. Thus, he thinks that the image of Turkey is still the same in the UK.  
 
Apart from the change in topics that Turkey is discussed with, it is also important to 
consider the depth of these discussions. J3 (The Telegraph) criticised the lack of depth 
regarding the content of the reports on Turkey. He argues that the content of the news 
items miss the background of long term relations between Turkey and Europe. He 
says:  
“I think that day to day, most daily newspaper journalists are just writing about 
what is happening. So, they are affected by the news events, by speeches *…+ 
and they tend to be focused on present day. If you see an analysis, saying 
things are going badly with Turkish membership, usually they will give as 
evidence two or three things that have happened in the last couple of months. 
So, people will look at Turkey's relationship with America or with NATO or with 
Israel or a row with the Prime Minister in Davos or whatever it is. It tends to be 
very driven by events, political agenda, and short term news agenda”.  
 
It was explored in this section that the journalists working for the British media clearly 
accept that there is a change in Turkish foreign policy towards the West and the 
Middle East and this has a reverberation in the media representation of Turkey. 
However, the journalists are also mostly sure that the political and economic links of 
Turkey with the EU is still strong. 
 
8.3.4.2. Journalists’ views on the drawbacks of Turkish membership in news items 
There are many reports, which are positive to Turkey’s EU bid, but they still cover 
many drawbacks of Turkish membership. Journalists were asked how they account for 
this and why almost all the news items somehow include a negative point or problem 
about Turkey or Turkish membership to the EU such as the Armenian issue, the Kurdish 
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issue, and the Cyprus issue.  
 
The journalists think that they should be investigative and critical to any issue they 
cover. J20 (The Guardian) argues that journalists should also try to analyse problems. 
This means that even though The Guardian is in favour of Turkish membership, it does 
not avoid criticising Turkey. The same comments were made by J18 (the FT). He argues 
that the media should continue to discuss the problematic issues which have become 
obstacles for Turkish membership. He says: 
“We are critical in what we write about. *…+ I don’t think that we are anymore 
critical of any government than we are our own [the British Government]. [...] 
There is a very aggressive news culture in Britain. [...] People highlight problems 
in Turkey, they would write a lot about Armenia. *...+ I don’t think there is any 
of the news organisations would single out Turkey for particular criticism (he 
refers to the British media). [...] I would like to think that we are absolutely 
right about the faults in Turkish society, economy and government. We 
absolutely should write about the Armenian and the Kurdish issues, education, 
or penal policy, or whatever”. 
 
According to most journalists, it is not ethical to hide problems and it is better to have 
an honest discussion on the issues rather than pretending they do not exist. J10 (The 
Guardian) thinks that mentioning the drawbacks is inevitable although the report 
seems to be in favour of Turkish membership. He says: 
“Nobody is perfect, no country is perfect. If you are doing a proper report on 
the country, you have to do the negative side of it as well. I think it will be 
unrealistic to expect an article saying everything in Turkey is wonderful, we 
want to have them as soon as possible. There are issues”. 
 
Some journalists explained the drawbacks issue by making a relationship between 
conflicts and being interesting. According to J1 (The Guardian), journalists want stories 
and conflict makes stories worthy. He says that if an event is peacefully going on, it can 
hardly become a story. Similarly, J2 (the FT) believes that news items should be 
interesting in order to get attention from the readers. He thinks that the drawbacks 
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which surround the Turkish membership discussions are all interesting aspects of 
Turkey's candidacy. He says: 
“It is a huge country, it is a Muslim country, it is a very poor country, relatively 
speaking. [...] There is a story today about Turkey's huge numbers of young 
people. What are they going to do in 20 years time? How many of them coming 
to Britain? Just because that story is in The Guardian today doesn’t mean that 
The Guardian has suddenly focused on this as a problem. It is just news; it is 
interesting to read about it”. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that underlining the drawbacks and clashes of Turkish 
membership is a necessity for the British media in order to keep its critical standpoint 
and make the news items more interesting. Having discussed journalists’ views on the 
coverage of drawbacks of Turkey-EU relations, the following section explains an issue 
which can be seen as both a drawback and an advantage for Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
8.3.4.3. Journalists’ views on the clash of civilisations thesis in the context of Turkey’s 
EU bid 
In his well known article, Huntington (1993: 22) claimed that the new world order will 
be built according to cultural differences between different civilisations and its effect 
will be observed more than the effect of ideology or economics. He thinks that Turkey 
would never become a member of the EU because of its religion. He sees Turkey as a 
'torn country' whose politicians and elites try to attach their country to the Western 
world while the culture of the country is non-western (Huntington, 1993: 42). 
According to Huntington’s (1993: 44) approach, if the torn country seeks to be 
transferred into another civilisation, it should fulfil the three tasks below. He thinks 
that the first and the second points are relevant to Turkey but the last condition has 
not been met. 
- The politicians and the economic elites should back the change. 
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- The public should be in favour of this transformation. 
- The majority of the intended host civilization should have positive opinions to 
welcome the torn country. 
 
As the discussions about the clash of civilisations are important in understanding how 
Turkey’s EU bid is represented in the British media, it is useful to look at the 
journalists’ position on this phrase. This section seeks to investigate whether the 
journalists think that the clash of civilisations paradigm has a connection with Turkish 
membership and in what way the journalists understand the clash of civilisations in the 
context of Turkey’s bid to become a member of the EU. Do they evaluate Turkish 
membership of the EU as a solution for the clash of civilisations? Or do they evaluate 
Turkish membership of the EU as a contribution in deepening the impact of the clash 
of civilisations? 
 
Several journalists accepted that the clash of civilisations has an impact on discussions 
about Turkey’s EU bid. They underlined a clear reason; most countries in Europe are 
Christian and Turkey is a Muslim country albeit a secular state. J9 (BBC News) says: 
“There is no doubt that amongst the British population, amongst the British 
media, there is Islamophobia. And I know that it has been expressed to me that 
there is concern about Turkey, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, joining a 
predominantly Christian organisation, or organisation that predominantly has 
Christian population”.  
 
Even though some journalists do not believe that Turkey contributes to any clash of 
civilisations, they think that the impact of the clash of civilisations discussions is the 
main element of Turkey’s EU membership story. For instance, J13 (The Guardian) 
argues that the whole Turkish membership issue is seen through the prism of the clash 
of civilisations. However, for some journalists, ‘the clash of civilisations’ discussions 
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have become a cliché in recent years. For instance, J12 (The Guardian) and J6 (BBC 
News) argue that the media repeated the clash of civilisations paradigm too many 
times and now it is a popular cliché for journalists and politicians.  
 
Although it is common to see attributions to the clash of civilisations in most news 
items on Turkey-EU relations in the British media, J2 (the FT) said that he had never 
used this paradigm in the news items he had written about Turkey. He thinks that the 
clash of civilisations argument is ‘nonsense’. He claims that if there is going to be a 
clash of civilisations, it will not take place in Turkey. Again, according to J11 (The 
Guardian), the clash of civilisations is artificial, and some politicians who are against 
Turkish membership want to use this paradigm in order to legitimate the obstacles in 
front of Turkey’s EU bid. J10 (The Guardian) has a recent example concerning the 
nonexistence of the clash of civilisations. He thinks that anybody who goes to Turkey 
and talks to people particularly in the last ten years can see that Turkey’s leading party, 
the AK Party, a conservative party which is also called an Islamist party by some 
people, is as much democratic as the secular people. He argues that accepting that 
there is a sort of clash of civilisations, and Islamists are somehow anti-democratic and 
they represent something different from European values in terms of understanding of 
human rights is not true.  
 
Using the clash of civilisations paradigm as a strategy 
According to several journalists, Turkey is a successful story in terms of democracy 
when it is compared with other parts of the Islamic world. Turkey is a predominantly 
Muslim nation but a secular state has a special position in the Muslim world. Important 
events in the first decade of the 21st century brought Turkey new duties. As seen in the 
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content analysis results, the British Government’s argument in support for Turkish 
membership is dominated by the idea of Turkey as a bridge between the West and the 
Muslim world. The British politicians see Turkey as a secular Muslim partner, a secular 
Muslim democracy, and they do not want Turkey to turn its face to the East and 
becomes less democratic. For these reasons, the arguments about Turkey are all 
strategic ones and Turkey is never discussed, or very rarely discussed, as a normal case 
(J3, of The Telegraph). 
 
As was raised by the journalists in the interviews, Turkey’s increasing strategic 
importance means that Turkey will continue to be discussed as an unusual case. 
Because of this, Turkey’s membership process differentiates from other former 
membership candidates. J4 (The Telegraph) thinks that especially after 9/11, Turkey 
became one of the most important places and one of the most interesting stories for 
journalists. She says: 
“The journey of Turkey could solve the questions, contradictions and suspicions 
of 9/11. *…+ People are looking for a solution. The US seeks a solution. Maybe 
the address of the solution is Turkey *…+ Turkey is a country which is watched 
and followed in the Muslim world. Also the Muslims in Europe watch Turkey. 
For these reasons, Turkey can be a model country for Muslims”. 
 
In contrast to what J10 and J2 claimed in the following section, J4 (The Telegraph) 
argues that Turkey’s strong relationship with the Middle East can help Turkey to be a 
bridge between the Western and the Eastern world. She does not believe that Turkey’s 
ties with the Middle East are weak. J17 (the FT) also believes that Turkey can be a 
model country for the Muslim world. He thinks that Turkey has a significant position to 
prove that the clash of civilisations is an unclear paradigm. Finally, J21 (The Telegraph) 
believes that if Turkey can be kept in the Western camp, remain a democratic and 
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stable and prosper country, an example to the Muslim world, it will prove that the next 
century is not necessarily going to be a century of the clash of civilisations. 
 
Turkey is not able to act as a bridge 
Two journalists insisted that Turkey can never be a solution for the clash of 
civilisations, and seeing Turkey as a bridge between the Muslim world and the 
Christian world is an overstatement. J10 (The Guardian) thinks that the bridge 
argument is exaggerated. He believes that Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East is 
not strong enough to help the Western world in approaching the Middle East. He says:  
“When it comes to this ‘bridge argument’ that people often say that Turkey can 
be a bridge between Christian Europe and sort of Islam, Middle East. I think 
that is nonsense! When you look at it, actually Turkey has much closer links 
with Europe than it does with the Arab countries and the Middle East. It is only 
in the last three or four years that Turkey had good relations with these leaders 
from *the Middle East+”. 
About the same discussion, J2 (the FT), who had worked in Turkey as a journalist for 
three years, strongly emphasised that expecting Turkey to be a solution for the clash of 
civilisations or being a bridge between the East and the West is absurd. He criticises 
what Tony Blair usually said about Turkey’s role between two civilisations. He thinks 
that Blair is a man who misunderstands Turkey and expects so much out of Turkey. He 
says:  
“For a long time, certainly until 2003 or 2004, Turkey was not any kind of bridge 
or buffer or whatever against the Islam or against fundamentalism or whatever. 
In particular, it was never a bridge between the West and the East. Because 
institutionally, philosophically, politically, historically, Turkey is incapable of 
playing that role. It doesn’t want to play that role *...+. It was a very inward 
looking country, completely absorbed by itself, with very little contact with the 
rest of the world. [...] I still believe that Turkey is incapable of playing that role 
except that Erdoğan seems to think that it can. What you now have is Turkey 
overreaching. Encouraged by the likes of Blair and the Americans. I think that 
that is a big mistake and this going to cost Turkey in the long term”. 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the UK has a different relationship with the EU and 
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it appears in various issues. Again in this section, some journalists argued that 
understanding the clash of civilisations in the context of Turkey’s EU bid would be 
different in the UK when it is compared to the discussions about the same issue in 
continental Europe. J17 (the FT) thinks that seeing Turkish membership to the EU as 
deepening the clash of civilisations is not an acute problem in the British media as it is 
in Germany or France where there is a tradition of seeing the EU as sort of recreation 
of Charlemagne's Europe. He says: “We (the British) are more secular in our view. We 
are more relaxed and more cosmopolitan”. Differences of the UK when it is compared 
to continental Europe also pointed out by J9 (BBC News). He thinks that the concern 
over watering down the EU or changing the fundamental character of the EU might 
exist in France and Germany but it does not exist in the UK. He argues that the British 
would be more interested in the economic benefit or damage of Turkish membership 
instead of its –so called- threat to Christianity or the European culture.  
 
All in all, even though some journalists are very critical of the issue, the overall tone of 
the journalists’ comments mean that the British Government sees Turkey as a bridge 
between two worlds. This is one of the important reasons concerning the UK’s support 
for Turkish membership. In this way, it is an opportunity for the British media and the 
British Government to show that they see the EU as a strategic project rather than a 
cultural realm. Therefore, when the journalists’ views are summarised, it can be 
claimed that the clash of civilisations paradigm is a tool for British politicians and the 
British media to show its support for Turkish membership. 
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8.3.4.4. Journalists’ views on why the British media constantly refer to Turkey as a 
Muslim nation 
One of the most striking points in the quantitative analysis of the coverage was the 
fact that Turkey was constantly referred to being Muslim (48.3 per cent of 143 news 
items). Even though the context of the news items was not always about religion or 
culture, the authors of the items somehow mentioned that Turkey is a Muslim country 
or has a Muslim nation. This association outnumbers the attributions to Turkey’s 
‘secular’ character which was found in 11.9 per cent of all news items. If the discussion 
was about Bulgarian membership of the EU, it would be unlikely to see attributions to 
sectarian difference such as describing it as an Orthodox nation. Thus, there should be 
some reasons to justify the insistence of the British media on constantly describing 
Turkey as a ‘Muslim’ country or nation. Journalists were asked why the British media 
always prefer to say ‘the Muslim nation’ instead of simply calling it ‘Turkish public’ in 
the news items. When all answers from the journalists are analysed, it is possible to 
categorise the three main reasons: the circumstances in the post-9/11 world and 
Islamophobia; journalistic tricks; and relevance. 
 
The circumstances in the post-9/11 World and Islamophobia 
Several journalists said that one of the most important facts about Turkey is that it is a 
Muslim country. According to J21 (The Telegraph), using the word Muslim has a 
political meaning now which was not the case before 2001. Also, J2 (the FT) says: 
“*this+ is just the way it is in the first decade of the 21st century”. He thinks that if the 
war in Iraq and 9/11 have not happened, all that kind of thing would be irrelevant. 
Similarly, J19 (The Guardian) thinks that the reason is the European and British publics’ 
obsession with terrorism and militant Islam. According to some journalists, the word 
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‘Muslim’ could serve the newspapers’ ideology if they are against multicultural society 
and migration to Europe. J11 (The Guardian) argues that if the newspaper is hostile to 
Turkish membership, it might use this word in order to remind its readers that Turks 
are Muslims. For all these reasons, J14 (the Mirror) thinks that the word ‘Muslim’ 
might convey something more like a threat instead of simply a description of one 
nation’s major religion. 
 
Journalistic tricks 
Some interviewees argued that emphasising Turkey’s religion should not necessarily be 
ideological or pejorative. It was mentioned that technically it is a necessity in a news 
item to use a different word or adjective instead of ‘Turkey’ after mentioning Turkey 
more than once. J11 (The Guardian) claims that sometimes journalists get tired with 
the same thing and think of another way to describe the thing. He says “you can’t say 
‘Turkey Turkey’ all the time”. J6 (BBC News) claimed that it could be just journalistic 
shorthand. He says “if you have only 500 words, I have got to remind people that 
Turkey is mainly Muslim”. Besides, he argues that it could be related to lazy journalism 
such as copying things from agency wires. According to him, most wires tend to write 
things in a very summarised and superficial way. He thinks that some readers may 
need some basic information and constantly emphasising ‘Turkey is a Muslim country’ 
does not have to have a negative impact. Furthermore, J18 (the FT) argued that most 
journalists have a kind of laziness and they apply this to all companies, individuals, 
countries, etc. while they are writing. He does not think that there is anything sinister 
into the Turkish issue. He said “when we write about Indonesia for example, we often 
write it is the most populous Muslim nation”.  
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Concerning the journalistic dimension of the issue, J4 (The Telegraph) argued that this 
could be related to seeking more attention from the readers. She thinks that while the 
world is getting more obsessed with Muslims, the news organisations could attempt to 
make their news items more interesting by connecting them with Islam. She says 
“After 9/11, this obsession increased. So, if the news item is about a Muslim country, it 
gives importance to the item even starting from the first sentence. I think *…+ they use 
it to make it (a news item) interesting”. 
 
Relevance 
It was also found in the interviews that describing Turkey usually as ‘Muslim’ is 
relevant to the context. The interviewees said that Turkey has an overwhelmingly 
Muslim population and it is relevant in some elements of the debate when it comes to 
EU membership. For instance, J2 (the FT) thinks that using the word ‘Muslim’ all the 
time is not irrelevant. He says “it would be misleading not to mention *it+ in a news 
report or any kind of piece about Turkey. You have to mention it”. According to J17 
(the FT), Turkish membership to the EU is a rare and interesting event. If Turkey joins 
the EU, it would be a big change in the EU to have a non-Christian nation. That is why it 
is relevant to emphasise that it is a Muslim country or nation. Also J1 (The Guardian) 
thinks that it is relevant to mention that Turkey is a Muslim country in a responsibly 
written report but he also warns “where you can get dangerous is if there is any sort of 
undertone of prejudice in there, and then you are getting into the Giscard d’Estaing 
territory of ‘too big, too poor and too different’". 
 
Several journalists think that both pro-Turkish membership and anti-Turkish 
membership arguments put forward by politicians are usually based on culture and 
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religion. Thus, it is normal to see religion’s reflection in news items. J8 (The Telegraph) 
says: 
“All the British politicians who have made the case like Tony Blair and David 
Cameron have identified the attraction of having a big Muslim country in. It is 
relevant to those who are in favour of it because it is an argument that has 
been used by Tony Blair and David Cameron”. 
 
Hence, it can be argued that associating Turkey with being ‘Muslim’ could sometimes 
have positive aspects in terms of support for Turkey’s EU membership when Turkey is 
defined as the only Muslim democracy or shown as a model for the Muslim world.  
 
8.4. Conclusion 
This chapter once more shows that a production analysis on news content could be 
conducted by focusing on different layers of a process. The chapter specifically focused 
on the journalists who work or had worked for the British media and published news 
items about Turkey’s EU bid. The research questions below were answered in the 
chapter by presenting an analysis of the interviews which were conducted with 21 
journalists. 
 
RQ1: Who is selected to write on Turkey and what are the most important influences 
on them while they are writing their news items? (Socialization) 
Most journalists who worked in Turkey in the past confessed that their knowledge of 
the country was very limited when they arrived there. They preferred to work in 
Turkey because of practical reasons in their career. At the London offices of British 
media outlets, no criteria were applied to the journalists who were chosen to write 
about Turkey-EU relations. Similarly, there is a random selection when somebody is 
appointed or sent to Turkey or other offices abroad. Only an editor from the FT (J18) 
 245 
 
said that they expect their correspondents to have some expertise about Turkey and 
an ability to speak Turkish. Concerning what influenced the journalists the most when 
they write about Turkey-EU relations, it was found that the politicians and political 
institutions are the most influential entities. Besides, the journalists’ visits to the 
country and Turkey’s representation in the media were highlighted as significantly 
influential by the journalists. 
 
RQ2: How do the journalists who have written about Turkey-EU relations view 
Turkey and its bid to join the EU? (Attitudes) 
The journalists’ understanding of Turkey was greatly affected by the country’s position 
between the East and the West and how much this position may be of value in helping 
to solve the problems between the two sides. It can be argued that the British 
journalists have various views about the issues which surround Turkey’s EU bid. Their 
overall approach is in line with the general view of the British media, which sees 
Turkey as ‘a positive Other’, and is in favour of Turkish membership with some caveats. 
They think that the UK and Turkey have a great deal in common in terms of their 
expectations of the EU and how the EU should be shaped in the future. Several 
interviewees mentioned the political and economic influences of possible EU 
membership of Turkey on the UK. Interestingly, very few journalists talked about the 
cultural dimension of Turkey’s EU bid although it was discovered in the quantitative 
content analysis that cultural and religious differences were frequently mentioned in 
the British coverage. This shows that journalists are not very interested in the cultural 
impacts or do not see it as an issue for Turkish membership. While the individual 
journalists do not refer to the cultural discussions on Turkey’s EU bid in their personal 
comments, the reason for the popularity of cultural discussions in the coverage may 
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possibly be related to bringing some conflict to the news items. This could also 
originate from the fact that quoting from EU media and EU politicians that are not 
happy with Turkish membership is common in the British media.  
 
All in all, similar to what was found in the content analysis, the journalists think that 
the discussions on Turkish membership is mostly associated with the UK’s and the EU’s 
global strategic plans. Therefore, Turkey is not seen as a country that can contribute to 
the political and cultural unity of Europe. That is why the overall tone of the 
journalists’ views suggests that Turkey is not a usual EU membership candidate. In 
contrast with these, Turkey is still welcomed to the EU by most of the journalists. This 
stance could have an influence on why Turkey was represented as ‘a positive Other’ in 
the British coverage. 
 
RQ3: How do the journalists who have written on Turkey-EU relations view the 
coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media? (Attitudes)  
The journalists underlined that Turkey-EU relations used to have a news value in 2005 
when there were tense discussions on Turkish membership and the future of Europe 
between the UK and the Franco-German axis of the EU. The same issue is no longer 
significantly interesting for the journalists as both Turkey and the EU have lost their 
motivation in membership negotiations. Moreover, it was mentioned in some 
interviews that in recent years there is less violence and human rights problems in 
Turkey for the Western media to write about. The journalists accepted that the change 
was not only about the decrease in the number of news items about Turkish 
membership but a shift has also happened in the content which Turkey is associated 
with. They stated that Turkey used to be linked with the EU affairs until some 
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important chapters in the membership negotiations were stalled in 2006 and 
accordingly Turkey has become more interested in the Middle East. 
 
The journalists have also made comments concerning the reasons for continuing 
remarks on the drawbacks of Turkey’s EU bid in the coverage. They argued that even 
though the British media is by and large in favour of Turkey’s EU bid, it should also 
represent the negative sides of Turkish membership in order to protect its investigative 
and critical character. 
 
Consequently, the chapter demonstrated what influenced the journalists while writing 
on Turkey-EU relations. It is possible to position this chapter’s outcomes in the lacuna 
concerning the influence of the individual level on news content regarding Turkey’s EU 
bid. ‘Media routines level’ and ‘extramedia level’ aspects which are also crucial in the 
production step of the news content will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 9: A FOCUS ON THE MEDIA 
ROUTINES AND THE EXTRAMEDIA LEVELS 
 
“On the day David Cameron gave his speech,  
I was pretty firm in my coverage that we had to  
show the meat of his speech which was about his  
enthusiasm for Turkish accession... Various editors  
in London wanted most of the story to be about his  
description of Gaza as a 'prison camp'. Israel and  
Palestine is a story with which foreign editors and  
editors feel comfortable. Turkish accession is a story  
that they don't feel very comfortable with”  
(J9, of BBC News).  
 
9.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the analysis on the individual level influences. The 
analysis of news production in this thesis would be left incomplete if the individual 
level’s interaction with two other levels was not examined. The ‘levels-of-analysis’ 
character of the hierarchical model enables an investigation on the interactions 
between different levels and “help*s] classify influences operating both separately and 
in conjunction with each other” (Reese, 2001: 178). Thus, this chapter focuses on 
‘media routine’ and ‘extramedia’ levels in the news production step.  
 
Even though the analysis on the production step in this research is built on the 
individual level, the impact of media routines and extramedia levels can be seen in 
several discussions in the interviews. It was found in the analysis that individual 
journalists’ socialization within the ‘media routines’ and ‘extramedia’ levels sometimes 
influences the individual level, and accordingly the construction of news media 
outputs. Since this study gives more importance to individual level in explaining how 
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news content is produced, the two levels are analysed within the limits of their 
relationship with the individual level. Therefore, the explanations concerning individual 
level in the previous chapter are also valid for this chapter’s analysis. 
 
These are the research questions related to the influence of media routines and 
extramedia levels: 
RQ1: How do the journalists view the influence of media routines level on the 
coverage of Turkey-EU relations? (Socialization) 
RQ2: How do the journalists view the influence of extramedia level on the coverage of 
Turkey-EU relations? (Socialization) 
 
The next section will answer the first research question by examining the influences of 
editorial line on the coverage, and journalists’ views on the British news organisations’ 
policy regarding the Turkish issue. Then, the following section deals with the second 
research question and includes an investigation on a parallelism between media and 
politics in the context of Turkey-EU relations. The same section also covers a focus on 
what journalists think on the PR activities concerning Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
9.2. Journalists’ views on the influences of ‘media routines’ 
“*…+ [N]ews workers ‘see’ some things as news and not others. Through their routines, 
they actively construct reality” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 120). Thus, media 
routines can identify what is counted as news and what is not (Preston, 2009: 52). 
Moreover, 
“Like people, organizations develop patterns, habits, and ways of doing things. 
The media organization must find ways of effectively gathering and evaluating 
its raw material. Most of these routines have become part of the news 
 251 
 
business, giving workers clearly defined and specialized roles and expectations” 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 117). 
 
Drawing on the points above, this section seeks to find out the media routines level 
influences on the news items about Turkey-EU relations. The ‘socialization’ aspect, 
discussed in the previous chapter, appears here in the relationship between editorial 
process and individual media workers. The interviewees were asked if the editorial 
process had an influence on their writings, and whether their news organisations had a 
specific policy concerning Turkey’s EU bid.  
 
Firmstone (2008a) and Donsbach (2004) underline the importance of individual 
journalists in news making practises. According to Donsbach (2004: 143), although 
there is pressure from editors and organisations on individual journalists, this is not a 
direct but a psychological influence. The overall findings in this research are more or 
less in line with what Donsbach (2004) and Firmstone (2008a) argued. The journalists 
who participated in the interviews said that the writer’s perspective is much stronger 
than the influence of media routines in news production in their experience.  
 
Excluding two journalists (the ‘Gaza’ example of J9, of BBC News, and the ‘mildly 
Islamist’ example of J4, of The Telegraph, which can be seen in the following section), 
no interviewee claimed that they experienced a direct influence from the editorial 
process. However, it is possible to see from what journalists said below that there are 
inevitable ‘indirect’ and ‘minor’ influences of newspapers’ editorial line on what 
journalists write. 
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9.2.1. Direct and indirect or minor influences of the editorial line 
Explicit editorial lines as commands, which are intended to slant the political direction 
of news items, are evaluated as ‘direct influences’ in this section. Other influences, 
which are often hidden and less significant, are described as ‘indirect’ or ‘minor’ 
influences. 
 
According to Tunstall, “any journalist submits to some extent to the policy controls of 
his [sic] news organization *…+” (1971: 123). Sometimes this translates into some 
degree of ‘indirect influence’ of the editorial line through the editorial expectations 
places upon individual journalists (also see Williams, 2003: 108-109). For instance, J9 
(BBC News) thinks that journalists know who they are writing for, thus they probably 
cover what they see according to what their paper demands. Regarding the same 
issue, J21 (The Telegraph) says “*…+ each newspaper will have a particular view and it 
will look for people (journalists) who will follow that line” and J12 (The Guardian) 
argues “you understand who wants the story before you began to write it. *...+ You 
know why they ask for the story”. This is where the British media outlets’ view 
concerning the Turkish issue has an influence on individual journalists without a direct 
command from the editorial line.  
 
The type of newspaper is also important to observe the degree of editorial impact on 
individual journalists. In terms of the differences within the British press, J8 (The 
Telegraph) thinks that the editorial line has less influence on journalists in The Daily 
Telegraph when it is compared to his experience in the Daily Mail. He says:  
“When I worked for the Daily Mail, there was a pressure to slant stories in a 
certain direction. *…+ Broadly, the tabloid papers have fixed editorial lines. *…+ 
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[The Daily Telegraph] allowed its journalists to report news in a straight and 
objective way”. 
 
Moreover, the newspapers’ stance on Turkey-EU relations is also significant concerning 
the question of ‘how much the news items are amended when they are sent from 
reporters to editors?’ J20 (The Guardian) argues that Turkey’s EU membership is not 
usually a polemical issue in his paper. Thus, he thinks that although both the editorial 
line and the journalists influence each other, there is a shared view about Turkey’s EU 
bid in The Guardian. 
 
When the journalists were asked if the news items that they had written were changed 
by the editors in London, most journalists said that there was no change except some 
‘minor influences’ such as technical mistakes or typographical faults. J6 (BBC News) 
thinks that the changes by the editorial line are mainly technical and related to the 
question of space rather than trying to change the editorial angle. He does not think 
that there is necessarily any sort of deep seated editorial agenda going on about 
Turkey’s EU membership. J14 (the Mirror) experienced her piece being shortened, 
however, the content of her news items were not substantially changed. According to 
J12 (The Guardian), the reason for technical changes can be accounted for by gaps in 
the coverage. He says “I think the assumption is that if they have to change a lot, you 
are not doing the job really well.” 
 
Concerning the direct influence of editorial line on news items, it can be argued that 
this kind of point-blank influence was detected in a small number of examples in the 
research sample. For instance, in his visit to Ankara in 2010, Cameron’s strong support 
254 
 
for Turkish membership was overshadowed by what he said regarding the Palestine 
issue. J9 (BBC News) who attended Cameron and Erdoğan’s press conference in Ankara 
says: 
“On the day David Cameron gave his speech, I was pretty firm in my coverage 
that we had to show the meat of his speech which was about his enthusiasm 
for Turkish accession… Various editors in London wanted most of the story to 
be about his description of Gaza as a 'prison camp'. Israel and Palestine is a 
story with which foreign editors and editors feel comfortable. Turkish accession 
is a story that they don't feel very comfortable with”.  
 
It is difficult to investigate if the words or adjectives or different expressions are being 
amended after the reporter sends it to editors. Only J4 (The Telegraph) confessed that 
there is a direct influence on the language of the news items she had written. The 
amendments were about the words which were used in connection with the AK Party, 
Turkey’s leading party since 2002 which contributed a lot to Turkey’s EU membership 
perspective (Akyol, 2009: 192). Although the party rejects the claim that it is an 
‘Islamic party’, defining the AK Party is still not very easy in domestic and international 
media and indeed it is often defined as an ‘Islamic party’30 in the British media. J4 said 
that she did not use a description like that in her first news items about the AK Party 
but then the editors in London added the description of ‘mildly Islamist’. She says: 
“I think it is wrong to call the AK Party government as a ‘mildly Islamist 
government’. I don’t think that Islamists have a mild version. I don’t know why 
The Telegraph consistently uses this concept. I think they like it. There is no 
                                                          
30
 Although this research’s content analysis did not have a special category for the AK Party, it was found 
in the sample that all broadsheets (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, the FT) defined the AK Party as 
an Islamic party at least in one news item. Moreover, the country profile about Turkey on BBC News 
website defines the AK Party as an “Islamist-based” and “Islamist-leaning” political party (BBC News 
Online, country profile, 2012). Concerning this issue, Christensen criticises the British media. According 
to him, defining the AK Party ‘Islamist’ without further information is an important example of 
information deficit in the media representation of Turkey (Christensen, 2006: 67). In contrast with the 
media coverage about the AK Party, its leaders always reject their party’s alleged association with 
Islamism (Hale, 2007). In Article 2.1 of the Party Programme, the AK Party reveals its position respecting 
secularism: "Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use 
them for political purposes” (The AK Party Website, 2011). The literature is not consistent as to whether 
the AK Party is a conservative democratic party or an Islamist one (Heper, 2004: 12; Rumford, 2006: 189; 
Keyman, 2006: 212; Kotsovilis, 2006: 57; Kösebalaban, 2007; Yılmaz, 2009: 62). 
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other explanation. I would not use this term. I would say ‘conservative’ in order 
to explain it briefly. *…+ I discussed with them a lot but they don’t change this 
term”.  
 
Another direct influence by the editors in London is related to one of Turkey’s biggest 
headaches in its EU bid: the Cyprus issue. Calling the military operation by the Turkish 
Armed Forces in Cyprus in 1974 an ‘invasion’ is almost impossible in Turkish media 
outlets. When the word ‘invasion’ was used by a Turkish journalist, J4 (The Telegraph), 
it was interesting to ask if it was her own expression or not. She explained why she 
used it: 
“Actually I am against the term ‘invaded’. Because when you look at the UN 
Guarantee Agreement31, the first part [of military operation to Cyprus] is not an 
invasion but the second operation can be seen as an invasion. *…+ Sometimes I 
use it like this but not consistently. You should also take into account the space 
you have on newspaper. You cannot explain the UN Guarantee Agreement in 
detail. But I am still not sure if it is right to use this term or not. I am in 
between”. 
 
This section showed that there are direct, indirect and minor influences of the editorial 
line on the news coverage about Turkey-EU relations. Indirect and minor influences 
were demonstrated as part of the daily routines of journalists. Concerning the direct 
influences of the editorial line, only two journalists gave examples from their own 
experiences. As a result, it can be argued that the news coverage on Turkey-EU 
relations is not frequently influenced by the editors’ direct interventions. However, 
there is a strong belief among the interviewees that the journalists know which news 
organisation they write for. Therefore, there is an inevitable influence of the news 
organisations’ policy concerning the EU in general and Turkey-EU relations in 
particular. The following section will present more discussions on this issue. 
                                                          
31
 J4 refers to the Article IV in the Treaty of Guarantee (1960: 2) which states: “In so far as common or 
concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to 
take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”.  
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9.2.2. The policy of the British media towards Turkey’s EU bid discussions  
Having explained the journalists’ view on the influence of editorial process, this section 
seeks to look at how the British newspapers and the BBC approach Turkey’s EU bid. 
Journalists were asked if they think that the editorial lines have a policy about Turkish 
membership. Some journalists clearly revealed their media organisation’s view about 
Turkey’s EU bid. Some of them said that the issue does not hold enough importance in 
the agenda to settle a view. And some journalists did not want to talk about the 
general view of their and other media organisation’s approach to Turkish membership. 
They said that they are not in the position to explain this. 
 
It was seen in the answers that journalists asserted the policy of the British media in 
the Turkish issue through the special relationship between the UK and the EU. 
Therefore, even though some journalists disclose that some media outlets do not have 
a specific policy on Turkey’s EU bid, it can be argued that a policy towards the Turkish 
issue inevitably occurs when the news organisations’ positions regarding general EU 
affairs are considered. For instance, Euroscepticism was underlined in the interviews 
regarding its connection with the British media’s view on the Turkish issue. Then, 
journalists highlighted a second strand which harbours a certain chauvinism that wants 
to close the UK’s door to foreigners, especially to Muslims. This is where Turkey’s 
representation as ‘a positive Other’ disappears. However, this strand is mainly limited 
to the tabloids and they rarely cover the Turkish issue. 
 
Even though Euroscepticism decreases the level of interest on EU affairs in the British 
media, most journalists argued that Euroscepticism in the British media actually serves 
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Turkish membership. They argued that the majority of media organisations in Britain 
want a broader, wider Europe, embracing Turkey as well as Eastern Europe. J2 (the FT) 
and J16 (The Telegraph) think that the British elite and many journalists, working for 
the British media, do not believe in further integration in the EU. Thus, their approach 
to Turkish membership could be positive in order to dilute the initiatives for European 
federalism. J3 (The Telegraph) summarises the situation with a phrase in English: "You 
can also kill a cat with cream". He thinks that the traditional British Conservative 
approach to the EU probably wants to admit China too if it could. In this way, the EU 
can expand more and more and, accordingly, transform into a meaningless political 
organisation. What J3 said explains one of the core reasons why Turkey was 
represented as ‘a positive Other’ in the British media.  
 
According to the journalists, the second strand in terms of British media’s view in the 
Turkish issue is related to chauvinism. This is generally seen in the tabloid papers which 
do not publish deep analyses concerning the Turkish issue. Their arguments are mostly 
about migration and the discussions are usually superficial. When they represent the 
Turkish accession, the tabloids could be in between because what they defend clashes 
with the Turkish case. J8 (The Telegraph) indicates the dilemma:  
“The traditional tabloid papers the Daily Mail, The Sun and the Daily Express 
which are hostile to immigration but also hostile to the EU. Therefore, Turkish 
membership presents a dilemma. *…+ Is it a good thing because it will weaken 
the EU or a bad thing because of immigration? My sense is that those issues 
aren’t fully resolved *...+”.  
 
Economic recession in Europe also has an impact on how migration issues are 
discussed. J3 (The Telegraph) thinks that the relatively positive approach to Turkish 
membership in the British media may change soon. He believes that when economic 
times are bad, British people become more hostile to immigration. For the first time 
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now in the UK, people may start talking about Turkey in the context of immigration 
concern. 
 
Some journalists did not want to talk about other media organisations’ positions on 
the Turkish issue but they clearly revealed their media organisation’s attitude 
concerning Turkish accession. Some of them preferred to say that they were in the 
middle and impartial. No journalists said that their media organisation is against 
Turkish accession but they emphasised that the tabloid press could be critical or simply 
against further expansion of the EU. Different British media organisations’ perspective 
regarding Turkey’s bid to join the EU and how they legitimise their approach are listed 
below: 
 
The Daily Telegraph 
J4, who used to be the Istanbul correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, said that The 
Telegraph is strongly in favour of Turkish membership. The reason in her words is 
“because The Daily Telegraph wants to strengthen the Atlantic axis and Turkish 
membership is perceived within the UK's relations with the US”. Again J21 (The 
Telegraph), a leader writer, accepted that The Daily Telegraph has always been in 
favour of Turkish membership of the EU. 
 
The Guardian 
J1 (The Guardian) and J20 (The Guardian), a leader writer, said that The Guardian is 
extremely pro Turkish. J20 believes that the reasons why The Guardian supports 
Turkish membership are exactly the reasons that Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, or 
the Austrians worry about. J20 said “we don’t believe, as a paper, that the EU is good 
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as a Christian club”. J10 (The Guardian) also claimed that his paper has a clear policy 
regarding Turkey’s EU bid. He said that the editorials written about Turkish 
membership obviously reveal The Guardian’s position. 
 
Financial Times 
J18 (the FT) strongly emphasised the support of the FT for Turkish accession to the EU, 
and the importance they give to Turkey in their coverage in recent years. He thinks 
that the liberal press in Britain more or less have the same approach concerning 
Turkish membership. He says: 
“The FT has always been very supportive of Turkish membership. *…+ The 
business elite in Britain, when they express their corporate view, perhaps they 
would be in favour of Turkish membership. I think the liberal press, The 
Guardian, and The Independent, *…+ I imagine they would have been 
supportive” (He refers to 2004 and 2005 when the discussions about the 
Turkish membership issue were on a peak).  
 
BBC News 
In the Methodology Chapter, the question of the BBC’s stance regarding the EU affairs 
in general was raised. Here, the journalists from BBC News who participated in this 
research revealed their organisation’s stance concerning the Turkish issue. J16 (BBC 
News) claimed that the BBC is always impartial. He argued that the BBC does not have 
a position either for or against Turkish membership of the EU. He said “we just cover 
the forces that shape that position”. Again, J9 (BBC News) thinks that the BBC does not 
have an exact standpoint about the Turkish membership issue. When their view is 
considered together with this study’s content analysis, it can be argued that the 
general tone in BBC News coverage is neither in favour of nor against Turkey. 
However, it should also be underlined that the qualitative content analysis included 
several examples from BBC News which represented Turkey as the Other of Europe. 
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Even though the reason for this type of representation is the quotations from the 
media of other EU Member States, the selection of quotations was made by individuals 
in charge of BBC News in line with editorial decisions. 
 
The Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror 
J8 (The Telegraph) stated above that tabloids are probably in the middle concerning 
the Turkish issue and some journalists mentioned that tabloids are against further 
expansion of the EU. However, the data gathered from the interviews regarding the 
tabloids’ approach is limited. As no journalist participated in the interviews from the 
Daily Mail, and because of only one interviewee from the Daily Mirror, the perspective 
of these two media organisations could not be clearly demonstrated by the interviews. 
However, their general stance about Turkish membership was demonstrated by the 
examples given in the content analyses in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
All in all, the journalists’ views concerning the approach of their news organisations to 
the Turkish issue demonstrated that The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian and the FT’s 
editorial view is clearly pro-Turkish. Even though there was not enough information 
about the other news organisations, it can be strongly argued that they are at least not 
against Turkish membership of the EU. However, the reason for this positive approach, 
as explained by the journalists, is related to the British media’s Euroscepticism rather 
than a special interest in Turkey. How other influences are also in line with that view 
can be seen in the following section.  
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9.3. Journalists’ views on aspects of ‘extramedia’ influences 
There are various points which influence media content although they do not originate 
from the media or individual journalists. They are classified as an extramedia level in 
Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model (1996). According to Reese (2001: 182), 
acknowledging this level means that the power to construct news content does not 
only belong to the media itself. The power over the content is shared with various 
entities such as “the government, advertisers, public relations, influential news 
sources, interest groups, and even other media organizations” (Reese, 2001: 182). 
Among those entities, following Reese’s approach, this study’s empirical analysis paid 
more attention to “systemic, patterned, and ongoing ways media are connected with 
their host society” (2001: 182). Therefore, the following sections look at journalists’ 
views on the influences of politicians (with a special emphasis on the UK’s special 
relationship with the EU and its influence on Turkey’s EU bid) and PR activities which 
are units of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) extramedia level. Firstly, parallelism 
between media and politics is examined in the context of Turkey-EU relations and the 
British media. 
 
9.3.1. The degree of parallelism between the British media and the British 
Government 
In order to comprehend the construction of news, the extramedia level influences 
should also be investigated as the media often “rely on external suppliers of raw 
material, whether speeches, interviews, corporate reports, or government hearings” 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 127). For instance, the results of this research’s 
quantitative content analysis showed that almost all quotations and references in the 
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news items were provided from politicians. Before analysing how journalists explained 
the impact of politics on their work, a crucial term parallelism should be described. 
 
‘Party-press parallelism’ (Seymour-Ure 1974; Blumler and Gurevitch 1975) and its 
adaptation political parallelism32 in Hallin and Mancini’s study (2004) are two concepts 
that can help to explain how the British media distinctly reveals its political tendency. 
When the Liberal (i.e. the Anglo-American) model of mass media is evaluated, it is seen 
that “*…+ [i]n the U.S., Canada and Ireland political neutrality has come to be the 
typical stance of newspapers. The British press, on the other hand, is still characterized 
by external pluralism” (Hallin and Mancini, 2007: 28). What they mean by ‘external 
pluralism’ is “the existence of a range of media outlets or organizations reflecting the 
points of view of different groups or tendencies in society” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 
29). Thus, they argue that this situation leads to a political parallelism in the British 
media and they claim that “it is no coincidence that the concept of ‘party-press 
parallelism’ was developed in Britain, where *…+ the press has always mirrored the 
divisions of party politics fairly closely” (Hallin and Mancini, 2007: 28). Similarly, 
Negrine (1994: 40) claims that the British newspapers transfer the ideology of political 
parties to the readers. He asserts that British newspapers and British political parties, 
historically, have connection. Because of the degree of this connection, he uses the 
broad concept ‘parallelism’ in order to explain the relationship between a news 
organisation and a party political discourse.  
                                                          
32 In Negrine (1994: 52), ‘parallelism’ is “a concept which explores the extent to which newspapers 
reflect or fail to reflect the breadth of the party political discourse”. According to Hallin and Mancini 
(2004), while ‘party-parallelism’ refers to a direct relationship between a news organisation and a 
political party, a broader term ‘political parallelism’ is related to the general approach of a news 
organisation in political issues and how parallel it is with political parties or other kinds of institutions 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
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As an example, just before the 1997 elections in the UK, the Daily Mirror placed the 
slogan “Loyal to Labour, Loyal to You” on its banner (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 211). 
“Even the page three girl was mobilized in the *Daily Mirror’s+ campaign effort: each 
day a different ‘Blair Babe’ appeared to say why she was voting Labour” (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004: 211). This is not significantly different for British broadsheets. 
Distribution of readers’ sympathy to each political party shows the British paper’s main 
political orientation. For instance, according to a study conducted in 1997 in the UK, 67 
per cent of The Guardian readers support the Labour Party while only eight per cent is 
in favour of the Conservative Party. The picture is the opposite among The Daily 
Telegraph readers as 57 per cent of its readers support the Conservatives (Scammell 
and Harrop, 1997: 161).  
 
An event, which shows the degree of the British media’s distinct political tendency and 
the tradition of announcing which party they are going to support in the elections, 
recently caused a controversy in Turkey. The Economist advised Turkish people to vote 
for the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the second biggest political party of Turkey, in 
the Turkish General Election in 2011. The Turkish ruling party the AK Party’s leaders, 
including the PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, harshly criticised The Economist because of its 
advice to Turkish voters. Following this, The Economist wrote “Mr Erdogan has 
accused The Economist of acting in concert with ‘a global gang’ and taking orders from 
Israel. This may win him votes at home, but it will hardly add to his credibility in the 
West” (The Economist, 2011). 
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All in all, it can be claimed that there is some degree of political parallelism between 
the British news organisations and the British political circles. When the overall 
tendency in the British press is examined, it is seen that the right-of-centre in British 
politics has more supporters within the British media (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 
60-61). However, the existence of political parallelism does not mean that only a few 
political orientations are available in news content of the British media (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2007: 29). Moreover, it should also be underlined that the political stance of 
other news organisations in continental Europe may not be seen as less distinct than 
the British (Hallin and Mancini, 2007).  
 
The following sub-sections will look at what the above overview on political parallelism 
means in practice. Firstly, political parallelism in the British media in the context of 
Turkey’s EU bid per se will be analysed. This will then be followed by an analysis of the 
impact of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the content of coverage. 
 
9.3.1.1. Political parallelism in the British media concerning Turkey’s EU bid 
As one of the indicators of political parallelism can be “manifested in journalistic role 
orientations and practices” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 28), this section seeks to 
investigate the journalists’ views on the degree of an interaction between the British 
media and the British Government, and who influences who in Turkish membership 
discussions. Although journalists’ overall view suggests that there is a remarkable 
amount of interaction between politicians and journalists in the issues which are 
directly related to the UK, it was found that the politicians’ influence on the British 
media is limited in the discussions regarding Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Some 
journalists believe that to some extent there is a correlation between what the British 
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media say about Turkish membership and what the Government thinks on the same 
issue. While looking at this correlation, the political stance of each paper is significant. 
J6 (BBC News) thinks that to some degree media follow political parties’ policy. He says 
“*the Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph] are always trying to push the Tory Party to 
become even more Eurosceptic than it already is”. J11 (The Guardian) has a similar 
view. He argues that media people and politicians spend a lot of time talking to each 
other. The views held by The Guardian have quite an influence on what happens inside 
the Labour Party and vice versa. J4 (The Telegraph) also emphasises the significance of 
journalists’ meetings with politicians. She says: 
“The leader writer probably speaks to the Foreign Secretary about Turkey's EU 
membership when they are sitting at a gentleman's club. This is very normal. 
They don’t use force. They think about Britain's benefits. *…+ How can they 
write their commentaries without communicating with politicians?” 
 
This communication is not always limited to an interaction. In some cases, influences 
become stronger. Even though there are not many, some journalists think that there is 
a significant influence by politicians which shapes the British media’s view on Turkish 
membership. For instance, J17 (the FT) thinks that both the Government and the main 
opposition party are in favour of Turkish membership and this has an important 
influence on the media. His view is a crucial example of political parallelism as he 
argues that if the Government was hostile to Turkish membership, the media would be 
less favourable to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. J21 (The Telegraph) explains the 
influence through a different perspective. According to his view, political parallelism of 
the British media in the Turkish case is pertained to the insignificance of Turkey-EU 
relations for the British media. He thinks that Turkish membership is not one of the 
main events of the political and public agenda. Thus, it is possible to see that the 
media is following the Government in the Turkish membership case. He thinks that the 
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discussions regarding Turkey’s bid to join the EU is not a big enough issue for the 
media to campaign on it. He also adds that there is a consensus within the foreign 
policy establishment regarding the Turkish issue and it is accepted by most political 
parties. J20 (The Guardian) claims the opposite of what J21 (The Telegraph) suggested. 
He says “I think *the media is] driving. If it was an issue that was important enough, it 
would be the other way around. In this case it is [driven] by experts”. Similarly, J14 (the 
Mirror) claimed that if it is about something that the public is not very aware of, then 
the media will have their own approach and it will be very much driven by individual 
newspapers and newspaper editors. 
 
It was also highlighted in the interviews that foreign policy issues tend to be less 
politicised. Thus, Turkish membership discussions could be less tense in terms of the 
mutual influence between the British Government and the British media. J12 (The 
Guardian) said:  
“The Daily Telegraph is a very conservative newspaper as you know but when it 
comes to foreign policy, it is really not that different from any other 
newspapers. Foreign policy is less party politicised unless it is something very 
specific to British. What The Daily Telegraph thinks about Tunisia isn’t going to 
be very different from what The Guardian thinks about Tunisia. Or about 
Turkish membership. Because it is not a domestic story. Unlike Germany where 
Turkey is a domestic story”. 
 
Therefore, it is not easy to say that the Turkish issue might cause clashes within the 
British political parties.  
 
Almost all journalists think that there is no formal correlation between what the 
Government thinks and what the British media say about Turkish membership. They 
think that the media and the Government are fairly separate. According to J10, The 
Guardian’s view on Turkish membership is not related to the British Government and 
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the similar line with the Government on this issue is just a coincidence. Some 
journalists are remarkably sensitive in emphasising that their coverage is not 
influenced by state power. They think that intellectual dialogue between British 
journalists from the established papers and the Foreign Office or people from 10 
Downing Street does not mean that the journalists follow the official view. J2 (the FT) 
says: “Certainly, our coverage of Turkey in the FT has no relation whatever with the 
thinking in the British Government. *…+ It is purely news driven, policy driven. It is 
driven by events in Turkey and Europe”.  
 
Two journalists tried to demonstrate the weakness of the Government’s influence on 
the media coverage about Turkish membership through expressing the differences in 
Government’s and media’s approach. J13 (The Guardian) underlines the existence of 
various approaches in the British media about Turkey. She thinks that the Government 
does not have an influence on the British media because “different newspapers end up 
in different places on *the Turkish issue+. *…+ There is a kind of variety of opinion”. 
What J13 claimed is too broad when it is compared with the detailed content analysis 
in this thesis. In terms of being in favour of or against Turkish membership, it can be 
easily said that the results are not as various as J13 claims. For instance, there is no 
news organisation which is totally against Turkish membership of the EU in the sample. 
However, it is not hard to assert that The Guardian and the FT are overtly in favour of 
Turkey’s EU bid.  
 
J9 (BBC News) also highlights the difference between the British media and the 
Government concerning their approach to the Turkish issue. He said that, to some 
degree, Islamophobia plays a part in some negativity towards Turkish accession in the 
268 
 
British media. Such negativity is not reflected from the Government. Also, he thinks 
that the British media is more sceptical than the Government in overall issues 
regarding Turkey’s EU bid. J9’s comment is important because this thesis argues that 
the British coverage represents Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ while the British politicians’ 
view in the same media coverage portrays Turkey as an integral part of the European 
Self. This point is probably related to the British media’s critical stance regarding any 
type of issue, negativity as a news value (see O’Neill and Harcup, 2009: 166), and other 
reasons which will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
 
9.3.1.2. The influence of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the media 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid 
As several times explained in the thesis before and in the Media Routines Level Section 
in the first half of this chapter, the UK has a different relationship with the EU when it 
is compared with other major European countries such as Germany and France. 
Accepting that the British Government’s overall approach to the EU has a reflection on 
the British media (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999) as part of existing parallelism, this 
section considers whether the journalists think that the UK’s special relationship with 
the EU, as a source in the extramedia level, also have an influence on how Turkey’s EU 
bid is represented in the British media. 
 
 
The Eurosceptic approach is happy with Turkey’s EU bid 
Almost all journalists think that the special relationship between the UK and the EU 
definitely has an influence on the media representation of Turkish accession to the EU. 
J6 (BBC News) thinks that the Eurosceptics in the British media are happy with the idea 
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of having countries coming in which would maybe slightly shift the centre of gravity 
away from the Franco-German axis in the EU. He argues that the Eurosceptics are in 
favour of the idea of seeing the EU as an internal market and a free trading bloc, and 
Turkey can help the UK to transform the EU into such an organisation. J9 (BBC News) 
has a similar view. He says: 
“*The UK’s special relationship with the EU+ probably adds to some 
newspapers' enthusiasm for Turkey. Because those newspapers themselves are 
sceptical and they understand the process of bringing Turkey *…+ would almost 
certainly halt further integration within the European Union”.  
 
Also J17 (the FT) thinks that the British media is sceptical and hostile towards the 
integrationist Franco-German view, and the idea of ‘United States of Europe’. Thus, the 
British media tends to favour the plan of widening Europe in order to dilute the 
integrationist view. J3 (The Telegraph) argues that Britain’s awkward relationship with 
the EU is at the heart of all discussions while explaining how Britain and the British 
media approach Turkish membership. Therefore, he argues that the British media, 
through politicians’ speeches, usually employs Turkey in explaining its own problems 
with Europe. Similarly, J20 (The Guardian) clearly claims that the British politicians are 
not able to express their support for Turkey without indicating Britain’s own problems 
with the EU. He gives the example of David Cameron’s speech in Ankara in 2010.  He 
says: 
“*Cameron+ quoted from de Gaulle ‘Britain can never become a member of the 
EU’, and he explained how ‘never’ never means anything in politics and how he 
was angry. What Cameron was doing was positioning himself not in the Turkish 
debate but in the EU debate. So, in a sense that is exactly an example of how 
the two are inseparable. You can’t discuss Turkey's bid to the EU without 
discussing Britain's *relations+ with the EU...” 
 
Among the interviewees, only one journalist, J2 (the FT) was not sure that this kind of 
awkward relationship between the UK and the EU could have an influence on Turkey’s 
EU bid representation in the British media. Although he believes that the main reason 
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for the UK’s support for Turkish membership is related to the UK’s Eurosceptic 
approach and awkward relationship with the EU, he is not very sure whether this 
Eurosceptic approach of the British elite influences the British media coverage of 
Turkey. 
 
Insufficient coverage 
Another influence of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the media 
representation of Turkey’s EU bid is about the insufficiency in the coverage. The 
interviewees think that the Eurosceptic approach of the UK could have negative 
influence on the amount of coverage concerning Turkish membership. As the 
Eurosceptic approach is powerful in some circles of the UK and the British media, EU 
affairs have less importance in the media when compared to other EU Member States. 
The journalists who had worked in Brussels argued that editors in London are not 
significantly interested in European affairs. J1 (The Guardian) says: “European Union 
[issues] is not like reporting from Washington where [editors in London] are interested 
in everything. *…+ So, there is a problem about writing stories and getting space in the 
paper. It is not with pro-Turkey or anti-Turkey”. Similarly, J14 (the Mirror) argues that 
any EU issue actually is more widely covered in France and Germany and “their citizens 
are more up to speed on EU events” whereas the British media tend to invest very 
little in their coverage of the EU. She claims that much of the politics is driven by the 
domestic agenda and EU affairs are not always significant for the British media. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the British media’s general reluctance on EU affairs 
inevitably influences how and how much Turkey-EU relations are covered. 
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This section looked at the journalists’ views in order to see whether political 
parallelism exists in the British media coverage of Turkey-EU relations or not. More 
discussions will be presented in this issue in the Conclusion Chapter. The following 
section below demonstrates another influence of the extramedia level on news items. 
  
9.3.2. PR activities and the communication between journalists and Turkish officials 
Another aspect of Shoemaker and Reese’s extramedia level influences is PR activities. 
As this research focuses on Turkey’s EU bid, journalists were asked if the coverage in 
this issue can be changed by propaganda and PR activities. Most journalists do not 
believe that PR activities can influence the news items. They advise that ‘hard sell’ 
initiatives could be very risky. For instance, J18 (the FT) argues that most journalists in 
the British media would resist the mechanical initiatives which aim to increase the 
number of news reports that are positive for Turkish membership. He says:  
“The British media is an incredibly anarchic milieu. So, I think journalists or 
news organisations probably do not respond to organised lobbying, or 
organised pressure in the way that the people who design these campaigns 
necessarily want”. 
 
J4 (The Telegraph) argues that PR activities do not reflect real life and politics, so that 
they could even be harmful for Turkey. She claims that if Turkey improves itself, 
Europeans and European media will notice it. She adds “boat trips for foreign 
journalists in the Bosphorus” could only satisfy the journalists who are coming from far 
away countries which do not have any political issues with Turkey.  
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The defensive approach of Turkey and weak communication between foreign 
journalists and Turkish officials 
It was disclosed in the interview data that the journalists were remarkably critical 
regarding Turkish officials’ weak communication with foreign journalists. J4 (The 
Telegraph) said that she did not think the Turkish Government had a good relationship 
with the foreign press. J11 (The Guardian) criticised how hard it is to conduct an 
interview with Turkish politicians. He found that TÜSİAD was more informative for him 
than the Turkish officials because he thinks that the Turkish state is “too secretive and 
too defensive”. 
 
An experienced BBC journalist J9, who worked in Istanbul and Brussels when Turkish 
membership was a popular issue, also thinks that Turkey is generally defensive in 
discussing issues. He says that journalists tend to see the worst side of the stories. If 
they are not advised, they continue to do that and the negative side will get published. 
He thinks that the important part of the insufficient communication between Turkish 
officials and foreign journalists is related to Turkey’s tendency to be defensive instead 
of proactive. According to his experience, Turkey has, amongst the great and civilised 
nations, probably the worst public relations of any country he has ever encountered. 
Although he accepts that it has improved recently to some degree, what J9 observed 
whilst he was working in Brussels and Istanbul is a proof of the weak communication 
between Turkish officials and foreign journalists: 
“In five years in Brussels, not once did the Turkish Representation in Brussels 
ever contact me, ever reach out to me, ever invite me for a meal or a chat. Not 
once! It was a similar situation in Turkey itself. The Government used to be 
extremely sensitive about the coverage which it received from the BBC, The 
Guardian. And yes, extremely difficult to, again, be in contact with over any 
relevant period of time.”  
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J9 thinks that the reason for the weak communication between Turkish officials and 
foreign journalists could be linked to Turkish pride. He thinks that this pride is 
manifested by thinking "why should we reach out to you (the foreign media)? Why 
should we explain things to you?" He also connects this pride with Turkey’s distrust of 
the foreign media which probably comes from having been in a relatively closed 
society for a long time:  
“It is a function as I think of all diplomatic outreach. It is a function of the 
nature of the country itself which sees very little reason why it should be going 
to the effort to explain itself to other countries. Turkey sees itself, widely, as a 
great nation”.  
 
When he was asked what could have happened if Turkish officials had been in touch 
more with foreign journalists in Turkey, Brussels or London, J9 said that Turkish 
officials would have been able to make the case for Turkey's EU membership, and they 
would have been able to explain many of the difficulties which are currently emerging 
in the accession process (e.g. the Cyprus issue and the problems in human rights).  
 
There are also some journalists who had had positive experiences about Turkey’s 
efforts to explain itself. In J1’s (The Guardian) experience, the Turkish Mission in 
Brussels has a successful press office. Also J13 (The Guardian) was very impressed by a 
conference which she attended in Istanbul in 2006. She said that the organisation 
brought together the Turkish elite from media, business, and politics with the 
European elite. She considers that this kind of organisation can have a big influence on 
how Turkey-EU relations are discussed in the media. 
 
Thirteen of the 21 journalists attended at least one event related to Turkish 
membership of the EU. However, only four of them said that the event was organised 
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by the Turkish State. The events they attended were mostly organised by TÜSİAD, 
Turkish universities, Turkish think-tanks, and other Turkish NGOs. Three journalists 
underlined the contributions of TÜSİAD and how active they are with J11 especially 
thinking that TÜSİAD is more proactive than the Turkish Government in EU affairs. 
 
What should Turkey do? 
The journalists who participated in the interviews talked about their own experiences 
and gave advice to Turkey for better relations with the media in the EU. The majority 
of journalists believe in initiatives in real politics. They think that improvements in the 
rule of law, human rights, and economy could have more positive results when it is 
compared to ‘hard sell’ PR activities on journalists. J17 (the FT) summarises what the 
majority of journalists argued:  
“I don’t think governments can, by saying things, necessarily change opinion. 
The governments change opinion by doing things. So, in ten years time, if 
Turkey is an even more prosperous, democratic state, then its case with public 
opinion for membership would be much much stronger. The fear, in the public 
mind still, is Turkey is a poor country. If we let them in, they will send all their 
people here”. 
  
Hence, it can be suggested that what Turkey should be doing is making PR about what 
it has succeeded regarding democracy, economy, and culture. 
 
The interview outcomes showed that the journalists demanded more access and 
outreach for the press. They emphasised the importance of good communication with 
the foreign press. They think that it is significantly useful for the Ministries or the PM’s 
office to engage with the foreign journalistic community and have a regular dialogue 
with them about what are the important issues and how they are covered in the 
international press. They claim that this is especially important in capitals such as 
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Brussels, London, Paris, and Washington. 
 
Consequently, if Turkey wants to get more support from the European public, it should 
employ media in order to disseminate its arguments which show that it deserves to be 
part of the EU. Moreover, many PR and lobbying organisations focus on the elite 
instead of aiming at the public only. This is because the elite are one of the major news 
sources who can influence the media content (Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 100). The 
elite are usually the decision makers which include politicians, people from think tanks 
and pressure groups. Media can serve them as the basis for ‘elite-elite communication’ 
where the elite can follow other elite’s opinion. Also, the elite’s views could be 
influential on the media as much as the media’s influence on them. A recent Turkish 
initiative the Public Diplomacy Institution which was established in 2010 and works 
under the Prime Minister’s Office should also focus on the European elite in order to 
influence Turkey’s media representation. The institution is already engaged in some 
activities such as raising the reputation of Turkey in international circles by organising 
meetings where foreign journalists meet Turkish ministers (Kamu Diplomasisi 
Koordinatörlüğü, 2011). 
 
9.4. Conclusion 
Since “*…+ how or how far the personal characteristics or orientations of journalists are 
translated into actual influences on news content seems *…+” vague (Preston and 
Metykova, 2009: 34), the focus on the individual level is usually not enough to uncover 
the complex structure of the news production process. Therefore, following the 
discussions in Chapter 8, this chapter included the findings from the interviews which 
are related to the media routines and the extramedia levels. The influences of these 
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two levels on news items were analysed by looking at the journalists’ personal 
experiences. 
 
As a contribution to macro analysis on production studies in the context of the 
hierarchical model, the chapter illustrated that some levels of the model can be 
utilised in helping the analysis of a third level as this chapter did for the individual 
level. In terms of the micro analysis, the findings which were presented in this chapter 
can be useful to fill the lacuna on the influence of media routines and extramedia 
levels concerning the news items about Turkey’s EU bid. The overall outcomes of the 
micro analysis are presented under two research questions below. 
 
RQ1: How do the journalists view the influence of media routines level on the 
coverage of Turkey-EU relations? (Socialization) 
“The routines level of analysis considers the constraining influences of work practices” 
(Reese, 2001: 180). It was seen in the interviews that the journalists who had written 
on Turkey-EU relations were not exposed to a serious degree of pressure from their 
editorial line. Excluding two interviewees, no journalist claimed that their news items 
on Turkey were directly changed during the editorial process. This relatively low 
degree of constraints from the media routines level, especially from the editorial line, 
once more showed the significance of the individual level in the context of news items 
on Turkey’s EU bid. In this respect, it can be suggested that this study is more or less in 
line with what Donsbach (2004) and Firmstone (2008a) argued concerning the 
importance of the individual journalists. However, three journalists strongly underlined 
the significance of journalists’ awareness of the expectations from the editorial line. 
They argued that even though there is no direct demand from the editors, the 
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journalists know why they asked for the story (e.g. J12, of The Guardian). Moreover, 
most journalists accepted the ‘minor’ influences at the media routines level by 
referring to the points such as the problem of space in their newspapers or some 
technical mistakes such as typographical faults. Yet, in J6’s (BBC News) words, these 
amendments did not intend to slant the political angle of the journalists’ piece.  
 
Two key points, which are ‘Euroscepticism’ and ‘chauvinism’, appeared at the stage of 
an analysis on the policy of each British news organisation on Turkey’s EU bid. No 
journalist claimed that their news organisation is against Turkish membership. 
Regarding some journalists’ argument that some editorial lines do not have a specific 
policy on Turkey, it can be claimed that these media outlets’ policy inevitably appears 
on the Turkish issue when their view on general EU affairs is concerned. Moreover, the 
overall findings in the content analysis and the interviews illustrated that The 
Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and the FT have a clear view on the Turkish issue. 
 
RQ2: How do the journalists view the influence of extramedia level on the coverage 
of Turkey-EU relations? (Socialization) 
According to what most interviewees said, politicians’ influence on the coverage is 
limited in the Turkish case. The journalists accepted that there is strong 
communication between them and politicians but they do not think that there is a 
parallelism between the British media and the British Government concerning the 
Turkish issue. However, some journalists believe that the media would have had a 
different stance if the Government was against Turkish membership. Therefore, it can 
be argued that there are various views concerning either the media or the politicians 
drive the other one in the Turkish case. One view suggests that the discussions on the 
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Turkish issue are expert-driven. Therefore, this view argues that the media has an 
influence on politicians concerning the debate on Turkey’s EU bid. Another group of 
journalists think that Turkey’s EU bid is not controversial in the British media. 
Therefore, they claim that the media do not have a decisive position on the issue 
which can drive the discussions. This view also underlines that there is a consensus of 
support for Turkish membership among different political parties and the media in the 
UK. Interestingly, it was found that when there is a debate concerning the problematic 
sides of Turkish accession, the discussions in the news content are mainly boosted by 
employing the opposing views from continental Europe (e.g. Giscard d’Estaing; Jacques 
Chirac; public opinion polls). Thus, these issues cannot become significantly tense 
within the limits of British politics.  
 
According to the journalists’ comments, the relatively modest interest of the British 
news organisations in EU affairs unavoidably influences the coverage of Turkey’s EU 
bid in the British media. This, at least, causes a quantitative under-representation of 
Turkish membership and other EU affairs in the British media (see Anderson and 
Weymouth, 1999). The journalists said that this is not a direct attitude towards the 
Turkish issue but Turkey is significantly influenced by the British media’s cold manner 
regarding the EU.  
 
The chapter also looked at journalists’ views on PR activities as part of the extramedia 
level influences. Some interviewees were remarkably critical about the communication 
of Turkish officials with foreign journalists. Moreover, it was found out that the 
journalists do not believe in ‘hard sell’ PR. They think that these kinds of initiatives may 
cause negative consequences for Turkey. They believe that what Turkey does in terms 
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of improvements in rule of law, human rights and economy will have a positive 
representation in the British media. 
 
All in all, the findings in this chapter demonstrate that Euroscepticism in the British 
media is one of the reasons why the coverage in general is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. 
Regarding a connection with the analytical framework of the thesis, the journalists’ 
views on the British media’s approach to Turkey’s EU bid verified the appropriateness 
of conceptualising the media representation of Turkey as ‘a positive Other’. The 
following chapter will present the concluding remarks on the topic of this thesis and 
answer the main research question of the thesis by employing the notion of ‘a positive 
Other’. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to present the key findings of the thesis together with their 
connection with the analytical framework of the research. As each supplementary 
research question was answered in the conclusion sections of relevant chapters, they 
will not be answered here again. However, the findings that are related to the 
supplementary questions will help to answer the main research question of the thesis 
which is ‘how was Turkey’s EU bid represented in the British media?’  
 
The chapter will present an answer to the question by means of conceptualising the 
media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in news coverage and discussing the role of 
news production in the formation of this representation. The chapter firstly focuses on 
the general tone of the content. Then, the notion of ‘a positive Other’ is discussed 
together with its relations to news coverage and how the coverage is produced. 
Afterwards, the chapter explains contributions of this thesis to the field, reveals the 
limitations of the study and expounds its suggestions for future research. Finally, the 
chapter presents concluding remarks in brief. 
 
10.2. The general tone of the content 
By taking into account all the headline and body of news items in the sample, this 
section seeks to illustrate the overall picture concerning the British coverage of Turkey-
EU relations. Revealing the degree of support or opposition is not simple but one can 
infer the general tone of the items in the sample after conducting a systematic 
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quantitative and qualitative content analysis. The overall examination showed that the 
majority of news items in the sample had a balanced view in general. Most news items 
tend to present the ideas of both sides of the argument. However, analysis of the 
sample showed that there are more news items in favour of Turkey than negative 
ones. Owing to the triangulation of different methods in the research, this claim can be 
underpinned by the findings from the ‘media routines level’ analysis which 
demonstrated that the editorial lines of most papers are in favour of Turkish 
membership.  
Yet, even though the items generally support Turkish membership of the EU, they also 
underline the drawbacks of the accession (e.g. size and population of Turkey, relatively 
poor economy) and other points which make Turkey ‘non-European’ or at least ‘less 
European’ in the context of the coverage. Moreover, even the positive items usually 
include lines which remind Turkey of its responsibilities to become a member, and 
attributions to negative public opinion in Europe. Thus, the items have an approach 
which highlights that ‘Turkey should join the EU but…’ which makes the British media 
outlets, in Aksoy’s words, the “critical advocates” of Turkish membership (2009: 497). 
Therefore, the representation contributes to an understanding that admits Turkish 
accession only with some caveats. 
 
Furthermore, even though the underlining of Turkey’s differences from the EU 
Member States outnumbered the similarities in the British coverage, the results of 
both the quantitative and qualitative analysis are not able to clearly show whether 
Turkey was othered or shown as part of the European Self by the overall coverage. This 
is because of the general supportive tone of the news coverage and the editorial line 
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of most media outlets even though Turkey’s Other character was preserved in the 
content. Therefore, the study proposed the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in order to 
conceptualise the overall tone of the British coverage on the Turkish issue. The notion 
refers to support for Turkish membership without overlooking Turkey’s differences in 
various aspects from the general characteristics of EU Member States. The reasons for 
this type of conceptualisation were also validated by the overall findings in the 
interviews which suggest that the British media tends to highlight Turkey’s Other 
character while it also supports Turkish membership of the EU for the benefits of the 
UK. 
 
All in all, it can be claimed that the British media tends to cover the issues which 
represent Turkey as an ‘Other’ in the European context. However, the same news 
organisations also accept Turkey as a potential member of the European Self due to 
their understanding of the EU and their approach to Turkey-EU relations and/or the UK 
- EU relations per se. Accordingly, the representation of Turkey’s EU membership in the 
British media exposes that Turkey can become a member of the EU if only the 
membership is considered by a functionalist approach. This view gives importance to 
the geo-political benefits of Turkish membership for the UK, e.g. Turkey’s duty of 
reaching the Muslim world and acting as a bridge between the two worlds. In this way, 
Turkey can be a mediator and the EU can reach out to the Other via Turkey. As a result, 
even though it seems confusing and awkward, the general tone of the content reveals 
that Turkey’s chance to be part of the European Self is dependent on Turkey’s 
characteristics related to its ‘Otherness’. This point can be shown as one of the reasons 
why Turkey is ‘a positive Other’ in the overall coverage. 
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10.3. Explaining the media representation with the notion of ‘a positive Other’ 
The explanations above elucidate the general tone of the coverage about the Turkish 
issue. One should also elaborate the reasons behind it in order to comprehend the 
media representation. The reasons were accumulated from the findings in the content 
and the general outcome of interviews by taking into account the analytical framework 
of the thesis.  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction and the Analytical Framework chapters, describing 
Turkey’s media representation as ‘a positive Other’ is significantly related to how the 
context, where the representation emerged, approaches the EU in general. 
‘Functionalist’ and ‘essentialist’ approaches were employed in this thesis in order to 
distinguish different understandings of the EU. The research clearly shows that the 
overall British coverage evaluates the EU affairs in general with a functionalist 
approach. This type of understanding has an immense influence on the formation of 
Turkey’s media representation as ‘a positive Other’ in the British coverage.  
 
By means of this functionalist approach, when the British media represents Turkey as 
‘a positive Other’, it not only shapes the representation of Turkey as an Eastern or 
Western country, it also serves to protect the British identity vis-à-vis the EU identity. 
By portraying a type of Turkey which is suitable for the European Self, the British 
media proposes that the EU identity can be shaped according to British interests. 
Therefore, one can argue that Turkey’s representation in the British media as ‘a 
positive Other’ is firstly useful for the UK’s understanding of the EU and its 
confrontation with the Franco-German axis in the Union. This does not have to do with 
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the British media’s employment of Turkey in a context of Self/Other nexus as a way to 
strengthen its British identity versus the Oriental. Instead, the British media creates its 
own image of how the EU identity should be by utilising the discussions on Turkey’s EU 
bid. 
 
The journalists’ overall explanation about the reasons for showing Turkey as ‘a positive 
Other’ and the supportive tone in the content can be summarised by J2’s (the FT) point 
on the issue. J2 argues that the British media’s default position is related to its elite 
and strategic perspective on the Turkish issue. He thinks that this is a legitimate but 
also dishonest view to take because he believes that the British media’s positive 
approach to Turkish membership does not have resonance on the street. J2 claims that 
if Turkey becomes closer to joining the EU, then all the tabloids and probably some 
right wing broadsheets such as The Times and The Daily Telegraph will show their real 
face and come out against Turkish membership. 
 
As J2 underlined the difference of the right wing perspective, in some cases, a total 
explanation concerning the British media’s approach is not valid. Therefore, the 
differences within the British media should be highlighted too. For instance, while 
supporting Turkey’s EU membership, the Europhile papers, such as The Guardian, also 
refer to spreading liberal values instead of only shaping the EU according to the UK’s 
benefits. Concerning this issue, it was found in the coverage that The Guardian’s 
support for Turkish membership is less strategic and focussing less on the UK’s 
interests compared to the support of The Daily Telegraph. Similar differences were 
also mentioned in Aksoy’s (2009: 498-499) work regarding The Guardian and The 
Times. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the sole reason for making Turkey ‘a 
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positive Other’ is to transform the EU into a loose international organisation even 
though it is the main raison d'être of this sort of representation. 
 
It can be asked at this stage if Turkey is happy with its representation as ‘a positive 
Other’. As was presented in the quantitative content analysis results, the most 
frequent reason regarding the support for Turkish membership was ‘Turkey’s mediator 
role between the Eastern and Western world’. It can be argued that this is exactly 
what is expected by Turkey’s recent EU vision. Therefore, in addition to its benefits for 
the British media, Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’ in the context of 
Turkey-EU relations is also useful for Turkey’s understanding of the EU. 
“It is important to note that the AKP leadership has redefined the EU 
integration project. Initially voicing the view that EU membership for Turkey is a 
civilizational project, the AKP leadership came under criticism from its own 
popular base and intellectual elite and eventually began to present EU 
membership as a dialogue or meeting of two civilizations rather than as an 
entry of Turkey into the civilization represented by the West” (Kösebalaban, 
2007: 95). 
 
Therefore, concerning the new circumstances, it can be argued that Turkey’s EU bid is 
not only about Turkey’s will to be embedded into a new civilisation anymore. Since the 
AK Party came into power, the EU has become a tool for Turkey to link the two 
civilisations. Turkish PM Erdoğan’s initiative to establish the Alliance of Civilizations 
with the former Spanish PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, in 2005, is an example of 
how Turkey’s strategy on EU membership coincides with its media representation in 
the British media and the motivation of the UK Government’s support for Turkish 
membership. The individual level analysis of the journalists also expounded the 
similarities between the UK and Turkey concerning their expectations from the EU. 
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The extramedia level analysis in Chapter 9 examined whether there is a political 
parallelism between the British media and the British Government concerning Turkey’s 
EU bid. It would be useful at this stage to deal with its connection with the reasons for 
Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’. It was discovered that there is a 
difference between the stances of British politicians and the British media concerning 
Turkey’s EU bid although they are both in favour of its accession. Moreover, it is a fact 
that the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in the UK all 
strongly support Turkish membership of the EU. They see Turkey as a full partner of 
European or, in a more inclusive grouping, Western powers. Similarly, the majority of 
the British media in the research sample is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. However, it is 
still possible to see many examples in the British coverage where Turkey is represented 
as the Other of Europe. Thus, the general outcome of this research claims that the 
British news media do see Turkey in Europe but there is not a strong representation of 
Turkey as a country of Europe (see Neumann, 1999; Koenig et al., 2006). 
 
It was found in the news content that the UK was shown as the strongest supporter of 
Turkish membership among the EU Member States. By and large, the news items 
framed Turkey and the UK in complete cooperation which reached a peak on the verge 
of the start of the membership negotiations on 3rd October 2005 when the UK was 
holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU. Since the UK was running the 
meetings, success or failure was directly related to British politicians’ performance. 
Therefore, this increased the interest of the British media in the issue and probably 
influenced the degree of support for Turkish membership in a positive way. However, 
the degree of support in the media coverage was not as strong as the support of 
British politicians. For instance, the British media’s interest in underlining Turkey’s 
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differences from EU Member States in terms of culture, politics, geography and 
economy can be shown as a solid example. As illustrated in the quantitative content 
analysis in Chapter 6, around 60 per cent of all news items in the analysis in some way 
or other mentioned Turkey’s differences while only 22.4 per cent highlighted the 
similarities. The news source of the highlighted differences was not the British 
politicians but the politicians from other EU Member States or the journalists’ personal 
contributions to the coverage. Therefore, this research claims that the notion of ‘a 
positive Other’ can only explain the media representation but not the UK’s official 
political stance. It is extremely rare to see a critical view on the Turkish issue from a 
British politician quoted in the British media. It can even be argued that the British 
politicians evaluate Turkey as an indisputable member of the European Self instead 
‘the European Other’ or ‘a positive Other’. Thus, it must be highlighted that the notion 
explains the British media’s view on the Turkish issue rather than the UK 
Government’s. For these reasons, even though there is a parallelism in the sense that 
the media follow the political positions of those in power especially when they are all 
in agreement, it can be argued that an exact political parallelism between the British 
politicians’ general view on Turkey’s EU bid and the British coverage on the Turkish 
issue did not fully appear in this thesis’ analyses. 
 
The reason behind the difference between both sides’ stances could be because of 
their different aims and duties in the context of Turkey’s EU bid. British journalism did 
not have the responsibility of persuading other EU Member States in order to start the 
membership negotiations on 3rd October 2005 while the British Government, especially 
during its Presidency of the Council of the EU, made a great deal of effort to stop the 
Austrian and Cypriot objections. Another reason could be the quotations in the British 
 289 
 
coverage from opposition leaders and the media in other EU Member States.  
 
Furthermore, the research findings also put forward that Turkey’s representation as ‘a 
positive Other’ in the British context was influenced by the individual journalists. This 
can be deduced from the journalists’ views concerning the production of news items 
which were analysed within the individual level of Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical 
model. Moreover, the analysis on the individual level and the extramedia level 
influences also revealed that the difference between the coverage and the politicians’ 
view is related to the British media’s critical approach to any issue and journalism’s 
general tendency to set out the problematic aspects while communicating an event, 
i.e. negativity as a news value (see O’Neill and Harcup, 2009: 166). Regarding a 
significant example on this issue, J9 (BBC News) stressed that the British coverage is 
sometimes influenced by Islamophobia while the British politicians never link this issue 
with Turkish accession. 
 
All in all, the findings cannot claim that there is a complete political parallelism 
between the British media and the British Government on Turkey-EU relations. What it 
can argue is that there is a parallelism concerning both sides’ approach to the EU 
affairs in general and this is doubtlessly influential on the media representation of 
Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
10.4. Contributions, limitations and suggestions for future studies 
First of all, the thesis’ specific literature review -studies on the representation of 
Turkey-EU relations in different countries’ media- looked at almost all academic works 
which were published on the issue since 2001. This was a crucial attempt to present 
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the overall picture on the topic, as it was noted that most studies in the literature did 
not refer to each other. Secondly, the study looked at a wider research sample which 
covered seven years (1999-2006) while the previous studies mostly focused on 2004 
and 2005 when Turkey-EU relations reached a peak. Furthermore, the data were 
analysed by using a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative content analysis and 
in-depth interviews. In terms of employing methods, this was a new approach among 
other studies in the same subject. In particular, conducting interviews with the 
journalists who had written the news items in the coverage was the first attempt in 
research projects on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations. The data found 
in the interviews were categorised by using Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical 
model which provided a standard terminology. Concerning the different levels of news 
production, the model also gave an opportunity to conduct comparable levels-of-
analysis research for further studies (Reese, 2007: 37). Finally, regarding the 
theoretical aspects, the study brought the notion of ‘a positive Other’ from a study in 
international relations (Neumann and Welsh, 1991) and applied it in a research project 
in journalism studies in order to conceptualise the media representation of a political 
event. 
 
Concerning the limitations of the study, a sampling method of the analysis of the news 
content was the main restriction. Apart from that, the British nationwide newspapers’ 
and BBC News website’s coverage of Turkey-EU relations were analysed without any 
significant limitation. Restrictions in the research were mostly related to the analysis of 
news production. Firstly, the interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011 although 
the general issues in the interviews were about the journalists’ experiences between 
1999 and 2006. Due to the lapse of time, some points in the discussions were probably 
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overlooked by the interviewees. Moreover, excluding Brussels and Istanbul 
correspondents, several journalists in the sample wrote about Turkey’s EU bid as part 
of their daily routine at London offices. These journalists’ focus was not on the Turkish 
issue during the process when the interviews were conducted. Secondly, the 
production analysis on the coverage was totally limited to the interviews with 
journalists. Even though several interviewees were experienced journalists, leader 
writers and editors, a full production analysis would have been possible if other 
research techniques such as focus groups, questionnaires and newsroom observation 
had been employed. By this means, other levels of Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical 
model could have been included in the analysis. Thirdly, as was discussed in Chapter 5 
in detail, the study did not look at the readers and how they understood the news 
items about Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
Having explained the contributions and limitations, this section also presents some 
advice for future research projects in the same or similar topics. First of all, the 
examination of the journalists in this thesis may be an inspiration for other under-
explored research projects, such as an investigation into the reception step. Such 
initiatives, built on the existing production and content research, can help to reach the 
‘multi-step’ results concerning the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the loop 
of production, coverage and readers (see Philo, 2007; Fürsich, 2009). Moreover, if an 
intensive political process similar to 3rd October 2005 happens again in Turkey-EU 
relations, then the new media could also be a domain for analysis. Even though the 
silent period of today is not viable for this kind of study, looking at what people share 
about Turkey’s EU bid in social media when the issue becomes popular again would be 
an asset for the literature. 
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Lastly, as was found in the extramedia level analysis, Turkey is immensely sensitive to 
the foreign coverage about any issue regarding Turkey. On the other hand, as some 
journalists claimed, Turkey is defensive and secretive in its relationship with foreign 
journalists. Therefore, a study of Turkish politicians and a social psychology 
investigation into Turkish audience’s interest in the foreign coverage of their countries, 
which is actually the same for most rising nations, could be useful research projects 
following the outcomes of this thesis. 
 
10.5. Concluding remarks 
Having illustrated the conceptualisation of the media representation of Turkey’s EU 
bid, finally, this section discusses the future of Turkey-EU relations in brief and then 
offers some advice regarding how Turkey can contribute to a better coverage of 
Turkey-EU relations.  
 
Today, mostly due to the influence of Germany and France, the EU authorities have 
avoided revealing a date for the completion of negotiations and the date for Turkey's 
full membership. As Finkel (2009: 121) argues “*n+ow is not the time to risk humiliation 
by being seen to want EU admission, but rather to wait in the wilderness until a new 
generation of more sympathetic European leaders comes to power”. Therefore, it can 
be argued that changes in the political situation in Germany and France could make 
Turkey’s EU membership popular again in the EU’s political and media agendas in 
subsequent years. This may especially be realised if socialist or social democratic 
parties become powerful. François Hollande’s recent victory in the French Presidential 
election and his positive approach to Turkey could be the spark of change. However, it 
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is a fact that the financial crisis in the EU is a massive obstruction to bringing Turkey to 
the EU agenda again. 
 
Even though the issue firstly needs important political events in order to grab 
headlines in the coverage, it would be fruitful to highlight some points concerning 
what Turkey should do for a better coverage for its EU bid in the British media. First of 
all, it was explored in the extramedia level analysis that ‘hard sell’ PR activities could 
not work in the British media. The journalists advised Turkey to develop itself in the 
direction of EU standards in terms of democracy, rule of law, and economy, and 
manage to find solutions for political vicious circles (e.g. the Cyprus issue) which are 
obstacles to better relations with the EU. They think that positive changes in these 
points would have automatic reverberations in the British media. Therefore, Turkish 
officials should observe whether Turkey’s good deeds in the direction of EU 
membership reverberate sufficiently in the media or not. Moreover, as mentioned in 
Chapter 9, some journalists complained about the inadequate information channels 
and the difficulty of reaching Turkish authorities. In J9’s (BBC News) words, bad 
communication costs Turkey because without efficiently employing media as a 
channel, Turkey cannot make a case on some issues even though Ankara is genuinely 
right (e.g. some aspects of the Cyprus issue). Therefore, Turkey must communicate 
better with foreign journalists who work in Turkey and in EU Member States. 
 
All in all, the thesis showed that the British media’s approach to Turkish membership 
was not a simple choice of supporting or opposing. It was discovered that the British 
media’s position in the Turkish issue originated from the awkward relationship 
between the UK and the EU, and accordingly between the British media and the EU. 
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Therefore, even though the representation in the content and the news making behind 
that appear to be supporting Turkey’s EU bid in general, one can argue that this is not 
because Turkey is a bona fide European country for the British media. For this reason, 
it can be claimed that the British media’s support for Turkish membership is not 
genuine but strategic and pragmatic. Consequently, bearing in mind all the discussions 
in the thesis, the British media tells us that Turkey is different but not an enemy. 
Turkey is an Other but a ‘positive’ one. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I: Quantitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme 
Instructions: 
- Please write the answers (value number) next to the question mark of each 
question. 
- If you cannot find the answer, you should code ‘N.A.’ 
 
1   Date of issue?  
 
2   The name of news organisation?  
(1) BBC NEWS ONLINE 
(2) THE DAILY MAIL 
(3) FINANCIAL TIMES 
(4) THE GUARDIAN 
(5) THE DAILY MIRROR 
(6) THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 
 
3   Period of the sample? 
(1) HELSINKI SUMMIT (02/12/1999 - 20/12/1999) 
(2) TURKISH PARLIAMENT (26/07/2002 - 12/08/2002) 
(3) COPENHAGEN SUMMIT (04/12/2002 - 21/12/2002) 
(4) BRUSSELS SUMMIT (08/12/2004 - 25/12/2004) 
(5) NEGOTIATIONS (24/09/2005 - 11/10/2005) 
(6) PORT PROBLEM (21/11/2006 - 07/12/2006) 
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4   Item number?  
 
5   Length of item? 
(1) 100-300 words 
(2) 301-600 words 
(3) 601 & over words 
  
6   Type of article? 
(1) Report 
(2) Leader 
(3) Commentary 
(4) Review 
(5) Economic Analysis 
 
7   Page number? 
 
8   Name of journalist (byline)? 
 
9   What are the main topics of the news item? (Up to THREE from the beginning)  
 
10   What statements are made about Turkey’s relationship with the EU in the news item 
(Please code the first SIX statements)?  
 
11   Which issues does the news item cover (Please code the first SIX issues)?  
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12   Please identify which country highlights or raises the issue (i.e. puts it on the agenda)?  
(One country may raise more than one issue, but at most three issues should be coded. NO 
more than SIX countries/issues. Please code in sequence in which they appear in the text. 
Please leave it blank if no data were found.) 
 
 
13   Does the news item refer to any differences (i.e. comparison, especially by using the 
word relatively) between Turkey and other EU Member States? If so, what are they (Up to 
THREE differences)? 
 
 
14   Does the news item refer to any similarities between Turkey and other EU Member 
States? If so, what are they (Up to THREE similarities)?  
 
 
15   What are the main reasons put forward in the news item in support for Turkey’s bid 
(Up to SIX reasons)?  
 
16   What are the main reasons put forward in the news item in opposition to Turkey’s bid 
(Up to SIX reasons)?  
 
 
17   Who are the actors (excluding Turkish actors) who support for Turkey’s EU bid? Were 
they only quoted, or were they only mentioned or both? (Up to THREE from the beginning of 
the news report. Please code in order of appearance.) Please fill in the boxes below: 
Actor Quoted  Mentioned 
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18   Who are the actors (excluding Turkish actors) who oppose Turkey’s EU bid? Were they 
only quoted, or were they only mentioned or both? (Up to THREE from the beginning of the 
news report. Please code in order of appearance.) Please fill in the boxes below: 
Actor Quoted  Mentioned 
   
   
   
   
   
 
19   Who are the Turkish actors in the news item? Were they only quoted, or were they only 
mentioned or both? (Up to THREE from the beginning of the news report. Please code in order 
of appearance.) Please fill in the boxes below: 
Actor Quoted  Mentioned 
   
   
   
   
   
 
20   Does the news report contain a statement that indicates whether a particular country is 
in support or against Turkey’s bid (Please code up to THREE countries)? 
 
23   How is Turkey described in the news item? (You can select more than one) 
 
24   Which adjectives, words or phrases are used to describe Turkey (Up to THREE from the 
beginning of the news item)? 
 
26   Which conditions for Turkey’s entry into the EU appear in the news item (Please code up 
to THREE in order of appearance)?  
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Appendix II: Qualitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme 
News item:  
News Organisation:  
Date:  
Author:  
QUESTIONS ANALYSIS 
 
1- How are Turkey, its actors, 
and the events that Turkey is 
involved represented in terms 
of being the Self or the Other 
 
 
  
 
2- What kinds of labels are 
attached to Turkey and Turkish 
actors? 
 
 
 
3- Which arguments are 
employed in order to justify 
positive or negative 
attributions about Turkey’s EU 
membership?  
 
 
 
 
4- What is the author’s position 
in the context? 
 
 
5- How does the overall 
content approach to Turkey-EU 
relations? 
 
 
 
6- Does the news item include 
any interesting point which was 
not mentioned in other 
questions of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis? 
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Appendix III: Interview Questionnaire 
1- What can be the most important influences on the journalists who have published news 
reports about Turkish membership in the British media in terms of their approach to Turkey?  
2- There are at least 50 different journalists in the British mainstream newspapers who have 
written at least one news item about Turkey’s EU bid in the last decade. Do you know how 
they were chosen among all the journalists? Or why were you chosen? 
3- Personally, what do you associate Turkey with? Metaphors, images, socio-historical 
understanding? 
4-What do you think about Turkish membership of the EU? 
5- What can Turkey do in order to increase the number of the news items which supports 
Turkey’s EU membership on the British media? 
6- Have you ever attended any meeting or presentation organised by Turkish officials 
regarding Turkey’s EU bid?  
7- Do you personally think that the British public’s approach to Turkish membership is largely 
influenced by the British media? Or do you think that British people are not aware of Turkish 
membership? 
8- Do British papers have a specific view or policy about Turkish membership? 
9- Did the editorial process change the news item you had written about Turkish membership? 
Do we read the writers’ perspective or the media organisation’s perspective? 
10- There are many reports which are positive to Turkish membership but they still represent 
many drawbacks of Turkish membership. How do you account for this?  
11- The UK has a different relationship with the EU if we compare it with other EU Member 
States. Do you think that this can have an impact on the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in 
the British media? 
12- Is there any correlation between the British media and the British political parties in terms 
of their approach to Turkish membership? And are the media following political parties’ policy 
or driving it?  
13- What can be the advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership for the UK? 
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14- There is a remarkable amount of attribution to ‘the clash of civilisations’ while Turkey’s 
membership is discussed in news reports. Can you see any connection between the clash of 
civilisations thesis and Turkish membership? 
15- The Turkish membership topic is not as popular as in the past couple of years in both the 
UK’s and the EU’s media agenda. How can Turkish membership be popular again like in 2004 
and 2005? Is it just depended on the politicians? 
16- Is there a change in the news topics that Turkey is associated with? 
17- Why the British media always prefer to say the Muslim nation instead of Turkish public in 
the news coverage? 
 
Appendix IV: List of Interviewees 
Interviewee Date and place of the interview 
J1 (The Guardian) 17-05-11, London 
J2 (The FT) 14-01-11, London 
J3 (The Telegraph) 29-03-11, Telephone 
J4 (The Telegraph) 24-01-11, Istanbul 
J5 (The Guardian) 18-01-11, Telephone 
J6 (BBC News) 14-01-11, Telephone 
J7 (The Guardian) 03-05-11, Telephone 
J8 (The Telegraph) 14-12-10, London 
J9 (BBC News) 30-11-10, London 
J10 (The Guardian) 14-12-10, London 
J11 (The Guardian) 11-01-11, Telephone 
J12 (The Guardian) 21-01-11, Istanbul 
J13 (The Guardian) 02-12-10, London 
J14 (The Mirror) 09-01-11, Telephone 
J15 (BBC News) 21-03-11, London 
J16 (BBC News) 14-12-10, London 
J17 (The FT) 17-01-11, London 
J18 (The FT) 12-01-11, London 
J19 (The Guardian) 21-07-11, Telephone 
J20 (The Guardian) 07-01-11, London 
J21 (The Telegraph) 29-12-10, London 
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